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1 “The Origin of Two Maritime City-States” 
 The world is an ever changing place that has witnessed the rise and fall of a multitude of 
vast empires, the formation and break-up of alliances, and the invention of institutions and 
specializations that people have endeavored to create. Most of history focuses on the bigger 
picture, the so called “Big Players” or superpowers that are thought to control and be the main 
avenue for change. Past historians have concentrated on national histories, which in turn have 
dominated the narrative. However, this will never add up to be a complete history as small 
nations or cities have proven to play pivotal roles in historical events. These important moments 
in history are where the City-State, or ancient Polis, come into play as serious political, military, 
and commercial actors. The question is, not that of national histories, but instead a manner of 
scale and understanding the fact that national boundaries were not distinct and were fairly 
permeable which helps explain the massive cultural contacts that occur within this region of the 
world. This thesis will examine medieval and early modern city-states in the Mediterranean as 
illustrative of political, commercial and military responses to threats and opportunities in the pre-
modern period instead of focusing on larger states and empires that seemingly dominate the 
Mediterranean world. When discussing state powers such as Venice, it is not enough to simply 
enough to acknowledge how they conduct wars, but the manner in which city-states are able to 
successfully negotiate with larger states and its ability to establish multi-layered relationships. 
This relationship creates an air of complexity that could see a city like Venice, go to war with the 
Ottoman Empire for example, and yet still conduct regular trade and commercial expeditions 
with them in Istanbul, so as not to allow political disturbances to ruin the overall trade economy. 
In order for a city-state to survive, that city must have shrew negotiation skills, skills that can 
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create creative outcomes such as this, when the alternative, all-out war, is extremely risky and 
could end in the military domination of the capital city.  
In order to accomplish this goal, this thesis will attempt to identify and understand the 
institutions in which city-states, such as Venice and Genoa-- seemingly fragile and weak-- 
employ to counter significant internal and external threats in the form of rivalries with other city-
states, the environment in relation to disease and commercial risk within the Mediterranean Sea, 
and finally, larger states or empires whose presence simply and utterly dwarf that of the 
respective city-state, both politically and militarily. The dynamics and institutions that comprise 
states are imperative in understanding how a specific state will act in a situation that they deem 
to be threatening.  According to Hui, who wrote War and State Formation in Ancient China and 
Early Modern Europe, states whose rulers “wish to maintain survival, recover losses, or establish 
hegemony would have to strive to increase their military and economic capabilities” by not only 
creating “larger armies, but also [establishing] a range of administrative, fiscal, and policing 
organizations.”1 In order to view this process and understand the mechanisms used and employed 
by city-states, this thesis will focus mainly on Venice as our chief example and will, on occasion, 
branch out to other city-states in the region for comparative purposes. The time period that this 
paper will deal with will roughly cover between 1100 AD and 1600 AD. In addition to this, it is 
important also to take into consideration the mechanisms that enabled city-states to survive, 
which this paper will accomplish by examining not only the city-states that endured and 
prospered, but also those that failed establish themselves and which were ultimately conquered 
by a neighboring forces or states.  
                                                          
1
 Hui, Victoria Tin-bor, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. pg 38-39 
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 This thesis will also stand as a comparative study of two main city-states, Venice and 
Genoa. In addition to this, other city-states will be discussed in varying lengths in order to 
achieve a broader and more accurate understanding of their responses and reactions to threats. 
This will in part occur naturally with the application of the “survivor bias theory,” which takes 
into account (for the purposes of this thesis) those city-states that survived in addition to those 
that failed to establish themselves and lost power. Most historians, according to John Gaddis, 
“trace process from a knowledge of outcomes” whereas political scientists use “process tracking” 
“which suggests a rediscovery of narrative, and the technique does employ narratives in 
constructing comparative case studies.”2  One primary goal of this thesis is to accomplish both 
tasks that historians and political scientists employ in an attempt to discover other key significant 
players within the Mediterranean region while at the same time analyzing their institutions which 
have allowed these states to react and respond to events. One of the goals of this examination is 
to identify those traits which help city-states and potentially more importantly, those 
characteristics that caused it fail. This comparative study will help determine the nature of city-
states in the terms of what sorts of areas these entities tend to form in and the conditions that 
contextualize their rise to power. In addition, this will help identify each city-states distinct 
culture as well as how their foundings have influenced the institutions and mechanisms that their 
citizenry create.  
 One might ask: Why is it important to study city-states? Or perhaps what possible benefit 
can one receive from studying a city-state that they can’t receive from studying a larger country 
in the same context? In short, it’s important to study city-states as they have either been key 
players or influential partners in many historical events that allowed for larger countries or 
                                                          
2
 Gaddis, John. Landscapes of History: How Historians Map The Past, Oxford University Press, 2002. Pg 
65 
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alliances to be able to accomplish their feats  in addition to that of carrying out the interests of 
the city-state itself. Part of a city-states power comes from its geographical location and their 
ability to assist themselves as well as other states. According to Giovanni Botero, a 
contemporary historian who has done considerable research on cities regarding their institutions 
and functionality, considers “a site convenient if it is so situated that many peoples need it for 
trade, either exporting the goods of which they have a surplus, or importing those that they 
lack.”3 This is the case because most contemporary historians of the time focused on the 
significance of cities, despite the ever growing power of the nation-state monarchies. Both 
Genoa and Venice are great cities “because they both mediate between extremes; they are not 
just transit-points, but warehouses and stores…it is not enough; therefore, for the site to be 
necessary, in order to render a city great; besides that, it must be useful to the neighboring 
peoples as well.”4 Furthermore, and additional example of this can be seen during the crusades 
where Europe sent vast armies to conquer land in Palestine. City-states in Italy became key to 
this operation as a means for troops to travel across the Mediterranean as city-states such as 
Venice, which had vast fleets, was able to allocate the city’s resources in order for them to be 
able to pump out ships at a rate no country in Europe had the ability to even come close to. Due 
to this, one could argue that Italian city-states dominated the Mediterranean during this time. The 
crusades were an essential component to the rise of Italian city-states and will be discussed in 
depth later on in this paper. 
An ancient example could be viewed when ancient Greek Polis united under the Delian 
League and the leadership of Athens in order to combat the Persian Empire that was attempting 
                                                          
3
  Botero, Giovanni and Symcox, Geoffrey. On The Causes of the Greatness and Magnificence of Cities, 
1588. University of Toronto Press, 2012. Pg. 17 
4
 Botero, Giovanni and Symcox, Geoffrey. On The Causes of the Greatness and Magnificence of Cities, 
1588. University of Toronto Press, 2012. Pg. 18 
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to invade and conquer Greece. These accomplishments would be impressive for that of a country 
to manage, and seems nearly impossible for a single city to accomplish. This is discussed heavily 
in Faruk Tabak’s Waning of the Mediterranean, in which he describes “a pulsating unit that, 
despite some regional variation caused by the arrival of new crops or proximity/distance to other 
markets (such as the Atlantic), responded with great uniformity to the dominant rhythms of 
‘temporalities’ and socioeconomic process” along with incorporating “a half centur[ies]” worth 
in “research on agriculture, manufacturing, money, and land use, especially from Turkish-
language sources.”5 This brings us to Tabak’s larger concept of a Geohistorical approach that 
rejects the classic “Clash of Civilizations” theory which splits the Mediterranean into the East 
and West, Christians and Muslims. One possible explanation for these instances of immense 
achievement within city-states could be that they have an innate ability to concentrate their 
power on a single goal or task that larger countries lack the efficiency and capacity to 
accomplish. To reiterate a previous example, many coastal Italian city-states focused mostly on 
navies and building large fleets chiefly for commercial gains and power. During the times of the 
crusades, Genoa has able to refocus all of her efforts into making ships in order to carry troops 
and supplies over to the Levant, which it did so by allowing its government to temporarily 
assume control in order to organize the building project. It was said that “the citizens of Genoa 
decided that the time had come to bury their differences and to unite in a compagna under the 
direction of six consuls; the aim of the compagna was primarily to build and arm ships for the 
crusade” between the years 1083 through 1096.6 This shows the ability of a city-state to fully 
take control of their economy in order to accomplish a single great task that other larger 
                                                          
55
 Salzmann, Ariel. An Introduction To The Research of Faruk Tabak, Sociologist, Int. J. Middle Eastern 
Study. Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pg. 2 
6
 Abulafia, David. The Great Sea: A Human History of The Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, 
USA, 2011. Pg. 290 
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countries would have difficulty organizing. Another side effect of this specific example is that 
citizens of city-states like Genoa or Venice would become expert sailors that states and other 
cities would seek out in order to conduct business.  
 
i. 
City-State as Polity 
 Before going into the immediate historical context that will surround this thesis, it 
is important to actually understand what a city-state is in comparison to that of a nation or 
empire. Mogens Herman Hansen has done a tremendous amount of research on identifying what 
a city-state’s (Polis) characteristics are that distinctly separate them from actual states. In A 
Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, The shotgun method: the demography of the 
ancient Greek city-state culture, and An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis, Mogens 
explores the wide depth and breadth of characteristics and traits that most city-states tend to 
possess.7  
 To begin with let’s start out my explaining the differences between states and city-states 
according to Hansen. He acknowledges that a city state must not only have a “nucleated centre” 
but must also have these five characteristics that he refers to as stadtgemeinde.8 Stadtgemeinde is 
the German word for borough, township or urban center which Hansen likes to use in his 
research. These five characteristics that city-states must possess to be classified as a city-state are 
(1) a defense circuit, (2) a market, (3) laws and law courts, (4) political decision-making body, 
                                                          
7
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 12 
8
 Hansen, ed., City-State Cultures, 12. 
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and (5) at least partial autonomy.”9 These characteristics are very broad and one might find it 
more helpful to determine those characteristics of a state which Hansen seems to have a more 
specialized criteria for. A “territorial state,” as Hansen refers to these entities, although dislikes 
the term, is:  
“Is characterized by specialized and hierarchically organized decision-making institutions and 
administrative organs which have monopolized the legitimate use of physical force. Thus a state 
is a centralized legitimate government in procession of the sole right to enforce a given legal 
order within a territory over a population.”10  
 
Some historians feel as if this definition is insufficient and lacking a criteria that establishes a 
public power over both ruler and ruled.11 However, this may not be appropriate to apply during 
this time as public powers over both ruler and ruled appear to have a more modern day 
distinction over the responsibilities of the state over the individual or general public where 
people have some power to elect officials and check the government’s role. Although some city-
states and states may have had institutions such as this, it might be unfair and counter-productive 
to require the application of this criteria over a territorial state.  
 Many historians refer to states as “territorial states;” however, this causes a significant 
problem as far as classifications go. Hansen would argue that a city-state is a “territorial state just 
as much as any macro-state with multiple urban centers” and that “It has a small territory (mostly 
the immediate hinterland) but nevertheless a territory with, usually, well-defined borders.”12 
Focusing on definitions and characteristics such as size and territory are unhelpful. It is better to 
                                                          
9
 Hansen, ed., City-State Cultures, 12. 
10
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 13 
11
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 13 
12
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 16 
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acknowledge and identify the concentration of political organization “surrounded by either a city 
or many urban centers.”13 City-states vary in size and territory over the course of their history. A 
city-state can even aspire to and become an “empire” but is still considered a city-state, not 
because of its territory, but due to the inability of the political institutions to fully assimilate the 
cultural and social aspects of a neighboring territory and incorporate it into its own. When city-
states do expand and increase in size and territory, the usual result is that of a capital region that 
has few or many “dependent” regions, which is why some city-states are awarded the name of 
empire.  
 This next section will examine the regions and dynamics that tend to allow city-states to 
take root. This will tie into how city-states tend to form, the culture they develop, and the 
relations these geo-political entities have with their neighbors. A city-state usually forms within a 
region where the people that inhabit it all share a common language and cultural history. 
However, if one were to look at this region in a broader context, Hansen notes that for centuries, 
this area will deal with long periods of political divides which dissolve into smaller communities 
that share a common idea.14 These smaller communities are what create city-states. These 
communities tend to form out of a need for protection, but can occur for a variety of different 
reasons. Hansen explains a few of these occurrences and acknowledges that city-states most 
commonly form from a period of decline where a larger macro-state that disintegrate into a 
number of independent cities.15 However, city-states can also form from colonization, a period of 
demographic and economic upsurge that takes place at the same time as this city’s state 
                                                          
13
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 16 
14
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 16 
15
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 17 
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formation and urbanization occur.16 In addition, this period of colonization can either occur in a 
location where no state has existed prior, or where a state once existed but has lost significant 
political and military sway over the region, thus allowing smaller groups within a macro-state to 
break away and form small independent, or semi-autonomous states.  
 Although the formation of city-states can vary, one aspect, however, tends to be a 
constant throughout history and geographical region. Most areas that have one city-state tend to 
have many more either already in the region, or will see many additional ones founded.17 This is 
the case for two reasons. First being that once a city-state has been formed, this area is then 
established as a decent location for smaller independent or semi-autonomous states to form. 
Again, this can either be from a break-up of an empire or macro-state, or could occur from 
colonization of a newly discovered region. The second reason for multiple city-states to form is 
that this occurrence will dictate how long these cities will survive. This is the case because city-
states are dependent on one another for protection, finances, and quite often food from trade, 
whether or not these city-states understand this fact or not. One might grow confused and ask, 
“Why did city-states fight amongst themselves if they are dependent on one another for 
survival?” An easy answer to this question could be that the leaders of city-states were short 
sighted in their mindset when thinking about how to deal with major threats such as empires. 
However this is not to say that city-states are incapable of working together; in fact, this is 
essential to their survival within their geopolitical regions.  
                                                          
16
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 17 
17
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 16-17.  
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Most alliances made between city-states were temporary at best. Within clusters of city-
states, these cities communicate over land, sea, or a mixture of the two.18 If a region is not 
efficient or convenient for city-states to communicate within a larger cluster, then these city-
states will become isolated and extremely vulnerable to foreign influences or invasions as a lack 
of efficient relations between these political entities means that these states will most likely be 
weak economically and militarily due to being forced to rely on themselves entirely or close to it. 
However, some regions that have split into clusters of city-states have done so on multiple 
occasions.19 This means that just because a region has now become occupied by a macro-state, 
does not mean that this area cannot disintegrate into city-state clusters again. Later on in this 
chapter, there will be an example of a city-state that suffered from a poor geopolitical region and 
were then conquered due to lack of efficient resistance to foreign influence.  
 Despite certain common characteristics between city-states, most vary considerably in 
relation to size, both geographically and demographically. This is partly the case, as Hansen 
points out, because no city-state is powerful enough to permanently conquer a region and 
transform it into a cohesive political unit in line with the “capital” city.20 This is an additional 
characteristic that city-states tend to share and can therefore be helpful in identifying the 
difference between a city-state and a macro-state. An attempt to create a larger political unit that 
encompasses multiple major cities tend to fail when dealing with these. City-states, in this case, 
tend to get “swallowed up” by larger neighboring states or end up in a breakdown of the alliance 
as these agreements favor the stronger city-states, leaving the weaker ones to contend with more 
                                                          
18
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 16 
19
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 17 
20
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 16 
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problems.21 This becomes apparent during the 16th century in Europe as city-states in Italy face 
grave threats from Empires and larger states as more and more cities in the North and South of 
Italy become subservient to these greater authorities.  
 Depending on the manner in which a city-state was founded, will have significant bearing 
on the institutions and culture the political entity adopts. Hansen has divided this into three 
separate political cultures: hegemonic, independent, and dependent.22 Depending on which 
political culture each city-state has will determine how much political freedom that city will 
bestow upon its citizenry. That being said, city-states all vary according to how strict their laws 
are and their distinctions between what they consider to be a citizen and an “outsider.”23 
 Now that some time has been spent on discussing how city-states are formed and varying 
characteristics that some might employ, this next section will cover some common 
characteristics that Hansen has acknowledged most if not all obtain. City-states have been in 
existence since about 5000 B.C. and were first found in Mesopotamia, and then began to spread 
throughout India, China, Egypt, and the Americas.24 With each passing military conquest, these 
cities tend to fluctuate, either increasing or decreasing in size and population. As far as size and 
territory are concerned, this will vary from region to region, and city to city. Typically, however, 
most city states start quite small in regards to population and land are concerned and then begin 
to grow as they survive through history. Hansen has struggled with setting exact parameters for a 
city-state in comparison to a macro-state as they can be considered both large and small. 
                                                          
21
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 17 
22
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 17 
23
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 17 
24
 Kotkin, John, The City. Random House Publishing Group New York. 2005. Pg 4 
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However, the typical city-state will have a main city, with a developed political urban center 
which is surrounded by territory in the immediate vicinity that the city can control.25 Many city-
states do expand territorially and can encompass additional regions with small towns that can be 
assimilated into the capital region; however, this can be quite limited as city-states tend to 
borders of other city-states and thus create conflicts over control of the land. As far as population 
is concerned, as previously stated city-states tend to be smaller usually in the 4 to 5 digit range, 
although some do grow and incorporate over 100,000 residents within a single city, even though 
not all of these people will be considered citizens.26 A city-state has a distinctive political and 
ethnic identity that can be shared across a region with other city-states as well as tend to refer to 
their respective ethnicity according to the name of their city.27 However, this does not serve as a 
unifying force for these city-states as most tend to be centered on an idea that puts their city-state 
first and foremost ahead of other cultures, which includes other city-states. A city-state’s 
political identity can differ from this ethnic identity as it is formed and based off the 
urban/political center decided upon by the city’s citizens. A city-states urban center will reveal 
much about the identity and values of the citizens which live within the city and can help explain 
their decisions when dealing threats or other governing duties. Just because city-states are in the 
same region, does not necessarily mean they share a similar ethnic or political identity. Citizens 
within a city-state tend to change their form of government as the times and situation of their city 
demands. However, a city-states ethnic identity is not something that can so easily be changed, if 
at all. People can migrate from place to place; however, the ethnic identity of a city-state is 
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 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 17-18 
26
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 17-18 
27
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 17-18 
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difficult to drastically change due to very stringent citizenship laws that many Italian 
Renaissance city-states obtained at the time. This is not by any means a new or relatively new 
phenomenon of dealing with citizenship and ethnic identity.   
 A city-state differs greatly from a macro-state in respect to the size and location of the 
majority of the population. In a city state, the population of urban centers tend to be far higher in 
number than that of populations existing in macro-state city-centers.28 The sheer size of 
population could be an explanation as to how an individual city can be so efficient and capable 
of preforming difficult tasks. Most people in city-states tend to live either in the urban center, or 
along the countryside in small villages. Hansen remarks that all city-states have a single urban 
center which serves as a central place for the community’s economic, religious, military, and 
political power or authority.29 A city-states government is centered and run from the urban center 
and tend to remain within that city, even if they conquer other territories or cities. Hansen 
stressed that multi-centered governmental city-states are extremely rare.30 This urban center will 
serve as the sole place of political authority, even if a city-state manages to conquer additional 
regions or cities. In order to be considered a city-state by any standard, there must be at least “a 
self-governing polity” within the urban center, although this system does not have to be fully 
independent.31 These polities usually have some form of a legislature, administration, and 
judicial unit. These institutions will possess the legal authority over internal matters of the 
“state,” or at least a government with the ability to enforce laws. In order to be thought of as a 
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 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 18 
29
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 18 
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 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 18 
31
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 18 
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city-state, the urban center must have some form of defensive capability. This can be 
demonstrated by possessing an army and having a fortified location.32 Each city-state also must 
have an efficient and subsistence economy.33 What this means is that each city must have some 
form of farming in which to feed its citizens, along with specialization of functions within 
society, such as merchants, along with division of labor, thus ensuring a cites capability to 
function. The last main characteristic of city-states is that they are not self-sufficient.34 City-
states usually are characterized by its lack of economic self-sufficiency usually due to the small 
area in which the urban center is located. This will also lead a city-state to interact with its 
neighbors and will enter into large amounts of trade and commerce in order to make up for this 
self-sufficiency problem.  
 Relations between city-states vary but it is important for these cities to establish and 
maintain diplomatic relations as discussed earlier. However, city-states will inevitably go to war 
with each other. Hansen describes this phenomenon as “endemic,” but acknowledges that despite 
ongoing military conflicts, city-states will still attempt to continue and maintain economic, 
religious, and cultural interactions as this is vital to their overall survival.35 Although wars may 
occur quite frequently, city-states do tend to seek peaceful relations with city-state neighbors, or 
least those neighbors who are not direct rivals. During times of peace, city-states will establish 
diplomatic relations with one-another by entering into an alliance, formation of a league (often 
hegemonic with one dominant city-state leading the league), trade agreement, or just maintaining 
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standard diplomatic relations in order to attempt some moments of peace.36 After establishing 
diplomatic relations, city-states can begin to expand, not necessarily territorially, but culturally 
and economically through commerce. This expansion, either through commerce or military is the 
ultimate goal of the city-state as they are attempting to increase the reach and power of not only 
the city-state, but the notable families that run them. This is especially prevalent within the 
Mediterranean context.  A city-state will cease to exist if their urban/political center is destroyed 
or by conquest of a stronger state.37  
Cities were initially created in order to maintain security during invasion.38 People feared 
attack and dangers in countryside from nomadic raiders so this was an understandable alternative 
as city walls provide protection from invaders and raiders. Once security was under control, 
these cities began to expand their power and influence. In the end, “the development of imperial 
cities with control over large areas allowed for rapid growth of trade in all areas of early urban 
growth, from China to Egypt, Mesopotamia, and eventually the Americas.39 This development 
will later provide the vary foundation in which Italian city-states follow in order to survive in the 
Mediterranean Sea. With this, came population increase, commercial advancement as trade 
continued to expand throughout Italy, and transformed what is today modern Italy into a vibrant 
region teeming with life and potential.40  This is the location that strong city-states will form as 
the region had a significant economic and political recovery period despite the collapse of the 
Roman Empire and waning of the Byzantine Empire.  
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ii. 
City-States in the Mediterranean Sea 
This in the end provides a broad, but basic description of what we can refer to as a city-
state throughout the rest of this thesis, which is how this paper will create a broader connection 
to city-states in general, even though this thesis will focus only on a handful of city-states in the 
Mediterranean. However, before examining these specific city-states, one must first establish an 
historical context in order to explain and critique a city-state’s development. David Abulafia’s 
The Great Sea and Faruk Tabak’s The Waning of the Mediterranean both offer deeper insight 
and context into the events that transpired within the Mediterranean for a vast majority of its 
contact with people starting from as early as 22000 B.C. leading up to modern day times. David 
Abulafia offer his own history separating his timeline into several sections in which to analyze 
and contextualize events. Faruk Tabak presents a history of the Mediterranean, but one that is 
propelled through finance, and economic prosperity. In other words, his books focuses on how 
economic practices shaped both political and military ventures along with their outcomes. 
Another aspect of importance that Tabak offers is some insight on how the plague decimated 
certain areas and the effects that had on society. At an economical level, Tabak argues that due to 
the Black Death, there was less need for food due to fewer people being left alive at that time.41 
This could provide both positive benefits in form of other crops for trade, but could also prove 
negative as a cut in food production could negatively affect ones trade output if that city or state 
is trading in food stuffs.  
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 By 600 AD, the Mediterranean had become a fractured region with little to no unity 
remaining.  Before the collapse of the Roman Empire, Rome had divided herself into two 
Empires, a West and an East. The Eastern Empire “far surpassed the second, both in superiority 
of civilization and in much higher level of economic development.”42 This in part is due to the 
lack of significant and major cities left within the Western Roman Empire before its collapse. 
Therefore, once Rome fell, the region will undoubtedly be in an economic state of desolation. 
However, the Mediterranean still maintained an internal trade network. One could see this from 
the Byzantine Empire as they still had a thriving economy at this time that spanned, arguably, the 
length of the Mediterranean at some points. The Byzantine Empire at this time still had 
considerable power and reach, but was significantly diminished from its former glory.43 In the 
early 600’s, a new threat began to rise in the east, which threatened Byzantine holdings in North 
Africa, Egypt in particular. This came to be due to the unification of Muslim tribes under the 
banner of Islam, which saw many caliphs unite.44 This unification gave some tribes power 
enough to seize control of Jerusalem, parts of Syria, and Egypt, which caused the Byzantines a 
chief grain supplier. However this strong resistance to Byzantine authority quickly began to 
deteriorate. These tribes were mostly united under Islam but quickly reverted back to their 
original tribes who began squabbling amongst themselves.45 This further provided chaos in the 
Mediterranean and officially marked the beginning of Arab and Muslim navies in the sea.46 
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Piracy had been mostly controlled in the Mediterranean until the introduction of these navies 
which further weakened the strained trade networks of a weakened Byzantine Empire who no 
longer could protect its neighbors from this threat.  
The Mediterranean Sea turned into a battleground between Christian fleets under 
Frankish and Byzantine banners against Muslim fleets. However, Frankish and Byzantine 
interests quickly came to a head over land possessions in Europe.47 Charlemagne, the leader of 
the Franks, had gained a considerable amount of power which threatened Byzantine interests 
ensuring that the Muslims fleets saw no strong resistance. However, Charlemagne did make 
some effort and sought to establish or improve settlements along the coast of his empire or near 
his empire that could build ships. One of these settlements included Genoa. The site where 
Genoa is located had been in use since the 5th or 6th century B.C. but saw varied amounts of 
prosperity. However, Genoa became an important location again as the want for more ships 
became a need for many states and empires in the Mediterranean. In 827, the Franks responded 
to Muslim pirates with very ambitious naval assaults all along the North Coast of Africa.48 
Although the Franks won almost every battle during this campaign, Charlemagne’s successor, 
Louis the Pious knew it would be impossible to keep any of the newly acquired cities and had to 
abandon them. In addition, due to internal rivalries and border disputes with the Byzantines, 
Louis’s attention had been taken away from pirates altogether after these events. These border 
disputes were due to conflicts in the Adriatic, which held many important trade routes along the 
sea.  Cassiodorus wrote that “the early inhabitants of these marshlands lived ‘like water birds, 
now on sea, now on land’ and their wealth consisted only of fish and salt, though he had to admit 
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that salt was in no sense more precious than gold: everyone needs salt but there must be people 
who feel no need for gold.’”49 When war breaks out in this area between these two powers, the 
cities that inhabit the region are forced to pick sides. Some end up swallowed by these Empires 
but some, like the people in the lagoon, were able to survive, gaining wealth from this conflict 
but remaining somewhat independent. One city-state had its roots established within this conflict 
as the neighboring villages sought collective defense within the Lagoons.50 This land was 
formally controlled by the Byzantines but left them mostly independent in return for a tribute and 
collective defense against Slav barbarian invasions and pirates. Once these villages and towns 
gathered, they established a settlement on the water, and named it Venice around the year 812. 
These people were expert watermen with ties to significant land holdings in which to grow 
food.51 The lagoon also provided protection for its inhabitants. This concept of the benefits 
provided by the lagoon is further supported by Denis Crouze-Pavan, writer of Venice 
Triumphant, who states that “the lagoons were already more than a mere shelter” and became 
“dotted with edifices and crosses” of a thickly populated city showing an area that has become 
heavily populated due to its variety of benefits.52 Many merchant families found significant trade 
in this location and accumulated wealth from salt, fish, and timber in addition to luxury items 
from East to West trade like silks, jewels, gold artifacts, saints, and relics.53 Abulafia asserted 
that “Now that Marseilles was in decline, Venice had become the main port through which 
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contact with the Eastern Mediterranean was maintained—commercial, diplomatic, 
ecclesiastical.”54 In other words, within a relatively short period of time, Venice became a very 
important location within the Mediterranean. This turned into a center for pilgrim traffic and 
became a patriarchal seat of Christianity due to that traffic. The prominent families of Venice, 
with their new found power and wealth established the Doge, part of the government that has the 
most power within the Venetian government, and kept a tight hold on it.55  
Despite the Mediterranean suffering from both Muslim and Christen fleets battling it out, 
a third religious group found opportunity. The Genizah Jewish traders flourished during this time 
monopolizing trade wherever they could locate it.56 They were especially well known for trade in 
silks, and traders like them became known for their ships as one of the only means of crossing 
the Mediterranean at the time. This helped to change the face of the Mediterranean Sea thereby 
once again establishing Alexandria as a powerhouse within the Fatimid Empire and helping 
Southern Italian city-states prosper. Some city-states like Amalfi were located here and thrived 
from this new trade. At the same time, German influence under Otto I began to fade which saw 
the rise of Pisa and Genoa as independent authorities.57 This marked the time where city-states, 
in the words of Faruk Tabak, “had dominion over the inner sea.”58 
This thesis will primarily cover the institutions and events that transpired for Genoa and 
Venice; however, it is important first to look at a variety of different cultures, states, and 
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civilizations that also occupy the same space as these two city-states. In the next chapter, the 
institutions of Venice and Genoa will be discussed in great detail, although again, it is vital to 
have a basic understanding of many of the events that caused cities like Venice to choose to 
create and establish a particular institution.  
Genoa is located in the Ligurian Alps, which provides protection for Genoa from land 
based attacks. However, these mountains also cut Genoa off from any decent land with which to 
grow food. However, despite lacking a plethora of land, Genoa still managed to export wine, 
chestnuts, olive oil, and herbs which connected Genoa to a rather ambitious trade network.59 
Genoa was not a center for industry, except for the fact that ship-building was very active here, 
especially during the time of the crusades.  
Pisa, in comparison, is located aside the river Arno, many miles from the sea due to the 
fact that the land around where the river connected to the sea was very marshy and prevented 
Pisans from establishing a sufficient port. Pisa’s assets including excellent land, which allowed 
them to trade in grains, livestock, leather, wool, meat, and dairy products.60 These trade networks 
allowed these city-states to improve their financial institutions which saw the rise of significant 
merchant and banking class. In addition, Tabak notes that fanning the flames of rivalry between 
city-states and notable families allowed merchants to capitalize on the financial and commercial 
opportunities which eventually, a few hundred years later, will result in fierce fighting 
cumulating in the Italian hundred years war which ended with the Peace of Lodi in 1454.61 
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In 1060, Genoese and Pisan fleets began concentrating on eliminating Muslim pirate 
raiders by attacking Sardinia and Sicily.62 This resulted in both city-states earning the title as 
defenders of Christianity along with providing a substantial increase in security for this part of 
the Mediterranean. At this same time, these city-states began establishing the first communes 
seen in Italy along with creating a trade network focused around Genoa, Pisa, and Venice. These 
were established and able to be created due to the fact that impressive developments in business 
and record-keeping had been achieved along with their ideal position for trade exponentially 
increased the power of these city-states wealth, which allowed them to expand their traditional 
trade territory.63 A few decades earlier in 992, Venice saw a considerable gain in power thanks to 
their actions in the aid and service of the Byzantine Empire where Venice received a grant of 
trading rights for which to boost its economy.64 The Byzantine Empire acts as a sort of Patron 
State that helps and nurtures Venice during its beginnings. Pisa and Genoa both had to rely on 
themselves when dealing with threats at this time but Venice had the Byzantine Empire which 
was sort of allied with Venice. Normally this could be extremely dangerous for a city-state; 
however, the Byzantines chose to allow Venice to remain as it was as this provided the 
Byzantine Empire with more substantial benefits.  
In the later 1060’s, Robert Guiscard and Roger de Hauteville, both Norman knights, 
attacked and conquered much of Southern Italy, which at that time had a substantial cluster of 
city-states that had appeared to be flourishing economically from trade. 65 This occurred in this 
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region because the city-states that inhabited the lands in Southern Italy suffered from 
geographical bad luck. The terrain was very mountainous and made traveling from city to city 
difficult which hampered any diplomatic progress of unity amongst these city-states. Therefore 
when the Normans arrived to invade Southern Italy, instead of seeing a united South, they 
witnessed multiple individual city-states who would not lift a finger to help one another.  
The Normans conquered land at the expense of the Byzantine Empire who was also, at 
this time, facing a breakdown in cooperation between the Pope and the Greek Orthodox Church 
thus weakening the Byzantine position within the Mediterranean Sea. The Byzantines, who were 
currently busy with factional fighting and attacks by the Slavs to the north, turned to Venice to 
solve this Norman problem in the form of ships and fleets to help stop the Norman advance. 
Venice provided naval assistance in 1082 against Guiscard’s fleet off the coast of Dyrrhacion 
which allowed the Byzantines to retake the city.66 The Byzantine Empire was very happy and 
grateful for the assistance and showered Venice in gifts. Emperor Alexis sent a golden bull to 
Venice while emphasizing that they were his “duli” or subjects(even though they were 
independent), which the Venetians took pride in their status as imperial subjects as they saw 
themselves as the inheritors of the Roman Empire who were helping the sister empire to Rome.67 
These girts sent with the Golden Bull included a right to trade anywhere in the Byzantine Empire 
except the Black sea and Cyprus without any taxation and granted to Venice bits and pieces of 
land along the Golden Horn.68 The consequences of this was that Venice was now able to 
establish a trade network throughout the Byzantine Empire, which would still exist after that 
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Empire is gone. In addition, this golden bull helped establish a gold standard which city-states 
looked to when establishing treaties for the future.  
In 1095, Pope Urban II “set in motion a movement that would transform the political, 
religious, and economic map of the Mediterranean and Europe.”69 This movement is referred to 
as the Crusades, and ensued due to Byzantine appeals oppression of Christians in the East, the 
defeat of Christian armies by Turks, and that fact that Jerusalem had been lost to “infidel” hands. 
The crusades saw the movement of massive armies traveling across Europe in an effort to 
reclaim the “holy land.” City-states monopolized on this as they provided the ships that many an 
army will utilize in order to reach this distant lands. The Genoese elite believed that their city 
was destined to play a dominant role in the crusades and therefore did everything they could to 
help these initial crusades.70 In return, they were rewarded with a Church in Antioch, along 30 
houses, a warehouse, and a well which created the nucleolus for a merchant colony in the Middle 
East.71 Genoa became the first of many as Italian city-states to begin setting up colonies such as 
this. They then began to appear all over the Levant in such cities as Jerusalem, Acre, Tyre and 
Jaffa. Acre eventually served as the main port for which Italian merchants did business within 
the Mediterranean.72  Pisa, after helping seize Jaffa in 1099, was allowed to set up a trading base 
there.73 Venice was perhaps the slowest city-state to voluntarily participate in the crusades. 
Historians disagree, but many attribute Venice’s slow advance into the crusades as due to 
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construction projects within the city-state. At this time, Venice was building and expanding the 
city rapidly. This is also the time when Venice begins and finishes construction of the Church of 
San Niccolo which sits on the Venetian Lido.74 Once Venice began to participate in the crusades, 
their main role was to help via sea, in the form of transporting troops and supplies along with 
establishing and maintaining naval blockades. Italian sailors from city-states were some of the 
best watermen around at this time, which is why it is no surprise that many countries will rely on 
any number of city-states to accomplish naval feats on behalf of their states or empires. Usually, 
city-states preferred times of peace with which they can establish trade; however, Abulafia points 
out that “trade obviously flourished in times of peace, but in war too there were excellent 
business opportunities: the seizure of booty and of slaves, the provision of armaments, and pirate 
raids against enemy shipping” to name a few.75  
Venice’s participation in the crusades yielded some negative effects. This soured 
relations with the Byzantine Empire who were angry with the crusaders over not relinquishing 
land back to the Byzantine Empire. Venice’s participation frustrated them as well as their 
growing economic position within the Mediterranean. In response, John II, son of Alexios 
Komnenos, refused to renew the Golden Bull (1082, trade rights) bestowed upon the Venetians 
for service to the Empire.76 With this, the Venetians turned elsewhere. Within a few years, a 
burst of crusader energy came from within Venice allowing the city to accomplish more feats in 
the Levant. Abulafia asserted that this rise in popular sentiment “enabled the Venetians to 
blockade Tyre, which was still in Muslim hands but fell the next year. Here the Venetians 
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established themselves in a highly privileged position, acquiring not merely one-third of the 
town, but estates outside it, and the right to a church, a square, an oven, and a street in every 
town they helped capture in the future.”77 Two facts were evident at this point, the first being that 
Muslim navies could no longer combat Italian shipping supremacy, and the second was that the 
Byzantines needed the Venetians and could not afford to lose yet another ally. Therefore in 1126, 
the Byzantines reconfirmed the Venetians Golden Bull. In addition, with the hopes of containing 
the Venetians, Emperor Manuel I Komnenos established “an enclosed area next to the Golden 
Horn, taking away land from Germans and French merchants, so as to create a Venetian quarter 
and control the Venetian traders more easily.”78 
Amalfi, a city-state in Southern Italy, is at this time beginning to fail. As of 1130, Amalfi 
had stopped the Norman Invasion, unlike many other city-states within the southern cluster. 
Amalfi had been close with the Byzantines; however, they were replaced by the Venetians who 
were able to provide far more for the Byzantines. In 1127 while looking for new allies, Amalfi 
and Pisa entered into a treaty of friendship.79 Pisa at this time had just joined the war with the 
Germans against the Norman invaders from the south. The Normans, who had been blockading 
the Amalfians allowed there ships to leave port if they attacked Pisan vessels. Amalfi agreed, but 
while away, a fleet of Pisan ships attacked and sacked the city in 1135, losing a substantial 
amount of their wealth.80 Amalfi had been known for basic goods such as wine and oil but now 
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could no longer support itself due to a lack of resources. They could no longer resist foreign 
influence and passed between Pisan and Norman control.   
Needing new sources of wealth, Pisan and Venetian merchants begin to turn their 
attention to Northern Africa, specifically Egypt, with the hopes of finding new trade. The 
Genizah Jewish merchants who had dominated this area had recently lost influence under the 
Fatimads which the Italians hoped to secure. Genoa soon followed suite and acquired “a 
fonduk—a warehouse and headquarters—in Tunis, Bougie, Mahdia, and other cities along the 
coast of Africa.”81 Italian merchants traveled to cities all along North Africa and “visited the 
ports of Maghrib to acquire leather, wool, fine ceramics, and from Morocco, increasing 
quantities of grain. Particularly important was the supply of gold, in the form of gold dust that 
reached the towns of the Maghrib along the caravan routes that stretched across the Sahara.”82  
During the second crusade, the Byzantines saw renewed attacks by the Normans. This 
time, the Emperor again sought the aid of the Venetians when Corfu was attacked, but Norman 
navies remained a continual presence in and around Italy.83 The Venetians were successful in 
repelling the Norman navies; however, both the Byzantines and Venetians were slowly realizing 
they did not like each other as much. They begrudgingly continued to help each other but 
relations had significantly soured. This is the point in which we will begin to fully examine 
Genoa and Venice as their communes or system of government have begun to better develop a 
more comprehensive system of  institutions along with their vast fleets which can now operate 
throughout the Mediterranean Sea.  
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2 “Venice and Genoa, a Struggle for Foundation: Their Routes to Empire” 
 In the last chapter, this thesis discussed some of the primary and essential characteristics 
that all city-states must possess, as well as offered a glimpse into a very volatile world in which 
these Italian cities existed. At the conclusion, I discussed one city-state, Amalfi that was unable 
to cope with this radically changing world and analyzed some of the reasons as to why that 
happened. This chapter will build off of those ideas and will analyze specifically how Genoa and 
Venice rose to power. Venice and Genoa both embarked on a journey of great risk around the 
beginning of the 10th and 11th centuries in an attempt to assure their continual existence and 
security within the Mediterranean; in fact, they sought to accomplish by creating institutions that 
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not only helped the day to day processes of their respective cities, but they also acquired the 
ability and nature of their city’s responses to commercial and military threats and opportunities. 
 This chapter will begin to explore these two city’s histories and institutions starting 
around 900 AD, however, it will quickly move to the 12th century, as that will be the start of the 
main focus of this piece. Whilst beginning to analyze these institutions, it is ever so important to 
have a good contextual understanding, which will explain the volatility and luck of the 
Mediterranean region in which Venice and Genoa find themselves situated.  
Towards the end of the 12th century, Middle Eastern industries were in decline, with their 
economies contracting and their politics fragmenting, albeit temporarily.84 This most likely 
resulted from the recent crusades that saw the formation of the Latin Kingdoms along the Levant, 
thus allowing European powers to enter into the region. Italian city-states jumped at the 
opportunity to expand their trade and thus started moving toward this location. City-states at this 
time were mainly competing with each other for profits and monopolies within certain regions of 
trade. This competition saw the decline and thinning out of some weaker city-states as some 
were eventually unable to fend off foreign influence. Mogens likens the rise of Italian city-state 
power with that off the creation and adequate formation of the Commune, which allowed city-
states to better handle the “growing volume and complexity of trade,” which many acknowledge 
to be the lifeblood of these city-states.85 In addition, Mogens suggest that this institution is a 
political response to “either to the void left by the collapse of the central government or to the 
opportunities for political autonomy opened up by the struggle after 1076 between the German 
                                                          
84
 Abulafia, D. The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, USA, 
2011 pg. 326 
85
 Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, KGL, Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000 pg. 279 
30 
 
Emperor and the papacy.”86 This argument is convincing due to the fact that most Italian 
communes began to form after this date such as Pisa in 1081, Cremona in 1078, Genoa in 1098, 
Verona in 1107, and Venice in 1143. It should be noted, however, that these communes had 
slightly different names for their governmental systems and assemblies. For many European 
powers, city-states became a necessary solution to the question of attempting to establish 
sustained trade within different regions of the Mediterranean as they were known as some of the 
most skilled merchants in Europe. The Commune, is defined as “a sworn association of like-
minded men who promised to abide by their own rules and to be sanctioned to be sanctioned for 
any infringement… whose purpose is to establish and uphold the reciprocal rules of engagement 
and to protect merchants against reprisals and the confiscation of goods.”87 Two main benefits 
immediately arose from this institution, which saw the lowering of costs for trading over long 
distance and the multiplication of trading centers across the Mediterranean world, which also 
saw the increased division of labor as well as the collection and diffusion of information.88 In 
short, trade became cheaper and less risky for those funding the expeditions. This immediate 
reaction makes sense because first and foremost, trade, was the most important part of the 
economic system in which city-states find themselves built upon, as they do not have the large 
swaths of land in which to cultivate numerous agricultural and industrial projects of their own.  
Both Genoa and Venice faced similar struggles at home which would suggest multiple 
reasons as to how improbable it is for these two entities to not only survive but flourish under 
these circumstances. Nonetheless, both cities managed to endure and build upon their success. 
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Both cities saw poor conditions at home, which will be discussed later in the chapter, that forced 
them into the sea as further land expeditions would bring them into conflict with multiple 
different states or cities that could overwhelm the lone city. Yet both capitalized on this inherent 
“bad luck” and sought to exploit the sea as a means for mobilization of their respective 
militaries, resources, and as a means to obtain their “birth rights” as they both saw themselves as 
decedents of the great Roman Empire. However, none of this would have been possible without 
the foundational institutions that these two cities both created in order to simply function as an 
entity in the Mediterranean.  
The next section will be divided into two main portions: Legacies, institutions, and 
systems created prior to 1200 AD, followed by those created after 1200 AD through about 1300 
AD.  
 
 
 
i. 
Geography and Myth: 
 As previously stated, both Genoa and Venice suffered from a lack of usable land which 
forced them to turn to the sea. This was not without considerable risk. Many like to think about 
how accessing the seas allows for opportunities to explore new lands and establish commerce 
with new states. In actually, these ventures comes with considerable risk. For example, both 
Venetian and Genoese citizens felt a considerable amount of anxiety during the month of June, 
which was when their fleets and trade expeditions were set to return from their long distance 
journeys. A Genoese historian remarks that “in 1207, seven galleys and other ships, containing at 
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least 1000 Genoese, were close to safety in nearby Nervi when a great storm sank a navis and 
two barks, and one galley was beached at Sturla.”89 
For Venice, land was scarce, due to the fact that those people who settled Venice, settled 
the city in a lagoon due to the need for protection against competing barbarian and European 
forces. As a result, Venice was able to produce little food except for the fishing that was 
attainable within this location.90 Due to a lack of land, status and wealth was based not on landed 
aristocracy but instead on entrepreneurial skill.91 Besides food shortages, ironically, fresh water 
was a constant problem which Venice struggled to correct. In addition, the constant changing of 
tides within the lagoon altered the shape and accessibility of the area, which the Venetians had to 
adjust for by creating safeguards in barriers in order to effectively live in this location.92 Aside 
from that, Venice did prosper from the fishing and salt collecting that occurred within the 
Lagoon. In addition, it did not take long for others to acknowledge the relative safety that the 
lagoon afforded to its inhabitants and were thus sought after as a safe haven to conduct trade.93 
Upon this realization, the Venetians are thought to have begun charging for this protection, 
which began the onslaught of trade goods flooding into this region. This prime location, at the 
mouth of the Adriatic, soon saw a flourishing trade community born. So although Venice herself 
could not produce a wide multitude of products, a large variety of goods still flowed through 
Venice, allowing her to reap the benefits of becoming a trade center. In addition, this trade also 
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greatly benefited from the good relationship the Venetians kept with the Byzantines up until the 
end of the 12th century.  
 Genoa, on the other hand, did not possess as good landed area, however, it also was 
located “at the mouth of nothing on a sea where some of the great ports sat” which meant trade 
competition was a considerable obstacle that the inhabitants would have to face.94 Genoa was 
situated in an area with rocky beaches, rugged cliffs, and had access to little flat ground or fresh 
water. Genoa had a number of other disadvantages to go with this. Liguria, the region in which 
Genoa is situated, suffered from a lack of plentiful resources and had little to no mineral wealth 
worth taping, except for some marble deposits. In addition, Genoa also had a lack of rivers near 
the city, which forced them to build ships along coves across the coast.95 The lack of rivers and 
fresh water also meant that the soil Genoa had, was less fertile and more shallow, which meant 
agriculture would never be as profitable as it could have been otherwise. Cereal farming was 
impossible due to the lack of land and freshwater and it also suffered from a lack of sufficient 
fishing because the waters near Genoa were too deep.96 Lastly, the environment around the city 
was quite fragile, taking considerable time to recover from either natural or man-made disasters 
that occurred in the area.  
However, Genoa did possess a good harbor, and despite being mostly mountainous, 
Genoa did have some fertile ground which was accompanied by “dramatic changes in altitude 
[within] this small region [, which] produced five zones of vegetation and climate within a small 
ecosystem” thus allowing for a wide variety of different agricultural products, although, 
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truthfully, limited in scale.97 This area hosted small forests, chestnut trees, land for vineyards, 
and olive groves which all helped to boost Genoese trade. Another environmental benefit of 
these mountains was that the mountains negated any chance of the formation of lakes near 
Genoa.98 This might initially sound like a disadvantage as Genoa was suffering from a water 
shortage, however, with lakes, this brought more mosquitos which carries the increased chance 
of disease. Genoa also produced fruit trees, made bread from chestnut flower, and produced 
cheese, wool, and leather from their livestock.99  
As previously stated, both Genoa and Venice saw themselves as heirs of the Roman 
Empire. This was displayed time and again through the Venetians willingness to assist the 
Byzantine Empire during times of need as the Byzantines were all that was left of the once great 
Roman Empire. Several myths have arisen from the Venetians early years, which they thought 
justified their place amongst the great Mediterranean powers. One day, it is said, the Pope, 
disguised as a poor beggar, entered Venice as a test to see how their citizenry and leaders would 
react. It is said that the Venetians treated him with such care and kindness that the Pope, ever so 
grateful and happy to see this reaction, named them protectors of the faith, and allowed them to 
walk in procession with a white candle during the feast-day procession to symbolize their honor 
and purity of the faith.100  
Later on, the Pope also gave the Doge permission to seal his letters with lead instead of 
the traditional wax, which signified the Doge was on level with the rank of emperor. The story 
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goes that when the Holy Roman Emperor found out about this, Frederick wanted the Pope locked 
away in chains and sent a massive fleet against the Genoese. The Venetians, in defense of the 
Pope and their city, launched a spirited defense, despite being so badly outnumbered at the time. 
The Doge’s forces managed to defeat the Imperial fleet and was rewarded with a sword that 
“represented justice of the war” and a golden ring, which now serves a pivotal role in the Festa 
Della Sensa(Ascension) ceremony where Venetians sail out to where the lagoon meets the 
Adriatic and toss the golden ring into the waters, symbolizing their union with the sea.101 
Whether or not this is true, these stories serve the purpose of instilling pride within the mention 
of Venice as they are not only skilled warriors and watermen in these stories, but also offer great 
kindness and protection toward Christianity, a potentially unifying force in the region.  
Genoa was an old Roman city, with Roman roads that lead to the heart of the city.102 
Despite this however, Genoa was not a center for trade, and the roads most likely were in place 
for military purposes although the ruins of the old city still remain the nucleus of Genoa, 
showing visual proof of their inherited right. Up until after the sacks by Muslim raiders in 934-
35, Genoa did not possess imposing magnificent buildings like some great cities, although, it was 
still seen as critical, due to their port which, many landlocked city states sought to use or covet. 
These sacks, could help explain the religious Christian fervor that the people within this city felt, 
along with their belief that they are destined to partake in the crusades, a premise which we will 
explore later on in the chapter.103  
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Genoa’s early history differed from that of Venice’s in the sense that the Genoese 
commune was less stable, but is comparable due to the fact that both polities found and acquired 
nationalistic tendencies through the use of their early founding myths. Genoa dealt with constant 
internal civil strife, which continued well into the 13th century, as well as constant threats of 
domination and invasion from the Germans to the North and had to be granted much of their 
rights by higher authorities.104 Genoa began, however, to develop significant strength at the start 
of the 11th century as they concentrated on building up their naval power in response to Muslim 
raiders. Through their wars with them, Genoa was seen by the Pope as a defender of Christianity. 
After 1156, Genoa had many rights bestowed upon them by the Lombard Marchese Alberto, who 
“confirmed the customs of the city.”105 This granted Genoa all the rights their fathers had under 
their previous host and also allowed them to exercise justices over themselves, thus, making 
them immune from any nobility. This is important because with this charter, Genoa was 
effectively (or not so effectively) governing themselves without the aid or creation of a 
commune. One additional fact that was seen under this charter, was that Genoa granted rights to 
farmers allowing them to hold land without public service.106 This is noted to be a relic from the 
Roman Empire, and is yet another example of how they descended from them.  
ii. 
Creating a Government 
 Venice and Genoa both took some considerable time to fully establish their official 
government structure, most likely due to the erratic nature of events that occurred within this 
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region, which forced these city-states to adapt to these ever-changing conditions. Both Genoa 
and Venice had to achieve some level of autonomy from other states and empires in the area. 
Although not officially owned by any one nation, both these two cities had strong connections to 
the Byzantine Empire and the German Holy Roman Empire respectively, both of which felt 
some privilege or entitlement to these cities. Nevertheless, both Venice and Genoa enjoyed 
considerable autonomy from the beginning, as these empires were now allowing these cities to 
operate on their own was more profitable for them at the time. These relationships between cities 
and empires will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 Venice’s political structure saw significant divisions among factions either loyal to the 
Byzantine cause, or the Holy Roman Empire.107 Officially speaking, legally, “the ruler of the 
Lagoon was the emperor of Constantinople” and the Doge, who ran the city, was “at best, a 
governor” as Medieval kings and Emperor’s received their power through God, whereas, the 
Doge’s power “flowed directly from the people they governed.”108 The Doge was specifically 
beholden to the tribunes and the people, the latter of which could assume the form of the Arengo 
which would be formed in moments of crisis. Thomas Madden, a historian reexamining Venice’s 
history, argues that the Arengo was so powerful that no authority could “trump” this assembly, 
“save for the emperor.”109 The Doge is elected by the people and can also be deposed by the 
people through the formation of an Arengo. This is significant because it highlights the 
Venetians distrust in concentrated power, and that they prized freedom over all else.  
For much of the 9th and 10th centuries, Venice prospered from a series of stable 
Dogeships, which tended to switch between ruling families, which at this time consisted of the 
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Badeor, Candiano, and Partecipaze families.110 This was a crucial time for the Venetians as the 
Mediterranean Sea was now being invaded by Muslim pirates along with Europe facing constant 
attacks by Vikings and Slavic raiders. Many Doges during this time, personally led war 
expeditions in order to eliminate pirate activity within their waters and throughout the Adriatic. 
This had the potential to curry favor with other cities and states also effected by the pirates and 
this, no doubt, greatly affected their relationship with the Byzantines who were also reeling in a 
vain attempt to protect their processions from these pirates.  
During the 950’s, Venice saw herself caught between a political event which forced the 
city to choose between their allegiance to the Byzantine Empire and that of the Holy Roman 
Empire. This occurred due to a coup led by Pietro IV who supported the Holy Roman Emperor, 
against his father Pietro III, who held allegiance to the Byzantines.111 This coup ultimately failed 
and saw Petro IV fleeing to the German Emperor. Upon his arrival, Pietro IV began to launch 
naval assaults against Venetian shipping. Shortly after this began, Pietro III died and the Arengo 
surprisingly elected Pietro IV to the Dogeship, as they saw this as a means to end the assaults.112 
Upon attaining the Dogeship, Pietro IV married Waldrada, the sister of the Marquis of Tuscany, 
who was the kinswomen to Emperor Otto II, Ruler of the Holy Roman Empire.113 Waldrada had 
German soldiers accompany her to the Ducal Palace (the residence of the Doge) for her 
protection. This had the unfortunate effect of creating resentment among the Venetian people, 
who now felt as if their palace was occupied by the HRE. Not surprisingly, in 976, civil strife 
erupted split between the Morosini family who opposed the Germans and favored the Byzantine 
Emperor, and the Coloprinis family who supported the doge and sought to strengthen relations 
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with the Germans.114 The Morosini family won the day and assaulted the Ducal palace, killing 
Pietro and his son, though they had the wisdom to spare Waldrada out of fear of reprisal from the 
German Emperor.  
Upon this very violent uprising, the Arengo, in 976, elected Pietro Orseolo to the 
dogeship. This series of events points to a larger possibility that the very foundation of the 
commune in both Venice and Genoa were unstable and that additional political, and commercial 
institutions need to be put in place in order to create a significant period of stability. Venice, far 
more so than Genoa, is adept at understanding the civil uprisings and worked to avoid them from 
the beginning. What is important to note about this individual is that he was not aligned to any 
leading noble family, but was instead, well known for his wisdom and piety, as well as being a 
well-respected individual in Venetian society.115 Pietro Orseolo personally financed the 
reconstruction of the Ducal Palace as well as levied new taxes in order to pay reparations to the 
German Emperor who was furious over the incident. However, this tax levied proved enough to 
avert war and also enough to fix much of the damaged cities caused by the civil strife in the 
previous year. Later in 991, Pietro II Orseolo was elected Doge and managed to quell the 
remaining factional strife by simultaneously improving relations with both the Byzantine and 
Holy Roman Empires.116 This was accomplished because, due to the actions previously 
discussed by Venetian fleets, the Byzantine enacted a Golden Bull, bestowing immense 
privileges on the city of Venice, which had the added benefit of making Venice more 
independent from their rule. In addition, it also helped that the new German Emperor Otto III 
was a personal friend of this Doge. This is important to show because it demonstrates Venice’s 
                                                          
114
 Madden, Thomas. Venice: A New History, Penguin, 2012 pg. 31 
115
 Madden, Thomas. Venice: A New History, Penguin, 2012 pg. 54 
116
 Madden, Thomas. Venice: A New History, Penguin, 2012 pg. 58 
40 
 
ability to not only politically navigate potentially divesting incidents, but also their ability to 
recover from such events and still end up on the beneficial side, be it luck or skilled diplomacy.  
From this point in the late 10th century, until about, the early 12th century, Venice 
prospered from improved relations with the Byzantine Empire in addition to relative peace 
amongst leading Venetian families. It is apparent from their actions during this time, that the 
Venetians realized early on that peace and quiet amongst their city and neighbors was good for 
business, which remained their guiding principle for dealing with notable families and 
international relations. During the Dogeship of Pietro Polani rom 1129-1148, Venice began to 
found their very own commune by raising additional families to become “notable”, which he did, 
by awarding them positions as Judges and advisors in his court.117 Some of these families include 
the Dandolos, Ziani and Mastroperos families. In addition, under Polani’s leadership, Venice saw 
the creation of the Consilium Sapientium, which was a council of wise men that represented the 
Venetian people and dealt with general day-to-day activities.118 
On July 24th, 1177, a historic event occurred in Venice, and involved both Pope 
Alexander III and Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire. The Pope and 
Holy Roman Emperor had been at war for some time, creating much instability within the region 
and distracting Europe from affairs occurring in the Levant. This conflict arose from territorial 
claims made by both the Emperor and Pope concerning northern and central Italy.119 To 
counteract German influence, the Pope initiated the creation of the Lombard league (an invention 
that will be discussed later in order to explain one method of how city-states can defend 
themselves) which sought to oppose German influence in the region. Venice, which had been 
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“officially” neutral during this struggle, was asked and then selected to be the meeting point for 
which to discuss terms and bring peace between these two Christian nations. Doge Sebastiano 
Ziani greeted both leaders and after much ceremony, began to conduct the last necessary acts to 
ensure peace.120 Much of the negotiations had been completed far before the Pope or Emperor 
arrived. The city of Venice also underwent massive preparations, including the completion of the 
Piazza San Marco, which was the largest open air gathering in Venice at the time and hosted a 
plethora of different buildings, immense columns, and magnificent statutes all which were to fit 
the nature of the grandiose event.121 In addition, this event further demonstrated Venice’s ever 
increasing economic might, as well as their furthered independence from the Byzantine Empire, 
as relations with them have begun to sour by the end of the 12th century. This event is also 
politically and internationally significant, not only because a very advantageous peace treaty was 
being negotiated, but also because of the fact that Venice, a lone city-state, now had the stature 
and importance to be able to hold such a significant event, which brings us to a conclusion for 
this section concerning the Venetians as their next great governmental, political, and military feat 
will entirely revolve around the expedition known as the forth Crusade.  
Where Venice prospered from a mostly stable urban and civil populace, Genoa faced an 
ever-increasing dilemma of how to manage their leading rival families, as on more than one 
occasion, these different groups attempted to pursue war against one another. This was a 
significant and persisting problem because the “great Genoese families were grouped together in 
tight clans, and the common interest of the clan overrode the immediate concern of the 
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individual. The price that Genoa paid was acute factional strife, as rival clans tried to gain 
mastery of the consulate and other offices.”122  
Between the years 1087 and 1099, Genoa established a commune which, described by 
Vito Vitale, one of Italy’s leading historians of Genoa in the twentieth century, as a “voluntary 
association of neighborhoods, with the bishop and nobility joining the oath” under the leadership 
of 6 consuls.123 Genoa herself was separated into 7 neighborhoods, each with their own 
economic and political power, in addition to each having an obligation to provide crews for 
merchant or military ships depending on the city’s need at the time.124 This took the form of a 
city that could self-govern, but suffered from an overly federated layout with not enough unity 
between the districts. Initially, Consuls served anywhere from 4 to 12 years depending on the 
laws that existed during that particular decade, as these laws tended to change rapidly in order to 
attempt to prevent families from consolidating too much power. This was the case until the year 
1122, when consuls were allowed 1 year in office.125 The responsibilities of the office of the 
consul is outlined as follows: Consuls were to administer equal justice among citizens, serve as 
judges, and not diminish the honor/income of the city or churches.126 The Compagna was an 
assembly that dealt with the day to day activities of the city and advised Consuls on their 
recommendations. This body had a large set of rules governing who could be in it and what they 
could do once entered into the body. If an individual was called to enter the Compagna, meaning 
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the individual was male, a citizen, and of a certain age, he would have 40 days to comply, or be 
barred from entering this body for 3 entire years.127 This was a severe penalty for those seeking 
political life, as only members of the Campania could enter into the offices of consulship, 
treasurer, legate, or advocate. Only members of this body had the right to vote for the Consul and 
carry out merchant ventures, and worked on the basis of the majority. This body also had 
jurisdiction over trade in addition to the responsibility of outlining laws pertaining to homicide, 
assault, and developing an overall legal code.128 In short, if one wanted political power in the city 
of Genoa, one would want to work to achieve office within this assembly.  
The Genoese Commune was quite efficient at levying taxes as well as raising money. 
Since defense was a primary concern for this city, Genoa needed to ensure enough fiscal revenue 
to fund defensive projects. One such method they employed in achieving this goal, was the tax 
on foreign merchants and their income made along not only the port but also the coastal territory 
that Genoa controlled.129 In addition, Genoa taxed land and goods sold into Genoa; however, this 
did not always fulfill Genoa’s monetary needs and often resulted in Consuls needing to borrow 
money in order to pay the bills.130  
The Commune not only benefited Genoa by levying taxes, but also allowed them to 
accomplish a great many other feats. For example, as the power of the Commune grew, so too 
did Genoa’s international prowess and ability to conduct affairs with other nations. The 
commune accomplished this by spending money in order to bribe other cities or states in order to 
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achieve their goals, and more importantly, the Genoese people trusted Consuls specifically to 
make these fiscal decisions.131 To add to this, the centralized government also allowed Genoa to 
concentrate on dominating the surrounding area, which also in turn, grew and expanded the 
city’s reach at home and abroad. For example, Ventimiglia, a small town near Genoa, saw its 
population come under Genoese control after the Commune humiliated their Count through 
economic dealings.132 In short, this Commune was able to not only develop and maintain an 
economic and legal system, but also sought to deal with political squabbles, although the latter, 
saw Genoa facing considerably more difficult squabbles, as individuals began using their offices 
to their own ends. This can be seen in a law change where Consuls now had to swear that they 
would fight wars till the end instead of leaving their compatriots to deal with the conflict on their 
own.133 
Throughout this decade, Genoa faced considerable internal and political strife that the 
Compagna could rarely correct on its own. Even the Consulship found it difficult at times to 
preserve the peace within the city and constantly had to make reparations and promises to 
unhappy families. These periods of unrest would generally follow times of war, due to the fact 
that as soon as the unifying enemy is dealt with, families once again fall into their standard 
squabbles and rivalries that tend to keep them separated and weak for some time. At the 
beginning of 1179, external wars raged and internal strife seemed to escalate, creating a 
considerable crisis for the commune to contend with. The Consuls at this time began separating 
                                                          
131
 Epstein, Steven A., Genoa And The Genoese: 958-1528, University of North California Press, 2001. 
Pg 45 
132
 Epstein, Steven A., Genoa And The Genoese: 958-1528, University of North California Press, 2001. 
Pg 45 
133
 Epstein, Steven A., Genoa And The Genoese: 958-1528, University of North California Press, 2001. 
Pg 50 
45 
 
markets and allowing families to build walls in order for them to feel secure within their areas.134 
However, this did not work, and in 1193-4 the situation worsened with the sight of families 
creating siege weapons behind their walls as they hurled rocks and weapons at one another 
within the city.135 A few years prior to this, Ottobono Scriba described a significant shift in the 
power of the commune as they slowly began to realize their current structure of government was 
no longer effective in quelling the social unrest. In response to this, the city created the position 
of the Podesta who was not only the new city manager, but also the military commander and 
chief judge.136 In addition, an 8-member body called reactors, was created to help serve this 
individual in order to face the difficult task at hand. In 1194, Oberto de Olevano became both the 
Consul and Podesta and managed to restore order and calm within the city. Following him, was 
Drudo Marcellino, who not only managed to continue the peace, but also determined a way and 
followed through with paying off Genoa’s considerable debts brought about by the civil strife 
and military conflicts.137  
iii. 
Economy of a City-State 
 For a city-state, their main goal was to obtain and secure safety and privileges for their 
merchants both at home and abroad. This is the case because a vast majority of income and 
wealth of a city-state depends upon how skilled and crafty they are at conducting trade. These 
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economic practices bred a very individualistic and capitalistic environment, where all merchants 
were vying with each other for profitable goods and exchange rates.  
 Venice is situated in an excellent location for prosperous trade at the top of the Adriatic. 
The city was positioned in a location that conveniently provided a “place from which to move 
goods to and from other European markets while also providing plenty of commercial docks and 
local markets for overseas shipping.”138 During the 900s, Venice focused most of their time on 
building, whether it be actual structures or large fleets. Within this time Venice also began 
reaching out and establishing trade agreements with far away locations. It is important to bear in 
mind, that all of this supplemented their already valuable relationship with the Byzantine 
Empire. Venice’s fleet became masters of the Adriatic, after clearing out the pirates, thereby 
freeing Venetian ships to offer patrol missions for valuable cargo. Around 900 to 950, Venice 
had a population that number around 50,000. This increased over the next few centuries and by 
1200 AD, the population living in Venice had hit 100,000 people, making it a very large and 
crowded city.139  
Like other city-states, Venice too, developed a system in which their people could enter 
into both sea voyages and landed trade routes with hard labor or by financial means in order to 
take part in commercial expeditions. Within Venice specifically, “lending, both simple and ad 
negotiandum, appeared early, and in the 12th century it became an indispensable tool even 
though borrowing money was expensive. Commercial companies existed in Venice, for the most 
part they were used for acquiring shares in boat leases, where risk was reduced by dividing the 
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global investment into 24 shares, or carati.”140 This system is similar to that of other city-state 
economic practices but was referred to as colleganza instead of the more traditional name, 
commenda. This allowed for a system with “limited liability contract that might be unilateral, or, 
more often, bilateral and ended at the completion of the voyage.”141 
Genoa as well had developed an economic system in which their citizens could 
participate in trade. There system took the form of many classic Italian city-state trading systems 
and employed the use of commendas, or commercial contracts, where an investor puts money 
into a venture, and the traveling partner puts this money to use in return for a fixed part, which 
would usually be around a quarter of the profits.142 For example, in October 1st, 1158, a Genoese 
citizen named Bongiovanni “‘accepted in a commenda’ L69 and agreed to take the investment to 
Sicily. Malfigliastro bore the risk of the venture, and Bongiovanni, by custom, received one-
quarter of the profit for his labor.” Societas are like commendas except the key distinction is that 
societas have both individuals contributing money with the individual assuming who goes on the 
expedition receiving a slightly higher share.143 In addition to these two, Genoa also employed a 
Sea Loan. This form of transition involves one citizen borrowing money from another and 
agreeing to pay it back within a certain amount of time or upon the conclusion of the 
expedition.144One important note is that this agreement requires the safe return of the expedition, 
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thereby leaving some room for insurance in case the merchant and sailors encounter pirates, 
storms, or any number of tragedy while out on the Mediterranean Sea.  
As time went on, these legal practices became more defined and evolved to face the ever 
changing events that face the city. In the Cartulary of Giovanni Scribba, who was a notary for 
Genoa between 1154 and 1164, one can note that these practices and institutions demonstrate an 
advanced stage of society that had clearly been evolving for some time.145 Many of these 
documents show and depict legal contracts, commodity sales, wills, dowries, estate inventories 
and more, which show a very complex society that had achieved a very robust system of record 
keeping. Many contracts were included in this describing Sea Loans and Commenda 
transactions, as well as articulated much of the cargo being pepper, Brazilwood, cotton, gold, 
silk, alum, cloth, and exports of woolen cloth and silver. The jobs of these merchants were to go 
to a location such as Syria, Alexandria, Constantinople, Acre, Tyre, etc.,, and after selling or 
buying merchandise, they were to return to Genoa. This principle kept in touch with their 
mandate of moving commodities of places with abundance, to locations with scarcity, thereby 
allowing for maximum profits.146 This not only helped with profits, but also greatly increased the 
diversity of products coming in and out of Genoa.  
Epstein further remarks that Genoa can contribute most of its economic success to four 
basic reasons. These include “A rapidly growing domestic market, emphasis on capital-intensive 
trading, a legal environment relying on trust and not force to create functioning markets, and the 
abilities of families to devise organizations capable of sustaining knowledge and techniques of 
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trading over time.”147 The capital based trading augmented the productivity of a region obtaining 
scarce resources. The Commune, well trusted by the citizenry, did not try to overstep its bounds, 
and most trade partnerships were created from kinship and family relations, thereby allowing 
little room for misunderstandings and vendettas.  
IV 
Military Institutions and Responses 
 City-states can be relatively small entities that obtain an immense amount of suspicion 
due to necessity and force of ideology, although justly deserved at times, due to their fear of a 
large state or empire potentially attempting to take them over. Therefore, in order to deal with 
this problem, city-states have developed a number of responses both for large and small state and 
city threats. Before entering into the specific institutions that Genoa and Venice possess, wherein 
this thesis will discuss methods employed in dealing with both large and small states, it is 
important to understand the grand scheme of things being that not all is as it seems. In other 
words, just because a city-state as entered into a war with another city-state, does not mean they 
are arch-nemesis or have cut off all relations/trade entirely. In most cases, city-state relations 
with other cities and country are quite complicated and exist on a level of potential perpetual 
peace and war simultaneously. This will become clearer as the thesis moves forward and is vital 
in eventually understanding Venice’s role with the Ottoman Empire.  
 A very common response when an Empire or large kingdom threatens a city-state is the 
formation of a league. For example, in 1156 the Lombard league was formed between: 
“Several shifting constellations of cities had emerged. Some were merely bilateral (the 
alliance between Milan and Piacenza in 1156 against Pavia and Cremona), others 
embraced several cities (Milan, Brescia, and Piacentza in 1159), buut the so called 
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“Veronese League” of 1164 was a genuine regional power bloc linking Venice with 
Vicenza and Padua as cities of the March of Treviso, and Verona, whose own Marca 
Veronese had by then been elided into it.”148 
But even when cities like these form alliance, it is equally not uncommon for them to break those 
alliance and go to war with one another. In truth, city-states tend to spend so much time at war 
fighting one another that even during times of peace, it is not uncommon for ships from 
competing states to attack one another. But even in the case of Venice and Genoa, Madden 
reports that: 
“On occasion Venetians and Genoese would swallow their dislike and band together 
against a common enemy, as they did with Emperor Frederick II, who waged war across 
Italy against the Popes and the Lombard’s. But usually the two powers entertained some 
level of aggression. It was not always easy to gauge their relations. Although Venice had 
an increasingly complex government to oversee their expanding empire, the Genoese did 
business in a much more casual manner, as families struggled against one another for 
dominance. Against their enemies, Venetians sent war fleets; Genoese sent Pirates.”149 
Even though they are major rivals, they still are able to find enough common ground, which is 
something Northern Italian city-states have prospered from.  
 Venice handles most of these threats by attempting to avoid them in the first place, and 
then learning from each subsequent attack. For example, the Magyar invasion in 899 was 
stopped by Venetian fortifications in Malamocco, which is the same way in which they held back 
the Franks in the 700s.150 After 1000 AD, Venice had additional walls constructed around the 
lagoon and placed them in a large sea chain that spanned across the entrance of the Grand Canal. 
During this time period, between 1000AD to 1200 AD, the Byzantine Empire had grown 
considerably weaker due to relentless attacks in the Middle East and the Normans in the 
Mediterranean. This forced Venice to keep bigger fleets around, not only for protection of their 
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city, but greater protection for their merchants across the Mediterranean Sea. But in order to 
build ships, a city needs wood, something Venice did not have easy access to. This is why the 
Venetian assaults off the coast of Dalmatia in 1071 are explainable, because Dalmatia was 
reasonably close to Venice, in the Adriatic, and it had lots of forests.151  
 By the 14th century, Venice had a famous squadron known as the Gulf Squadron which 
was charged with protecting the waters in the Adriatic.152 However prior to this, Venice first had 
to create a location in which to better construct ships. In the past, Venice relied on private 
shipyards and business for the construction of Venetian commercial and military vessels. In 1100 
AD, Venice founded the first Arsenale, “it was up until 1300 relatively small, and indeed may 
not have consisted of more than a storehouse for supplies. By 1300, however, with the 
construction of the ‘New Arsenal’, shipbuilding had begun on site (as opposed to being 
undertaken exclusively in private yards), with a mix of private merchant vessels and ships for the 
state. From 1302, the provision of a monopoly was established, forbidding the building of ships 
for the state elsewhere.”153 This is the process of how Venice created their large industrial ship-
building yard that had its roots in economic practices hundreds of years before it was actually 
significant.  
 The Venetian fleet consisted of two main types of ships. The first being the Round Ship, 
which was a ship equipped with lateen sails and generally used for trade and heavy cargo and 
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could transport up to 500 tons of weight, depending on how many decks the ship possessed.154 
These ships were called Tarette for ships with one deck and Navi, for ships with multiple. The 
second ship is the Long-ship, or biremes. These were military vessels propelled forward by oars 
and were faster and lower in the water, thereby allowing much more maneuverability. These 
ships usually possessed two decks and mainly protected cargo vessels (Round ships).155 The 
bireme was later replaced by the trireme which could hold more cargo and had an additional 
deck.  
 By 1171 AD, relations with the Byzantine Empire had greatly declined. Sometime during 
that year, a group of Venetian merchants attacked the Genoese quarter in Constantinople. 
Emperor Manuel, furious over this attack, decided he no longer wanted, or needed, the Venetians 
and ordered his soldiers to capture the Venetians and seize all their goods and possessions.156 
Nearly 20,000 Venetians were captured within the Byzantine Empire, thereby, forcing Doge 
Michiel I to respond. The Doge wanted a diplomatic resolution; however, an Arengo formed and 
order the Doge to respond to this grievous act of war. The Doge led a fleet of 100 galleys and 20 
transports, and sailed them to Chalkas, which was the capital in Greece at the time.157 The 
Governor came out to speak with the Doge in order for a peaceful resolution. The Governor 
agreed to help him send an envoy to the Emperor, which the Emperor refused to see. During this 
time, plague set into the military camp outside Chalkas and greatly weakened the military 
force.158 The Doge, having no other choice at this point, returned to a very dissatisfied people 
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who then assassinated him, after accusing him of not carrying out the “people’s” will. This is one 
of the last instances an Arengo will be formed, as this body’s rashness hurt Venice gravely 
during this hostage crisis and failed war.  
 In 1180, Emperor Manuel I died, thereby allowing his son Alexius II to rule at the age of 
12.159 Andronicus Comnenus became regent for the young ruler and encouraged and sanctioned 
anti-Latin fervor. Thus, it should be no surprise that later that year, mobs and riots formed and 
attacked Latin individuals in and across the Byzantine Empire. Thousands of women, children, 
and clergy-men were massacred, along with their processions seized.160 In response to this, Pisa 
and Genoa immediately declared war in the Byzantine Empire, which left the Byzantines with no 
choice but to turn to Venice for naval assistance.161 This was manageable because despite having 
20,000 Venetians in custody, all 20,000 were safe and soundly locked away from the mobs along 
with all their processions. The Regent immediately released all Venetian prisoners, restored their 
quarter, and made payments for reparations.162 This demonstrates both luck and good timing as 
Constantinople, with the rest of the Byzantine Empire, was no longer a place for competition and 
were only occupied by the Venetian merchants. However, relations never achieve the height that 
they once saw prior to the hostage crisis, which will help explain Venice’s actions (or inaction) 
during the 4th crusade.  
 Unlike Venice who began ship-building as a means for protection and increased 
economic activity, Genoa began as a means for aiding and potentially leading one of the crusades 
in an effort to reclaim the Holy Land. As far as their ships were concerned, they were relatively 
the same as Venice with both transports and galleys. By 1098, the first Genoese ships helped 
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participate in the first crusade, providing the wood needed to build the siege weapons in order to 
take Jerusalem.163 In Caffaro’s, Annals of Genoa, this historian recounts that: 
“The Genoese went to the River Jordan during Holy Week, then returned to Jaffa with the 
king, and held a council meeting there. From there they reached Arsuf, and captured it 
after three days fighting. Then in the month of May they reached Caesarea, and 
immediately beached their galleys. They ravaged all the cultivated land right up to the 
city walls and began to build siege-towers and siege engines.”164 
After aiding in the capture of several Middle Eastern cities they then: 
“Came with the galleys and the whole army to the beach of San Parlerio near St Symeon, 
and pitched camp. They first set aside one-fifteenth of the booty in the camp for the 
galley crews. The remainder they divided among 8,000 men, and gave to each as his 
share 48 solidi in the coin of Poitou, and two pounds of peppercorns, except for the 
rewards due to the consuls, the seacaptains, and men of quality, which were substantial. 
They started their journey back to Genoa on the Eve of St James the Apostle [24 July]; 
and they arrived back in the month of October, 1101 in triumph and covered in glory. 
[As] with the first Frankish army against Antioch in 1097, in the African expedition in 
1088 [correctly 1087], in the first expedition to Tortosa in 1093, and when Jerusalem was 
taken in 1099.”165 
The Genoese grew quite wealthy from the initial crusades. They were rewarded by Baldwin I in 
1104 with the bones of Saint John the Baptist, a relic for the city, along with a number of 
buildings in Antioch and Jerusalem, and small colonies across the Levant in Acre, Arsuf, and 
Caesarea from which they could conduct business and trade enterprises.166 
 In 1155, Frederick I of the HRE was marching to be crowned Emperor by Pope Adrian 
IV. Most cities in response sent money as gifts to the Emperor, however, Genoa did not and 
instead fortified their city, launching a massive wall project to protect its people.167 Frederick 
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surprisingly was not angry with this action and instead, impressed by their engineering feat over 
a very short time, rewarded them by leaving them alone, at least for the time being. Later that 
same year, Genoa received a promise of security throughout the Byzantine Empire, as well as 
receiving monetary gifts and tax incentives along with an embolum, or leased merchant quarter, 
inside Constantinople.168 This helps explain why the Venetians and Genoese were present inside 
Constantinople, setting off the Venetian hostage crisis. In return for these gifts, Genoa promised 
to not make war with the Byzantines, protect them from Norman fleets, and allowed their own 
citizens to serve as sailors in the Imperial fleet for a wage, but Genoa would not automatically be 
entered into war with the Byzantine enemies.169 These negotiations with the Byzantines were 
logical because relations closer to home were developing fast and Genoa needed more allies not 
so close to home, in order to continue conducting business.  
The problems at home surrounded the HRE and the Normans in Sicily, who both wanted 
Genoese support against the other. In return, both leaders were promising the city much and even 
began bestowing Genoa with some of these gifts prior to Genoa siding with anyone. In 1162, 
Frederick sacked the city of Milan and summoned Genoa for another round of negotiations. 
Frederick promised the Genoese greater independence, along with a hint at virtually no taxes in 
return for Genoese assistance in helping fight the Normans. To add to this, Genoa would receive 
one quarter of any city that it helped capture, the city of Syracuse (once captured), and one 
quarter of the emperor’s treasury at the time for their service.170 This was accepted by Genoa but 
did not go accordingly to plan, due to newfound conflicts erupting between Pisa and Genoa over 
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the island of Sardinia. This conflict which lasted from 1162 to 1175 was fought over Sardinia 
because of potential resources the island held along with commercial benefits.171 In truth, 
Sardinia was not that beneficial for either side but still a war they felt they had to fight in order to 
prove their superiority. At the same time as this war, civil strife erupted in Genoa and lasted for 
close to a decade due to military folly’s and squabbling among the families. The Consuls did 
manage to bring about peace eventually but further highlighted the volatility and sensitivity that 
their current political/social structure held. In 1175, Genoa makes peace with Florence and Pisa 
which agreed to provide each their own sphere of influence in Sardinia along with trading rights 
in their respective cities.  
V 
Changes in Military Institutions and Responses (After 1200 A.D.) 
  The 13th century saw a time of constant fighting between city-states and nations, in the 
backdrop of an overarching battle between the Christian and Muslim faiths known as the 
crusades. This should be no surprise to anyone, as the crusades had been occurring for more than 
200 years prior to this point. What is worth exploring is the constant squabbling between 
Christian nations that result in an ultimately weak effort to claim any land for Christianity. In 
1280, after the fall of the Latin kingdoms within the Levant and the Latin Empire that had 
assumed the role of the Byzantines, these city-states still enter into conflict over commercial 
gains instead of focusing on larger threats to the East. Again in 1280, Caffaro reported on an 
incident where he witnessed a skirmish between Venetian and Genoese Galleys: 
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“The Venetians were at the time at war with the Anconitans, and therefore…they were 
patrolling in that area just as many [Venetian] armed galleys [sailed] in different regions 
for protection as well as to attack their enemies, the Anconitans. The said galleys of the 
Venetians unjustly set upon our [(Genoese)] galleys attacking them even though they 
recognized the flags of the Genoese. The Genoese recognizing and seeing the Venetian 
arrogance, vigorously drove their galleys forward, entering into battle…The Genoese 
came out with the victory, so that they captured two of the Venetian Galleys, while the 
third rode swiftly away.”172 
What is interesting to note about this particular incident is that it shows how even during times of 
peace, these rival city-states will still set out and attack one-another for simply entering into 
territory they respectively regard as their own.  Before diving into the aggression displayed 
between rival city-states, it is important to take into consideration the events and military 
responses to these incidents that occurred leading up to the end of the 13th century.  
 A good place to begin is with Venice and to have a better understanding of how Doge 
Enrico Dandolo turned this city from a Republic, into a Maritime Empire. Venice has had a 
history of helping to support crusades in the past. In 1099, the Venetians supposedly set sail with 
some 200 ships, although they never saw any fighting due to delays on the part of the Byzantine 
Empire.173 But then again in 1122, the Venetians were instrumental in capturing the city of Tyre 
and demonstrating a more robust response to the Byzantine antagonism toward Venetian 
involvement in the crusades. With these two crusades, Venice reaped many commercial gains as 
the fragile Latin Kingdoms greatly appreciated the added support by capturing this extremely 
important trade port.  
 With this, we arrive back to the 13th century, on the eve of the 4th crusade led by the 
French, Count Thibaut of Champagne, Count Baldwin of Flanders, and Count Louis of Blois, all 
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of whom were attempting to create a logistical solution to how they were going to get an army 
around the size of 20,000 men over to the Holly Land.174 There end result was that they wanted 
to sail to the Middle East, and approached Venice asking them if they could do it. Innocent III 
had already called for this crusade a few years earlier, and had approached Venice with the idea 
of raising a fleet to sail to the Holy Land, so this appeal came as no surprise to them.175 What did 
however shock them, was the sheer size of the proposed army. The projected size of the crusade 
was 20,000 foot soldiers, 9,000 squires, 4,500 knights and resources to sustain them.176 This 
would require an incredible number of ships and manpower that any nation would balk at, let 
alone the lone city of Venice with a mere population of at best, 100,000 people. Another problem 
was finances. Venice did not necessarily have the required funding to start building immediately 
and would already require the vast majority of the merchant fleet, the entity that sustains the 
city’s treasury. However, the Doge with his council devised a plan that would help solve this 
problem. His proposal consisted of payments of 4 silver marks per knight, 2 silver marks for 
each horse, and 2 silver marks for each person who was not a knight, which totaled to around 
85,000 silver marks. In addition, Venice would supply a year of travel, along with 50 war galleys 
of their own to fight in the crusade on condition that all spoils would be split between the two.177 
However, since this was Venice, the Doge required the approval of the Great Council and the 
Arengo in order to carry out his plan. Luckily for the Doge, both bodies agreed, along with the 
French Counts, clearing the path for Venice to begin preparations for the crusade. In 1202, Doge 
Dandolo order all Venetian merchant vessels back to Venice and suspended all overseas trade in 
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order to acquire the vessels needed for transport.178 This was an enormous undertaking, the likes 
of which no state, or city-state for that matter had ever accomplished in the past. Venice had not 
only promised 50 war galleys, but also 450 transport ships for which to carry troops and supplies. 
This venture had the potential to economically cripple the Venetians, as they had to commit the 
entirety of their naval military might and merchant fleet in order to complete the task. Most ships 
had to be built at the state’s expense and Venice, who only had about 30,000 able-bodied men to 
send, decided to commit half that force to the crusade and come up with another 15,000 men 
from its dependencies as they did not want to leave the city completely unprotected.179 Despite 
this planning and successful completion of Venice’s promises, less than half of the assumed 
number of crusaders actually arrived on time, leaving Venice with a problem of collecting the 
fees for transport as each individual was supposed to pay independently; in fact this setback 
greatly angered the Venetian populace.180 In the end, the crusaders only came up with 51,000 
silver marks out of the promised 85,000, leaving Venice and the entire crusade with a potentially 
crippling dilemma of what to do next. In order to save the crusade, the Doge managed a 
compromise that saw Venice loaning the 34,000 silver marks to the crusaders in return for the 
army assisting them in attacking the Christian nation of Zara, which posed a threat to Venetian 
dominance in the Adriatic.181 This was agreed to and in October of 1202, the crusade set sail. 
Despite various setbacks and attempts by some individuals to not have a crusader army sack a 
Catholic settlement, the attack carried on as planned, and the city was destroyed, as the crusaders 
did not want to abandon the entire campaign due to this.182  
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 After the assault on Zara, the crusaders were left with the problem of choosing where to 
direct this army. Some wanted to invade Egypt and plunder the riches that lay within, whereas 
others wanted to go to Jerusalem. However, due to manpower problems, neither option seemed 
adept enough as the crusader’s numbers were to few. This problem, however, was eventually 
resolved as the crusader camp received an “unexpected” visitor. His name was Alexius IV, son 
of Emperor Isaac who had been murdered by his brother in a coup to take control of the 
Byzantine Empire. Antonio Morosini, who wrote the Morosini code reports that:  
This lad (Alexius IV), was the [son] of the emperor…emperor Isaac, who was chased 
from his empire by the Grifoni (Greeks), was carried safely by a tutor of his to Germany 
and grew up in the court of the Emperor. So the young man made a request of the Doge 
or his barons saying that on the recommendation of the monarch he wished to travel with 
the fleet and return to his empire, which was his by right. The words were very pleasing 
to misier the Doge, and they were accepted, with an agreement on the following terms, 
that when he regained his empire he would give misier the doge 200 thousand silver 
marks, and in addition to this repay every expenditure that the fleet made in this service 
and trouble.”183 
This agreement, which promised 200,000 silver marks, supplies, and a Byzantine army, was 
overwhelmingly accepted as the crusaders saw this as a mission to reclaim the throne for the 
rightful ruler of the Byzantine Empire. Alexius even promised to have the Greek Orthodox 
Church become subservient to Rome, giving the Pope some benefit from this crusade. This 
agreement came just in time as the Pope had just recently excommunicated the Venetians due to 
their destruction of Zara.184 The Doge, who felt almost trapped by this agreement, reluctantly 
concurred with the decision as he hoped to keep the excommunication secret, even though he 
knew that assaulting Constantinople was a significant political, economic, and military gamble 
for Venice.  
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 By 1203, the crusade reached Constantinople. During the initial assault, headed by the 
Doge, the crusader army appeared to be doomed to defeat. In the face of retreat, the blind Doge, 
standing at the bow of his ship, ordered it to be beached under a hail of stones and arrows.185 
Venetian troops, witnessing this successful act of bravery, rallied to the Doge as the Byzantine 
troops fled in fear. In the end, the Venetians won the day and oversaw the crowning of Alexius 
IV, who immediately gave Venice 100,000 silver marks with the promise of more to come.186 
However, more did not come and the leaders of the crusade were now faced with immense 
discontent from their army. Alexius eventually refused to pay any more money after many riots 
and fires that were started by disgruntled Venetians and Pisans, who managed to destroy nearly 
100,000 people’s homes.187 With this announcement, the crusaders took matters into their own 
hands and began raiding outside the walls of Constantinople. During this chaos, Emperor 
Alexius was murdered and replaced by Alexius V, which caused the crusading army to 
immediately declare war on the new Byzantine Emperor. The battle for Constantinople that 
occurred in 1204 between the Crusaders and the Byzantine Empire was mostly a naval affair, 
where “outnumbered but determined Venetian [and crusader forces] attacked and took the most 
well-fortified and powerful city in the Mediterranean.”188 The crusaders sacked the city for 3 
entire days.189 During the sack, Venice attempted to “save” some valuable pieces of art and 
history as the crusader forces were destroying a variety of objects in order to acquire the precious 
gems that lay inside. For example, during this sack, the Venetians “acquired” the Bronze horses 
of San Marco.190 The fall of Constantinople poised a significant danger to Venice. Therefore, the 
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Doge took steps to ensure stability in the region. The first of these moves consisted of a 
committee that would decide who the next Emperor of Constantinople would be. An account of 
the event states that: 
“When Misier the Doge was preparing to return to Venice after winning such a great 
victory and allegiance, he held a council to choose an emperor, since at the time no one 
of imperial blood could be found, and Count Baldwin of Flanders was worthily elevated 
by Misier the Doge and the barons, and one of the relatives of Misier the Doge.”191 
 Thanks to Venetian support, Baldwin of Flanders won the election, signifying the beginning of 
the Latin Empire in Constantinople. As far as the spoils are concerned and in addition to 
Venice’s purchase of Crete from Boniface, Madden reports that: 
“The Partition committee awarded Venice a large section of Constantinople near the 
harbor, the Sea of Marmara shoreline from Heraclea to the end of Gallipoli, and the city 
of Adrianople. Venice was also given rights to the islands of Salamis, Aegina, Andros, 
and both ends of Negroponte as well as the gulf of Corinth and the Morea (Peloponnese). 
Finally, [the] Venetians received all the lands of Western Greece along the Adriatic Sea. 
Like the purchase of Crete, these awards consisted only the right to conquer the region. 
Nevertheless, Dandolo immediately assumed a new title, which Venetians doges would 
proudly don for decades: “Lord of three-eighths of the Roman Empire.”192 
Venice also attempts to justify their actions and role in the crusade by affirming that 
Constantinople was in the hands of heretics, and that the events that transpired could only have 
been the work of a prophecy.193 This is a common theme of how the Venetian tend to respond to 
the threat of international scrutiny. Though Venice never tried to fully claim all the land they 
were given they did benefit from several strategic ports that greatly aided Venice’s economy, 
which was in need of activity due to the hiatus caused by the Forth crusade. 194  
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 For the Genoese, they saw dire consequences as the new Latin Empire in Constantinople 
was under heavy Venetian sway, thus allowing them to exclude all their rivals from these 
prosperous and tactical ports. This caused a serious blow to the Genoese commercial economy. 
This in part can explain Genoa’s financial problems during this century, which lead to constant 
warfare to find needed money and civil uprisings as these expeditions failed to produce adequate 
results.  
During this century, Genoa was in constant warfare with mainly Pisa, Venice, and 
Florence. Due to this, Genoa attempted to secure alliances in order to strengthen their position. 
Genoa sent peace treaty offerings to the Greek Emperor of Nicaea, the despot in Epirus, and the 
sultan of Egypt, as well as strengthening existing relations with the Holy Roman Empire.195 The 
latter was in need, due to existing contentions between the two state leaders. The Emperor had 
decreed in 1232 that rulers in North Italy, including Genoa, should not have a Lombard as a 
leader or ruler, which was a problem because the Genoese had just elected a Podesta who was a 
Lombard from Milan, and due to pride, Genoa refused to change officials.196 In response to this, 
the Emperor had Genoese traders and goods seized throughout the empire, thus virtually 
stopping trade with many colonies including the ever important Sicilian ports.197 Genoese 
politics became split once again between Pro-Lombard and Pro-Emperor forces. However, 
despite these new groups forming, Genoa still managed to operate and reinforce Middle Eastern 
colonies in the 1230s and negotiate the release of Genoese merchants in Sicily thus avoiding 
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war.198 Also, during the 1230s, the King of Morocco wanted and planned an attack on Ceuta, a 
site with a large Genoese merchant colony. In order to protect their interests, Genoa sent 18 
galleys and 4 large ships to aid the Sultan of Ceuta, however, the King of Morocco was still able 
to take the city despite Genoese intervention.199 In 1235, Genoa launched a major naval 
operation as a show of force against the newly taken city, sending 70 large vessels, 30 smaller 
ones and 20 war Galleys under Ugone Lercario, which was the largest fleet Genoa had ever 
assembled.200 This affair was ended with diplomacy as the King of Morocco ceded a portion of 
the custom duties of the city to Genoa along with payment and reparations for the Genoese 
merchant belonging in the city.201 This is an example of city-state diplomacy as these cities 
possessed the dominant naval force within the Mediterranean, thus allowing them to press other 
nations even via their naval capacity, despite that nation potentially dwarfing them in size.  
The 1230s and 1240s saw continuous peasant revolts and rebellions within the city of 
Genoa and throughout the countryside across Liguria. Many believed that Emperor Frederick of 
the HRE was responsible for inciting these upheavals in response to Genoa’s refusal to change 
their Podesta.202 Genoa however was saved by Pope Gregory IX, in return for Genoa’s 
acknowledgement of their supremacy in a religious sense.203 Genoa received 50 war galleys, as 
well as, a promise of aiding the city in recapturing the city of Syracuse. To add to this, Pope 
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Gregory IX excommunicated Emperor Frederick.204 The civil uprising had almost broken the 
city of Genoa during these decades; however, this was ultimately quelled with the help of Rome 
and the Podesta. To help the healing process, the leading Genoese families and Podesta chose not 
to punish any family siding with the Holy Roman Emperor, so as to have the city heal faster.205 
This is an excellent example of city-state families choosing to not punish the losers in order to 
better establish lasting peace.  
Major wars broke out with Pisa in the years 1282 and 1283. These wars were caused by 
Genoese suspicion that Pisan’s were inciting further unrest along the Genoese countryside.206 
Pisa launched a naval assault on Genoa; however, they failed, therefore, Genoa returned the 
favor sending 93 Galleys and 8 Panfili under the command of Doria and Zaccaria who caught the 
main Pisan fleet in the harbor. This battle is known as the Battle of Meloria207 Most of these 
ships were boarded with several others being sunk. This stood as a crippling naval blow for Pisa 
who would require considerable time to recover. This also allowed Genoa to dictate the terms in 
1288, which they received from Pisa, the regions of Cagliari and Sassari, along with being able 
to keep their possessions in Corsica. To add to this, Genoa got to keep the important site of 
Elba’s Castle until the Pisan’s fulfilled their monetary and land obligations to the Genoese. 
Lastly, the Pisans had to destroy their fortifications in Acre and in return, Genoa would return the 
considerable number of prisoners that they captured during the battle of Meloria.208 As a result of 
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this war, Pisa was never again able to challenge the might of the Genoese navy and subsequently, 
Genoa was able to get rid of one of their staunchest trading rivals in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Genoa’s main rivals now consisted of Venice, and a few other major trading ports along the 
south of France. For the last few years of the 13th century, Genoa and Venice were entered into a 
bloody conflict due to increasing animosity that had been building up over the last century. In 
1298, this conflict came to a head when the Genoese sent a fleet of 87 galleys up the Adriatic and 
right into Venice led by Lamba Doria.209 Venice responded by launching 90 of their own galleys. 
Among those present were Marco Polo, who had just recently returned from his adventures in the 
East.210 This battle swayed heavily in the Genoese favor although they were unable to attack the 
city. Most of the Venetian fleet was destroyed along with the capture of Marco Polo by the 
Genoese. The next year, in 1299, Pisa, Venice, and Genoa made peace each swapping prisoners 
and agreeing to stop fighting for some years.211  
VI 
Changes In Government (After 1200 A.D.) 
 Many significant events occurred in the years leading up to and during the 13th century 
which effected the Venetian government and changed it into what will eventually manage and 
maintain their empire. In 1192, Enrico Dandolo was elected Doge and is considered by many 
historians to be responsible for the creation of Venice’s maritime empire.212 By this point in 
time, Doges, upon their election, had to swear an additional oath stating that they will not act 
                                                          
209
 Epstein, Steven A., Genoa And The Genoese: 958-1528, University of North California Press, 2001. 
Pg 183 
210
 Epstein, Steven A., Genoa And The Genoese: 958-1528, University of North California Press, 2001. 
Pg 183 
211
 Epstein, Steven A., Genoa And The Genoese: 958-1528, University of North California Press, 2001. 
Pg 183 
212
 Madden, Thomas. Venice: A New History, Penguin, 2012 pg. 111 
67 
 
without the approval of the “Doge’s Council,” which is a “growing body of important Venetians 
who represented various portions of the city.”213 This is significant, because this shows an oath 
enumerating and limiting the powers of the Doge, which creates a nice system of checks, which 
further highlights the Venetians’ distaste and distrust of concentrated power. During his time in 
office, Dandolo created the first ever codification of civil and criminal laws in Venice, and made 
it publicly accessible for the people to acknowledge.214 This will later be improved upon by 
Doge Giacomo Tiepolo who created the Statuto, which is an “extensive codification of Venetian 
civil law.”215 This served as the basis of Venetian civil law for centuries. In addition to this, 
Dandolo also reformed the Venetian coinage system initiating the first token, quartarolo, and the 
first silver coin, grosso, the last of which became an international coin of exchange bearing the 
image of the Venetian Doge receiving a banner from the winged lion.216 This stands as a symbol 
of the economic and political might Venice possessed at the time.  
 Later on, under the Dogeship of Vitale II Michiel, Venice saw a new transformation in 
their system of organization. This Doge separated Venice into six sestieri, or districts, which 
included San Marco, Cannaregio, Santa Croce, San Polo, and Dorsoduro.217 This is significant 
because it greatly improved the local administration for each area of Venice, and also will in 
later days serve as the system for distributing the mail.  
Throughout all these ideas and institutions, the Venetians were careful as their feared the 
formation of factional groups that would place the interests of the group ahead of the city, which 
could prove detrimental for everyone. Therefore, in order to avoid this, the Venetians created a 
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rigorous system of checks and balances to avoid partisan politics. This election process was 
designed “to filter out partisanship while enlisting the wisdom of men and the will of God to 
make the best choice for the people of Venice.”218 Without going over the entire process to elect 
the Doge, a long arduous process is set in motion that begins with plucking a random boy from 
the streets in order to select and read wax balls with paper slips inside, that will eventually select 
the 41 individual council members who then selected the Doge. The election process was 
designed “to be so cumbersome that only God could influence” the outcome.219 This created a 
new, stable, and most importantly, peaceful method of electing the most powerful individual in 
Venice.  
Also, during the 13th century, Venice’s population, as previously stated, nearly doubled 
over the course of a few hundred years. A consequence of this was that the number of wealthy 
individuals increased, and they all wanted to serve in political office with the goal of attempting 
to achieve more power for their families and themselves. This saw increased numbers of 
members in the Doge council, which eventually began meeting on their own and formed the 
Great Council, which was made up of important and wealthy men and is described by many to be 
the “engine of the Venetian Republic.”220 This body had internal elections and acted as a sort of 
“gatekeeper” for entering into higher offices in Venice. This body increased in size with the 
number of wealthy citizens, which caused anger from the original members who wanted to keep 
the Great Council restricted. In 1289, Pietro Gradenigo was elected as the next Doge and devised 
a plan to deal with the situation.221 The problem with the great council was that there were too 
many families who wanted to enter and not enough space. In order to deal with this, Doge 
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Gradenigo reformed the Great Council by making it easier for men to join it, and what had been 
a few hundred man council became one with 1,100 members by 1300 AD.222 To compare this to 
a larger country, it would be as if 1 percent of an entire populace worked and served within the 
government. However, this did not fully solve the problem of those who wanted the council to be 
more limited. Therefore, in order to appease both sides, in 1323 the Great Council was closed 
and accepted no more members, meaning that only ancestors of the members already within the 
council could enter. This event is known as the Serrata, or closing.223 Some viewed this event as 
a defeat for democracy, however, others, like Madden, view this as a step in the right direction. 
Despite the closing: 
“The reforms that led to the Serrata had dramatically increased participation in the 
Venetian government, making it more representative in the world. The Serrata did not 
create an oligarchy, since hundreds of families and well over a thousand members were 
included in the council. Instead, it gave certainly to those important families that their 
position in government and society could not be taken from them. The Serrata, therefore 
had the effect of dousing the most virulent forms of factionalism in the Great Council. 
And it was, in any case, never a complete closure. Venetians who distinguished 
themselves by extraordinary service to the state could still gain membership for 
themselves and their family—although this was appropriately rare.”224 
Therefore, one can still acknowledge how this act did indeed expand the representation within 
the Great Council. Even though the council was technically “closed,” some exceptions were 
made for great deeds that certain citizens accomplished, such as the Polo family after their 
expeditions into the East.  
 By the start of the 14th century, Venice had a specific hierarchy of government. At the 
bottom (not to suggest this body is weak, but instead to imply the sheer size of this group and 
exclusivity toward male citizens) was the Arengo, which consisted of all male citizens and 
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confirmed the election of the Doge. Above them is the Great Council, who were responsible for 
running the day to day activities within the city as well as electing members to the council of 40 
and the council of 60, known as the Senate. The council of 40 served as a sort of court of appeals 
and prepared legislation for the Great Council to debate. In addition, this body was responsible 
for electing the three heads of the Great Council or Capi, who were the presiding officers during 
the meetings. The Senate was tasked with commanding fleets, naming captains, and sending 
emissaries, although, they still did require greater approval from the Great Council to decide 
anything. Above the Great Council and their sub groups were the Doge’s Council, which 
consisted of 6 men from the 6 districts of Venice and served for one year in office. The highest 
position of government was the Doge and the Signoria, which consisted of the Doge, his council, 
and the three Capi which created a body of 10 members who commanded the Great Council.225  
 Genoa did not have an easy time creating a government during this century. In 1216, with 
the continual rise in factional and civil strife within the city, the Genoese began giving their 
Podesta additional powers. This did create some stability, however it did not end the crime 
spreading across the city from factional feuds.226 This continued throughout the century. In 1257, 
the Genoese saw the rise of the Popolo, or people who held two fundamental beliefs that forced 
them to act in the face of all this civil strife. These beliefs were that first, “the violence of their 
self-proclaimed betters, the nobles, needed to be controlled because it weakened the city by 
involving others in factional strife” and “second, the people paid for wars through excise taxes 
on basic commodities like salt, while the wealthy profited from the ways taxes were leased to 
them or pledged to pay the interests on loans. Thus the power of the nobles to upset the city and 
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their control over its purse strings gave the people reason enough to rise.”227 This served as their 
primary justification for creating additional unrest in a city plagued by war.  
This is the environment that allowed Guglielmo Boccanergria to enter into the spotlight 
and become known as the “Captain of the People.”228 He was a wealthy and skilled politician 
who seemed to appease both the Guelf and Ghibelline factions. In 1257, conflicts began in Acre 
and the Levant where 52 Genoese galleys were destroyed by Venetian fleets.229 This was a great 
Venetian victory and greatly affected the Genoese’s ability to conduct trade within the Latin 
states in the Middle East. Boccanegria saw this as a potential opportunity with which to unite the 
people against a common foe, the Venetians, and inspired them with his promise of finding 
friendly markets in the Middle East.230 This worked for a time and allowed him to also push 
through some temporary reforms such as canceling some tolls, changed the old tithe system, 
placing a check on the church, and with these changes, he was able to establish friends among 
merchants.231  
One major concern at this time, was that Genoa was reeling from debts and loans that 
they owed. Due to this, Boccanegria attempted to reform the system of taxation by creating a 
new shareholder system that turned the state’s debt into mortgaged revenue. This new found 
source of income allowed Genoa to begin many building projects such as the Palazzo San 
Giorgio, which was a new palace. Along with this, were additional wharfs, a new harbor (Molo 
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Vechio), and the construction of a new public building, which served as the center for politics, 
thus leaving the citizenry with an alternative option instead of using notable family’s homes.232 
This allowed the people to become more independent from the aristocracy.  
Boccanegria focused on a new foreign policy revolving around revenge toward Venice 
and attempting to find new trading partners. Emperor Michael Palaeologus, who recreated the 
Byzantine Empire after defeating the short-lasting Latin one, decided to befriend Genoa as they 
were looking for a naval ally at the time.233 In return for this, Genoa received a plethora of trade 
rights; however, this deal was not as well liked as Boccanegria had hoped. Pope Urban IV 
excommunicated Genoa for their new Greek alliance. This also proved to be unpopular at home 
for Boccanegria as several attempts were made on his life.234 This effectively ended 
Boccanegria’s rule and brought Genoa back to a government headed by a Podesta. The war with 
Venice continued until 1270 when the Pope intervened in a 15 year truce, most likely in the 
hopes of attempting to start a new crusade.  
Like clockwork, when relations with Venice turned peaceful, the Genoese once again 
began erupting into civil and factional strife. Caffaro reports that in 1270, the very same year 
they achieved peace with Venice, Genoa: 
In that same year the Genoese city, with all the countryside, lived in bitterness. Such 
division reigned between citizens and countrymen that poisonous actions proliferated 
throughout the villages and localities of the commune of Genoa. Homicides and thefts 
were committed indifferently, because of which banishments from both [city and 
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countryside] were innumerable for those who caused riots in public streets, insulted men, 
and committed murder and despoiled their enemies and other travelers.”235 
Political divides widened with people either siding with the Papal authority or the Holy Roman 
Emperor, as this was still a point of intense contention in the city. It appeared that no matter what 
the Genoese tried, they were ultimately unable to quell the unrest. In 1310 Henry VII, emperor of 
the HRE, traveled to Italy to be crowned in Rome. Due to decades of continues economic and 
political strife, the Genoese willingly gave up self-rule to Henry for about 20 years. They did this 
“not in the face of external force, for Henry’s power and resources were limited, but because 
self-rule no longer worked.”236 
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3 “A Clash of City-States: Rivals Confronted” 
 By the start of the 13th century, the basic framework of Venetian Empire had been 
established and was invigorated by the wealth of the Venetian people and economy. Besides the 
multitude of different trade ports and destinations merchants had, Venice also underwent a 
cosmetic and functional transformation. The canals that weaved throughout the city experienced 
new clearings as the people drudged out the silt that had formed for decades within these 
waterways.237 To add to this, the Venetians also managed to better stabilize the land that the city 
rested on as the shifting tides within the lagoon posed a constant threat to the security and 
support mechanisms of the buildings, and also better defined the districts of the city.238 These 
were important improvements that the city required in order to operate the trading empire Venice 
has finally became after the 13th century. As far as trading is concerned, this information is best 
conveyed by Crouzet-Pavan who states: 
“The overall picture of the Venetians’ merchant ubiquity runs thus: Venetians were active 
in the Black Sea, where commercial exchanges intensified thanks to the constitution of 
the Tartar Khanate of the Golden Horde in Southern Russia. They had a foothold at 
Sudak, on the east coast of the Crimean Peninsula, from which they exported grains, furs, 
and slaves. An agreement with the Sultanate of Rum facilitated trade with the Asia Minor 
Coast. We also find them in markets in Egypt, still their preferred source for goods from 
the Orient. They ruled as masters in Acre and Tyre. In the Adriatic their monopoly was 
undisputed. Finally, they ventured more bravely into the western Mediterranean. 
Although a Venetian presence cannot be attested in Spain at this date and they did not 
manage to bring the Genoese and the Pisans to their knees, they nonetheless intensified 
their relations with Tunis, Bejai, and Ceuta.”239 
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However, this commercial prosperity did not last forever. However, up until this point of 
economic downturn for Venice, both Genoa and Venice were essential to the thriving and vibrant 
economy of the Mediterranean Sea. These two city-states were critical in creating this trade 
network that spanned throughout the Mediterranean, including the very profitable lands and trade 
routes of the Eastern Mediterranean, which served as the gateway to the Black Sea, Palestine, 
and Egypt. Furthermore, during this century, both city-states will be “locked in a deadly battle to 
preserve their own sea lanes and destroy those of their rival[s].”240 Furthermore, both Genoa and 
Venice have been described as vanguards who “geographically…tried to reach as far as possible 
in Asia…Institutionally…tried to devise better ways to do business to accumulate larger amounts 
of less risky capital, to administer companies, and to monopolize the markets for commodities 
and money,” and “technologically… developed impressive sophistication in navigation, 
shipbuilding, and armaments.”241 In truth, these city-states did not appear at first to be major 
players in the Mediterranean context, but proved over the course of history that these small 
republics could and did expand, mostly commercially but also territorially.  
Due to the Mamluck invasions in the Levant along with Genoa’s new role of protecting 
the newly conquered Constantinople, Venice saw herself cut off or severely restricted when 
dealing with areas in and around the Middle East. Despite this however, Venice’s commercial 
prowess can be seen extending farther than any other city-state within the Mediterranean. The 
wealth of Venetian merchants is illustrated by the adventures of Marco Polo and his father 
Niccolo Polo. The Polo family consisted of good businessmen and were well respected in the 
city. Upon an excursion, Nicolo Polo saw himself trapped on the wrong side of the Black Sea 
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shortly after the Greeks recaptured Constantinople from the short lasting Latin dynasty that had 
situated there. Without an easy way to return home, Nicolo traveled east. He ended up living 
with the Mongols for a few years until he arrived at the Great Khans palace where he met Kublai 
Khan, the leader of the Mongol Empire.242 Kublai Khan showered Nicolo with gifts and riches 
and talked incessantly about his fascination with the West and Christianity in general.243 Due to 
his fascination with Christianity, Kublai Khan requested Nicolo do a favor for the Great Khan. 
His request was for Nicolo to personally deliver a message to Pope Clement IV. This message 
requested that 100 scholars who could teach his people about trivium and quadrivium (advanced 
courses of study) as well as those who could convince his people about the true faith of 
Christianity.244 Nicolo returned 1 year later and personally delivered the letter to Pope Gregory 
X, as Pope Clement IV had recently passed away. The new Pope saw this as a potential 
opportunity to fight the Muslims and save Europe from further invasions. The Pope sent back a 
reply accompanied by Nicolo Polo, Marco Polo, and two Dominicans.245 They eventually made 
their way to Beijing where the Khan was thrilled to see them. He was especially intrigued by 
Marco Polo who he grew quite close to. While in Beijing, Marco Polo served as Kublai Khan’s 
ambassador as he “particularly liked Marco’s very Venetian approach to his ambassadorships. In 
Venice, ambassadors were essentially spies; in fact, it was their job not only to relate information 
to a foreign court but also to send back to the Venetian government dispatches reporting 
everything of importance, be it customs, rumors, or even local foods.”246After two decades in 
service, the Khan granted permission for the Polos to leave, and after escorting an important 
Princess to her future husband, the Khan of Persia, both Marco and Nicolo made their way back 
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to Venice accompanied by an escort of many ships filled with letters for European leaders, gold, 
and a multitude of different gems and presents.247 With this, the Polo family became even more 
wealthy and more importantly, the city of Venice prospered from the accomplishing relations 
with the Khan that not many Europeans would even dare to imagine, thus displaying the reach 
and wealth of the city and its citizens. 
 For Genoa, the 13th century was a turbulent year for trade as kingdoms rose and fell. 
Trade declined for Genoa within the Levant due to a series of invasions from the Mamluks and 
attacks by the Venetians during the first half of the 13th century. Furthermore, a great divergence 
began to appear as Eastern trade routes began to become more dangerous. This divergence was 
the product of what began in 1258 “when the Mongols destroyed Baghdad and established their 
rival capital at Tibrez,” which decreased the attractiveness of trade routes leading to Baghdad as 
risk had grown considerably.248 In addition, trade virtually stopped with the Byzantine Empire 
and Frankish states after the forth crusade and shrewd negotiating of the Venetians in excluding 
Genoa from these markets. Trade in Sicily and Naples fell to virtually nothing due to their 
uneasy relationship with Charles of Anjou who now ruled both of these territories.249 Finally, 
Genoa also suffered in Alexandria and Romania, in part, due to the Venetians, but also, due to 
the fact that the attention of the Genoese was never solely fixed upon trade. Instead, Genoa was 
forced to pay attention to constant rebellions and uprisings that were occurring within Genoa 
herself and the surrounding countryside.250 Therefore, with the traditional trade destinations no 
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longer serving as prosperous ports, the Genoese chose to look elsewhere. With this, the 
merchants looked to North Africa, Sicily, Catalonia, and Province in order to continue the trade 
revenue into the city.251 Catalonia and Venice both became significant rivals to Genoa during 
this century as far as commercial enterprises were concerned. However, despite “the rapidly 
changing political situation in the Mediterranean, the Genoese continued to find ways to prosper 
through long distance trade,” which “took some Genoese to the Black and Caspian Seas and the 
Atlantic Ocean in search of favorable markets in an increasingly competitive world.”252 
In addition, Genoa saw a series of industrial changes within the city. For example, 
weapons and ships were in high demand due to the crusades that occur during this century. They 
began creating structures that could produce weapons and reorganized the maritime shipbuilding 
jobs into the shipbuilders or master shipwrights, rope and sail makers, provisioners and coopers, 
followed by the stevedores who loaded and unloaded the vessels.253 Despite reorganization and 
finding new destinations for trade, the economic situation remained dire as the commune 
remained in almost constant debt to creditors. In 1214 the commune of Genoa appointed a 
council of Nobles to look into the finances of the city and essentially proposed a tax overhaul in 
order to fix the growing debt.254 This overhaul was actually quite effective, although short lasting 
as Genoa’s constant shifting between civil unrest and warfare caused the commune to spend 
immense amounts of money throughout this century.  
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Now that the previous chapters have established a historical context along with an 
overview of the institutions in which these city-states were built and relied upon, we can now 
begin to explore specific moments in history that will demonstrate a city-state’s level of 
eagerness to engage in military conflicts and their resolve to see these wars through. These 
patterns will be revealed by exploring a city-states adaptive nature in responding to varying 
degrees of threats, in which city-states have a plethora of options in their arsenal, and will 
respond either militarily, politically, diplomacy, or with commercial incentives to achieve their 
goals. To be more specific, this chapter will focus on the Venetian-Genoese wars that occurred in 
the latter part of the 13th century and continued through the 14th century. During this time 
interval, three large significant wars broke out between these two polities: in 1294, 1350, and 
1378. This pattern of debilitating wars that Venice enters over the course of the 14th century 
helps to explain the path Venice chose to take in order to build their Terraferma, or land based 
empire, which can be seen in the 15th century. In addition, these wars explain Genoa’s weakened 
state entering the 15th century and why that city-state ultimately succumbed to foreign 
intervention and why they chose to accept foreign rule in place of independence. This period of 
time, stretching from the end of the thirteenth century through to the fifteenth century, serves as a 
perfect lens with which to view both Venice and Genoa as their institutions and cities will be put 
to the test while attempting to navigate these perilous times, which saw many wars break out, 
economic crisis ensue, and also the appearance of the “Black Death” in the mid-fourteenth 
century, which would rock the very foundations of the Mediterranean world.  
According to John Martin and Denis Romano who wrote Venice Reconsidered, a book 
that offers a fresh look at the Republic of Venice with the most recent documentation on the city, 
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illustrates that this was a particularly trying and troubling time for Venice who found itself over 
extended and without many allies close to home. They further asserted that this century was:  
“Sandwiched between these two periods of expansion and growth is the problematic 14th 
century. Venice’s claim to dominance of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean had come 
under siege. The decisive defeat of Pisa and the hands of the Genoa in 1284 and the 
resurgence of Byzantine power in the eastern Mediterranean once again made Genoa a 
formidable threat to Venetian commerce in the East. Venice’s hegemony in the Adriatic 
were challenged by Bologna and Ancona. The key port of Zara, on the Dalmatian coast, 
essential to Venetian control of the Adriatic, was in rebellion, encouraged by the 
Hungarians. At home, food shortages and a constricting economy resulted in general 
unrest marked by sporadic uprisings... The badly deteriorating political situation in the 
latter part of the 13th century resulted in the much discussed piece of legislation that has 
come to be called the ‘Serrata’ or ‘closing.’”255 
 
As one can see from this, Genoa at the end of the 13th century saw their position increasingly 
strengthened from a badly defeated Pisa and a strong alliance with the newly formed Byzantine 
Empire centered in Constantinople. Although Venetians had gained considerable diplomatic and 
naval recognition for their efforts in the fourth crusade at the beginning of the 13th century, these 
benefits seem to have begun to fade and decline once the Genoese gained the upper hand after 
1260. However, in the 15th century, these conditions seem to have been reversed with Venice 
appearing to have regained much of their lost territory along with additional territorial 
acquisitions in the Italian peninsula. Venice it seems, began to shift its attention from that of a 
maritime empire to that of a more land based domain, a response to the war of Chioggia that saw 
Venice herself besieged by enemies allied against her. This shift in attention is in part 
responsible for the growing political, social, and cultural developments that will lead and inspire 
the early Renaissance. At the same time, Genoa seems to have slid back to their old ways with 
incessant civil conflict and uprisings debilitating the abilities of the Genoese commune and trade 
fleet.  
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Now it is important to take into consideration the fact that city-states view their 
commercial operations and trading ventures as some of the most important functions of the city. 
This will be explained and demonstrated at length such as during the opening phases of the 
Battle of Chioggia when Pisani abandons a good portion of his fleet in order to save the Venetian 
cargo vessels. With that in mind, one can see that over the course of this hundred or so years that 
city-states like Venice and Genoa will risk everything and spare no cost in attempting to ensure 
the protection of these financial routes. Venice and Genoa in particular, show an uncanny ability 
to offer a significant number of varying responses that ended in only 3 major wars between these 
two states, which, when looked at over the course of the entire history, shows a period in which 
these two city-states acknowledge the fact that wars can be extremely costly and crippling to that 
of the integrity of their spheres of influence.   
Despite such beneficial economic booms in the 13th century, Europe and the 
Mediterranean suffered near the end of the 13th century and continued until the 15th century when 
this economic downturn was finally lifted. By the end of the 13th century, Charles of Anjou was 
in Southern Italy attempting to create his kingdom, the Latin Based Empire in Constantinople 
had fallen, along with the fall of Baghdad in 1258. When kingdoms are at war or when they fall 
to ruin, chaos and uncertainty take hold, which leads to troubling economic times for that region, 
despite any prosperity that had ensued prior to the downturn.  
In addition to these events, further dramatic political shifts occurred due to the high 
degree of change that ensued within the thirteenth century which helped ensue and create the 
foundation for this period of “troubles” (14th century) as Abulafia phrases it.256 To begin with, a 
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good number of crusades led by various European leaders, attempted to, in vain, secure and 
protect the Latin Kingdoms of the Levant. Land continued to “shrink” in this area as Muslim 
Kingdoms slowly began systematically wiping out the Latin Kingdoms of the Levant.  
Several crusades were even aimed at Egypt, as many European leaders believed that the 
Ayyubid Dynasty posed a greater threat to the Latin cities. A crusade launched in 1219 gained 
brief success in capturing Damietta, but was ultimately repulsed, only to have the same thing 
happen in 1248 when Louis IX, the King of France, also failed in conquering the city.257 
However in 1250, military commanders of slave origin toppled the Ayyubid Dynasty in Egypt, 
which ushered in a period of Mamluk rule in both Egypt and Syria.258 The Mamluks were 
determined to drive out the Latin Kingdom and achieved their goal in 1291 when Acre, the last 
Christian city, fell in the Levant, cutting off access to trade conducted by the Italian city-states 
that had achieved monopolies in this area. In 1261, this situation intensified with the fall of the 
Latin Kingdom situated in Constantinople by the Greeks of Nikaia, who sought to reclaim the 
old capital of the Byzantine Empire in return for trading privileges and Black Sea trading 
ports.259 However Egypt was also a pace for commercial expansion and not just military 
conquest. The Venetians decided to refocus on this location during the latter 13th century. Venice 
reportedly, in order to outmaneuver the Genoese, decided to “strengthen her relationship with the 
new military caste of slave and former slave soldiers, a strategy that assumed heightened 
significance in 1291 when the Mamluks” captured Acre, the last crusader city left in the 
                                                          
257
 Abulafia, D. The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, USA, 
2011 pg. 348 
258
 Abulafia, D. The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, USA, 
2011 pg. 348 
259
 Abulafia, D. The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, USA, 
2011 pg. 349 
83 
 
Levant.260 The Genoese, “shifting their effort to the diplomatic front… allied themselves [in 
1260] with Michael Palaeologus, one of several Greek claimants to the throne in Constantinople 
and the one who seemed most likely to succeed in regaining that city”.261 The Greeks of Nikaia 
accomplished this goal with the help of the Genoese who chose to act diplomatically instead of 
engaging excessive hostilities. This of course, refers to the reasoning behind Genoese support for 
the resurgence of Byzantine rule. Venice had achieved much from the forth crusade, placing 
Genoa at a distinct disadvantage which they hoped to correct. Instead of engaging Venice head-
on in an all-out war, Genoa instead, chose to act through the Byzantines, which helped them 
achieve their goals, which in turn, helped achieve Genoa’s goal of a weakened Venice. 
Diplomacy alone, it seems, expanded Genoa’s trading options and simultaneously placed Venice 
at a distinct disadvantage, as they were no friends of the new Byzantine Empire.  
In the western Mediterranean, the situation was not any more tranquil. In the mid to latter 
13th century, wars broke out between the Papal States and Frederick of the Holy Roman Empire 
over claims to Northern Italy.262 Civil uprisings and internal conflicts spread throughout Italy and 
Sicily. According to the Sicilian Vespers, on March 20th, 1282 in Sicily, men and women woke 
up “to the sound of bells” where “messengers ran through the city calling on men of Palermo to 
rise against the Oppressor [(French)]” and at once the streets “were full of angry men, crying 
‘Death to the French.’”263 These uprisings are a result of both polities attempting to assert control 
over Southern Italy. In addition, this naturally sparked unrest in a number of city-sates, as old 
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political divisions between loyalties to the Guelfs and Ghibellines began to intensify. This was 
further complicated by the wars to the South of Italy between Charles of Anjou and King Peter 
III of Aragon over Sicily.264 This along with conflicts in North Africa, left a fractured 
Mediterranean divided, due to internal conflicts and exterior wars.   
During the latter 13th century and into the 14th century, three main wars were raged 
between the Italian city-states of Genoa and Venice that significantly weakened their strategic 
positions within the Mediterranean and placed even greater strains on their already stressed 
institutions. These moments of conflict occurred due mostly to disputes centering on control of 
the strategic Black Sea trade routes and their financial gains. Genoa, who had a trading base at 
Caffa, focused on slaves, grains, dried fruits, local products, and good quality wax, whereas the 
Venetians, located at Azoz, were more focused on luxury items.265 The fact that these rival cities 
both had trading bases in such close proximity to each other within the Black Sea, caused 
inevitable conflict. In order to wage war, city-states tended to favor preying on rival city-states 
trade conveys, which economically can cripple a city-state if enough valued merchandise is 
plundered. City-states were keen to develop strategies for assaulting these merchant vessels. 
Susan Rosan who wrote Medieval Naval Warfare: 1000-1500, concludes that: 
“Sailing was confined to the summer months between April and October, meant that 
ships on trading voyages could be reliably found at certain “pinch points” on their routes 
at well-known times. The effect of this was that an opposing fleet need only be ‘on 
station’ for a short time to have a good chance of taking a high proportion of the enemy’s 
trading vessels. Since trade was… of vital importance to both states, a successful actor 
like this was not just commerce raiding but a severe blow to the losing states security.”266 
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From this, one can see that the successful mastery of ascertaining these locations could yield a 
city-state or an aggressor considerable income and severely weaken the security and well-being 
of that city-state’s economy and social integrity.  
 Therefore, in the mid-thirteenth century, one can see the differences in responses and 
tactics when hostilities were at a height between Venice in Genoa. In order to protect their 
merchant vessels, the Venetian government organized there trade ships into conveys with armed 
escorts called a muda.267 In terms of Genoa, they attempted to go on the offensive, sending large 
fleets against large Genoese navies. Venice scored significant victories at Acre in 1258, near 
Settepozzi in 1263, and at Trapani in 1266.268 Genoa in response to this, adapted and began 
sending out smaller raiding parties targeting Venice’s merchant ships. In 1262, Genoese ships 
managed to plunder a years’ worth of cargo and merchandise for the city arriving from the Black 
Sea. In addition, in 1264, Admiral Simone Grillo tricked Venetian escorts into a false route and 
captured the Venetian muda heading from Constantinople to Venice.269 Genoa and Venice both 
realized that these conflicts were in fact working against their greater interests of trade 
domination as they hurt their overall spheres of influence. After this decade on fighting, Abulafia 
notes that Venice and Genoa had now achieved some level of relative peace. This chapter will 
specifically address those instances of major conflict in 1294, 1350, and 1378, but will also 
directly acknowledge the reasons as to why these moments occurred.  
i. 
The War of 1294: The Beginning of a New Era 
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Before explaining the events of the first significant conflict between Venice and Genoa, it 
is important to first understand the strategic positions and resources available at the time. This 
influences into a number of factors such as fleet size. Fleets, which had numbered once over 100 
during the ties of the early crusades, were reduced to about 60 galleys with a few notable 
exceptions.270 In Genoa, ship production was mostly private, instead of a state enterprise.271 In 
contrast, the Venetians, which had a state monopoly on shipbuilding, which were built in the 
Arsenale and then the Novo Arsenale, which was constructed in 1304.272  By 1324, this ship-
building complex was fully reformed and modernized to produce ships with the utmost 
efficiency. This state monopoly created an environment that was not particularly nurturing of 
innovation or technological advancement, which gave the Genoese an edge when fighting 
Venetian vessels. Genoese ships during this time were “larger and better equipped” than the 
Venetians, which could be due to lack of funds or the possibility that Venice was falling behind 
in the technological race.273 The Venetian Senate chose to build the Novo Arsenale in response 
to an increasingly dangerous shift in power toward the Genoese. In 1301, they also “declared that 
it was necessary to arm a permanent squadron for the protection of ‘the Gulf’ (Adriatic Sea).”274 
This further demonstrates the nature of city-states to adapt in varying degrees to the threats posed 
against their city and holdings.  
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Although as previously stated, these two city-states did engage in extensive naval and 
military operations. Both Venice and Genoa engaged in “complex naval operations over large 
stretches of the Mediterranean involving a sophisticated understanding of time and geography, 
utilizing the intelligence gathering, subterfuge, and variety of stratagems to bring enemies fleets 
to battle on favorable terms.”275 These complex naval operations included extensive preying on 
each other’s commercial shipping, which offers an explanation as to the severe decline of their 
commercial and military power during various portions of the 14th century. By 1294, Genoa was 
unquestionably the dominant force as far as western traders were concerned in Romania.276 This 
was made possible by good relations with the Byzantines, which became essential for those 
seeking to access the profitable waters of the Black Sea. This was made even more important 
after the fall of the last Latin Kingdoms along the Levant. Genoa, by this time, also had major 
colonies in Pera, adjacent to Constantinople, Caffa in Crimea, Tana within the Sea of Azov, and 
Chios in the Aegean.277 Venice, on the other hand, had many colonies and bases along the 
Aegean and the Peloponnese, the Island of Crete, and several islands within the Aegean that 
were controlled by Venetian noblemen but were not a part of the Serenissima.278 This gave 
Venice extensive control over the waters of the Aegean, Adriatic, and those around Crete, which 
they feared safety for, due to the rising threat of Genoa. That, and the fact that Venice was 
increasingly interested in reestablishing trade routes through the Black Sea, which were being 
blocked by the Genoese.  
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This in turn resulted in the inevitable war in which Venice felt the ever growing presence 
of the Genoese. By the end of the 13th century, one could see that “Genoese tactical superiority 
was as overwhelming as the Venetians’ had been at mid-century.”279 This in part is due to the 
utter defeat of the Pisans at the hands of the Genoese navy during the battle of Meloria in 1284, 
granting them partial supremacy in the west. During the onset of the war in 1294, the Genoese 
base at Pera “raised a scratch fleet of hastily armed merchant ships…though outnumbered….[the 
Genoese] inflicted a severe defeat on the overconfident Venetians, capturing most of their 
vessels.”280 In addition, the Genoese also caught the Venetian muda bound from Armenia off the 
port of Lajazzo and captured the majority of the goods the convoy contained.281 This 
demonstrates a tough start for the Venetians who have fallen victim to several of the advantages 
that Genoa possessed, including skilled sailors against over confident ones along with the 
strategy of preying on Venetian muda. This was in truth made more complicated with the 
“extension of the sailing season year round… made the task of choking off an enemy’s 
commerce by interception of a single convey impossible. The galley’s limitations as a 
blockading craft were considerably more evident in these new conditions of navigation.”282 This 
explains why Venice was still able to operate in this war despite these two significant defeats.  
For Genoa however, one of their most controversial “victories” occurred in 1295. During 
this year, Genoa “dispatched 165 galleys and 35,000 men,” a sizable maritime fleet the likes of 
which the Mediterranean would not see again for another 300 years, “but the Venetians evaded it 
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and the armada was forced to slink home.”283 The armada had been sent to Messina in Sicily, and 
had “dared” the Venetians to engage them, who were not so foolish to accept. However, this 
endeavor was not without a high price. Shortly after the return of the fleet and following the 
news of this “unparalleled and fruitless effort, and to some extent as a result of strain of 
financing and manning it, bitter internecine fighting broke out among the opposing parties at 
Genoa. No fleet at all was sent out that year while a Venetian fleet of some 70 galleys attacked 
Genoese processions in Romania, including even Pera and Caffa.”284 This shows how city-states 
must balance victory and defeat with the rising tide of civil unrest that the communes must learn 
to control in order to survive.  
In 1298, the ‘deciding’ battle of the war occurred. This was not necessarily deciding in 
the manner of utter destruction of one side’s fleets followed up by the invasion of the capital 
city; instead it was due to continuing unrest in Genoa that made them unable to continue the 
fight. The Battle occurred at the island of Curzola within the Adriatic, which was uncomfortably 
close for the Venetians. The battle consisted of 96 Venetian galleys led by Andrea Dandolo and 
77 Genoese galleys under the command of Lamba Doria.285 Genoa won a crushing victory over 
the Venetians sinking or capturing most of the Venetian galleys. Genoa also captured thousands 
of Venetian sailors, including the notorious Marco Polo, who was then imprisoned in Genoa.286 
However, after this great victory, the Genoese fleet did not continue onto Venice and besiege the 
city. Instead, they had to return home to deal with the growing civil war “between the Guelfs and 
the Ghibelline government of the metropolis growing increasingly dangerous and with the 
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expense of maintaining hostilities growing increasingly burdensome, [Genoa] needed to end this 
war on two fronts.”287 Genoa found this not to be too difficult to cease hostilities as all parties 
seemed to want to bring an end to the conflict. This in part is due to the large number of 
prisoners the Genoese now possessed both from Venice and Pisa during their conflicts. People 
are a resource that city-states must be very cautious and aware of so as not to find themselves 
under populated and vulnerable. Furthermore, “the Venetian failure to achieve decisive results by 
their attempt to destroy all of Genoa’s eastern commerce in the strenuous campaign of 1297 and 
the inability of Genoa to follow a naval victory with an attack on the enemy home city led to the 
peace.”288  
In the end, not much was resolved as the balance of power had not shifted significantly 
due to these military ventures. Pisa was still too weak to threaten Genoese dominance, and all 
three city-states agreed to exchange/ransom prisoners. However the main problem and key 
source of the conflict which was, the question of control over the Black Sea and Romania, were 
left unresolved. During the course of this conflict, both sides “were able to put out substantial 
fleets as great costs.”289 This was the first of a number of wars that prove to be more costly than 
beneficial as they realize that neither side is able to gain substantial progress against the other. 
Roger Crowley who wrote City of Fortune believes that the war “was conducted beyond the 
point of tactical reason and was immensely damaging to both parties” and that even “when the 
Pope attempted to arbitrate and meet half the costs of the Venetian claims personally, the 
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Republic was seized by irrational emotions and refused.”290 Despite the fact that both sides 
understood the risks and costs of extended naval warfare, it appears that neither was willing to 
enter into serious peace negotiations until they absolutely had to. This could be a result of 
desperate efforts on the part of the Venetians in order to curb the growing power of the 
Venetians, thus enabling them to allow a high degree of risk in order to achieve this goal.  
ii. 
The New Century and “The Black Death” 
Before discussing the second major conflict, it is essential to first look at the 50 year gap 
between the end of the first war in 1299 and the beginning of the second in 1350. Several 
significant political events along with disasters brought by the Black Death, wreak havoc on the 
Mediterranean state of affairs. The first of these events occurred in 1308 between three brothers 
seeking control of Ferrera, located along the Po River. One of the individuals seeking control, 
“Fresco, sought and received Venetian military support. For the Venetians, this seemed a golden 
opportunity to gain substantial control over the commercially important Po.”291 In Medieval Italy 
at this time, most political factions were split between the Guelfs and the Ghibellines. Madden 
reports that “these groups dated back to the eleventh century and the dispute is between the 
popes and the German Emperors of Italy. Since those same disputes regularly resurfaced and 
were often mixed liberally with Italian city-state independence, German wealth, and the freedom 
of the church…broadly speaking, the Guelfs were pro-papal, while the Ghibellines were pro-
imperial.”292 The Venetians aligned with the Ghibellines in an effort to subvert Papal control 
over the region since they technically were the overlords of the city. Therefore, it is not 
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surprising that when Pope Clement V opposed Fresco’s claim and instead supported his Guelf 
brother, hostilities ensued. The Papacy had offered Venice control over Ferrera as vassals who 
paid an annual rent, but the Great Council refused this, seeking to avoid undermining their 
authority to some foreign ruler.293  
This did not bode well with the Papal States. In response to their refusal, Clement V 
issued a formal Bull of excommunication against Doge Gradenigo and placed the city of Venice 
under interdict. Despite this move, Doge Gradenigo was under the opinion that “Venetians… 
need to safeguard their future in a dangerous world” thus “an opportunity like this to acquire firm 
control over shipping on the Po would not likely present itself again” and should be sought after 
by all means.294 Shortly thereafter, Venice annexed Ferrera. The pope, enraged by the Venetians 
actions, issued a crusade against the republic in 1309, and placed a devastating bull against the 
people of Venice, further excommunicating the Signoria and all Venetian citizens. Property 
throughout Christian lands were seized. Venice had acquired many enemies, grown jealous from 
Venice’s monopoly over much of the East, and thus many nations flocked to this crusade. The 
course of the war did not last long. The Venetian garrison at Ferrera was struck by disease, and 
quickly defeated by the crusader forces. Venice was unable to respond due to an unsuccessful 
coup in June of 1309 that left the people and government shocked.295 Due to the recent coup 
attempt and internal unrest, the Venetian commune created a new council charged with 
overseeing the security implementations passed by the Great Council. This new body was called 
the Council of Ten, whose responsibilities included overseeing the Signori di Notte—city guards 
who ensured no citizen entered the city armed, organize security for great council members, 
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intelligence gathering, diplomatic missions, investigating treason, and seeing that each sestieri of 
each district could provide enough well trained guards to ensure protection and maintenance of 
peace within the districts in addition to being able to respond to emergencies on behalf of the 
city.296  
The Venetians risked much in their efforts to expand their territory in the Italian 
mainland, which is the first instance of many that this city will undertake in order to enable their 
home-field security. In the wake of their defeat, they realized exactly how much they risked 
when the Signoria witnessed a portion of its city rise up against them. The Signoria proved 
robust along with their institutions sound, which allowed them to weather this coup and 
implement reforms like the Council of Ten, which they hoped would rectify the potential future 
unrest. 
This conflict with the Papacy will continue to surface well into the 15th, 16th, and 17th 
century as Italian city-states, such as Venice and the Papal States vie for control of the Italian 
mainland possessions. For example Pope Sixtus IV established an interdict on Venice in 1482, 
which brought about a short struggle between these two entities over the Venetians claim and 
siege of Ferrera. The interdict by Pop Sixtus read as: 
“If within 15 days the lords of Venice fail to raise the siege of Ferrera, they themselves 
and their subjects, supporters, advisors, and adherents, together with other specified 
cities, lands and places subject their rule, not to mention all persons both lay and clerical 
dwelling therein, shall, if they fail to obey the prescribed admonitions, orders and 
commandments, be accursed and excommunicate in their persons, while their possessions 
be laid open to plunder by all nations.”297 
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This demonstrates the Papacy’s power when going to war with any Christian nation under their 
religious sovereignty as states must be cautious when dealing with the Pope due to this ability. 
As we will see more in the next chapter, the Venetians are able to enter into conflict multiple 
times with the Papacy while walking the fine line of excommunication and hat that will mean for 
their city.   
Venice, now seeing the East become increasingly dangerous, began to look elsewhere to 
supplement any potential losses due to the fact that they were now beginning to lag behind the 
Genoese in trade. In 1317, Venice “set up regular maritime routes between the Mediterranean 
and the North Sea (Flanders and England)…Venetian ships could carry goods from the East far 
into the West taking on cargos of metals, wool, and textiles for the return voyage.”298 Routes like 
these become more prevalent among city-states as the Atlantic begins to open up due to 
technological advances in shipping. This in turn brings about more interlopers entering the 
Mediterranean world.  
In 1329, a new growing threat emerged near Venice within the Italy mainland. Verona 
had fallen to the Della Scala family who were openly hostile to Venice and other city-states in 
the area, and eventually expanded their territory adjacent to traditional Venetian lands.299  This 
family imposed stiff taxes on Venetian goods, causing a potential threat as this caused grain 
prices to rise. The city of Venice along had over 100,000 mouths to feed, which explains the 
potential economic and social crisis that could erupt should there be shortages of food. Their war 
cries for open conflict with some pushing for Venice to expand into the mainland. However, the 
Venetians, overall, preferred to not have outright war. Doge Francesco Dandolo did not truly like 
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the idea of expanding Venice onto the mainland and believed they were “sailors and 
businessmen, not soldiers and farmers.”300 Even though Venice had decided not to engage into 
open war with the Della Scala family, word spread throughout Italy that it had. It is not fully 
known whether this was intentional or not, however, what is certain, is that Venice greatly 
prospered from this news.  
The Della Scala family had wasted no time in creating enemies throughout the mainland 
through their territorial conquests and harsh taxes. Many enemies of the Della Scala family sent 
money and various forms of support in the hope that Venice would be powerful enough to 
eliminate this threat. In addition, the Visconti of Milan, Estes of Ferrara, and the Gonzagas of 
Mantura, offered military assistance and formed a league with the Venetians to crush the Della 
Scalas.301 The war was over by 1337, which saw Venice come into procession of Padua and 
Treviso. Upon this victory, Machiavelli reports that the Florentines did not benefit much from 
this alliance with Venice because the Venetians, “like all who enter into league with less 
powerful states than themselves, having acquired Trevigi and Vicenza, made peace with Mastino 
[della Scala] without the least regard for the Florentines.”302 Padua was awarded to the Carraras 
Family that had helped Venice throughout the war, but Treviso was added to the Venetian 
Republic, making it the first of many future mainland acquisitions to come.303 Despite the fact 
that Doge Francesco Dandolo had opposed open war, he was not amenable to the fact that 
fortune seemed to have turned against the Della Scala family and was quick to act 
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diplomatically, securing alliances in Italy and allowing Venice to reward herself with Treviso for 
committing a “service” for the Italian mainland overall.  
By 1314, Genoa had finally reasserted itself for Imperial rule, which it allowed itself to 
come under due to the ongoing civil unrest that had begun at the end of the 1294 war with 
Venice. However, from this period of 1317 to 1330-31, Genoa was engaged in a bloody civil war 
with various families and political factions vying for control.304 This in turn could provide a 
reason for a growing new presence in the western Mediterranean, the Catalans, which were a 
new conglomerate of city-states under the central authority of Barcelona. The major outcomes of 
this civil war is the heavy financial burden placed on the citizens of Genoa along with new 
fortifications that were erected around the city as Genoa saw itself attacked considerably from 
insurgents along its countryside, providing an excuse to reinforce the defense of the city.305  
Around the same time in 1332, Venice set out again to expand its trade operations into 
the Black Sea. After normalizing basic relations with the Byzantines, the Venetians sent Nicolo 
Giustinian, and ambassador and businessmen who “journeyed across the winter steppes to the 
Mongol court at Saray to request an audience with the Khan of the Golden Horde.”306 This was 
granted in 1333, where Nicolo spoke to the Great Khan on behalf of the Venetians “to beg the 
khan to allow the establishment of a trading colony and to grant commercial privileges at the 
settlement of Tana, on the Sea of Azoz.”307 This was an important site that Venice hoped to 
acquire. Tana, was within a location “well situated at the heart of the western Mongol Kingdom, 
ideally placed for journeys north to Moscow and Nizhni Novgorod, the river routes of the Don 
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and the Volga, and at the very head of the trans-Asian silk-road” in addition to the Sea of Azov 
being familiar terrain for Venetians who were used to “estuarine lakes with a mean depth of 8 
meters, whose channels and hidden shoals made travel difficult” for those not raised on the 
waters of the Venetian lagoons.308 This new trading base did not sit well with the Genoese, who 
was already battling the Venetians in other regions for monopolies in trade. The Genoese had felt 
the Black Sea and Sea of Azov to be their domain and resented the Venetians for interfering in it. 
The Venetian Senate also acknowledged the dangers of this new site, and they viewed Tana “as 
being precariously positioned ‘at the limits of the world and in the jaws of our enemies.’”309 In 
1341, the Great Khan, whom Nicolo Giustinian negotiated with, died, ushering in a period of 
uncertainty for the Italian city-states doing business in this region.  
The next major political events that ensued and rocked the foundation of the 
Mediterranean were brought about by the Black Death or Bubonic Plague, which threw both the 
European and Islamic worlds off balance. For the Islamic world, the Bubonic plague struck here 
first, presenting a new natural disaster that these states must deal with on top of the Christian 
attacks from the west and internal conflicts within their respective states. Ibn Khaldun, an Arab 
historian from this time, writes in 1348 that “A destructive plague…overtook the dynasties at the 
time of their senility…it lessened their power…Their situation approached the point of 
annihilation and dissolution…Civilization decreased with the decease of mankind. Cities were 
laid waste…The entire inhabited world changed.”310 Khaldun also had previously noted that this 
crisis was preceded by a period of economic downturn, which were caused most likely by the 
economic crisis growing in the Mediterranean at this time. Trade it seems, concerning gold and 
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commercial routes were cut drastically. The trade routes between North Africa and “the Sudan 
declined considerably, then almost ceased completely” as a result to this biological crisis.311 
Leading up to this at the beginning of the 14th century close to the 1340s, Europe 
appeared to be on the verge of an economic crisis. Famines were widespread due to population 
increase and financial institutions appeared to be failing.312 The culprits for those responsible for 
bringing the plague to Europe were, in fact, the Genoese, who caught the plague at their “trading 
base at Caffa in Crimea not by merchants but by Mongol Armies, who besieged Caffa in 1347” 
thus prompting “several Italian ships to flee from the war in the Crimea. Their path took them to 
Constantinople, but, even if they were not infected, there were stowaways onboard who were—
black rats who relished the grain that filled the holds of the Black Sea fleets and who carried 
plague flees, which also found homes in the bales of cloth in the cargo hold.”313 By 1347 the 
plague was devastating the Byzantine Capital, as it began to spread from there as people tried 
desperately to flee the disease. Later that year, those Genoese merchant vessels had reached 
Messina, the first European port to be infected.314  
The Black Death spread across European in a matter of years. It is said that potentially 
half the population of Europe perished in this crisis and major effects on the “social, economic, 
religious, and political life of the people of the Mediterranean.”315 In some places, such as 
Catalonia, up to 60 to 70% of the population perished as its spread intensified, taking on 
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“pneumonic form that could kill within hours of breathe-born infection.”316 This plague of the 
14th century might have been “the main agent in transformation within the Mediterranean and the 
lands beyond that led to the creation of a new order.”317 However, this was not the only factor 
and severed as an unbiased and independent variable in the grand scheme of affairs.  
The Black Death served to alter the framework, severely depleting populations of cities 
and severing lines of trade and communications, but also lessened the severity of the strain on 
the commercial, political, and social institutions of the state that were already under pressure 
from the growing populations. As such, although famine initially broke out as a result of the 
Black Death because there weren’t many people left to work the fields, this corrected itself 
quickly as there were fewer demands for foodstuffs in general. The great trading city populations 
of Venice and Genoa collapsed as the disease spread quickly through their narrow alleyways and 
tight streets.318 Venice alone had lost up to two thirds of its population along with losing the 
blood lines of 50 noble families. Roger Crowley writes that: 
“During the summer of 1348 the black-draped pontoons punted slowly through the fetid 
canals. The terrible cry rose up: ‘Dead bodies!’ ‘Dead bodies!’ Every house was 
compelled by punitive edicts to bring out corpses. Extraordinary measures were put in 
place to try to stem the death rate. A special health committee was convened; ships 
suspected of being infected were burned; all trade ground to a halt; the sale of wine was 
prohibited, taverns closed; criminals were let out of prison for lack of warders. The 
Rialto, the docks, the busy canals fell silent. Venice was gripped in gloom…the dead 
went on being tipped into pits—‘a layer of earth, then a layer of bodies, then another 
layer of earth’—‘just like lasagna’ an one Florentine writer unnervingly put it.”319 
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A Venetian artist Paolo Veneziano wrote, “Death himself motions the donor toward the Virgin, 
while an angel warns him that Man may die at any moment,” in describing how uncertain life 
and death had become in Venice.320 Another Florentine writer, Boccaccio, wrote that when the 
“pestilence” had arrived in Florence, as it did “over every other [region] of Italy… men and 
women alike, there appeared, at the beginning of the malady, certain swellings either on the 
groin or under the armpits, whereof some waxed of the bigness of common apples, others like 
unto an egg…name plague boils” would eventually appear “in every part of the body” and after 
such boils appeared, a “very certain token of coming death” would loom on the horizon for the 
victim.321 However, life went on. People within the Mediterranean knew that they had to move 
on from death; in fact, death was so common during this time, especially after the Black Death 
that people just went on with their lives. A Venetian Merchant named Andrea Contarini wrote 
his family member about the passing of his wife and son within months of each other. He states 
that he feels as if “a blade passed through [his] heart…as [he is] writing, one tear does not wait 
for the other.”322 A few years latter this same individual talks about bringing home his new 14 
year old “bellissima, bona he pura” thus demonstrating the relative speed with which individuals 
respond and recover from significant lose such as this. The old institutions, such as the merchant 
Fonduk, was still in place, city-states still raided and attacked each other, and European powers 
drew up elaborate plans for crusades against the powerful Mamluks in Egypt and Syria.323   
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Economic life began to recover anew as more land became available. New agriculture 
was cultivated, varying the commercial and economic life. By the 1400s, the population levels of 
Europe had begun to rise to pre-plague levels, thus prompting the Venetians, Genoese, and 
Catalans to not only continue to explore for new granary locations, but also increase 
specialization in trades of “all manner of goods” thus provoking the Mediterranean economy to 
take new shape.324 The collapse of the old banks in Italy allowed for the rise of new banks like 
the Medici Bank, which was tied to the political power and fame of the family.325 In the end, 
there is no question that the Black Death contributed to lasting psychological and political effects 
that have far reaching consequences. Fortune now begins to appear more frequent, or the 
perception of chance. Benjamin Kedar, who wrote Merchants in Crisis, asserts that: 
“Fortune appears as a major source of events, mostly unwelcome, also in the Genoese 
Annales of Stella and in the Cronica Venetiarum. This emergence of Fortune as an 
independent, largely amoral force indicates that the traditional perception of human fate 
was no longer adequate: Fortune, the personification of Chance, came to determine 
Man’s fate to a very large extent, and neither his sins nor righteousness were of much 
effect in face of her decree.”326 
This shows a new threat of fortune and will be the guide for many city-states when deciding how 
to proceed in the future. Fortune is usually associated with negative phenomenon that are used as 
tools to guide leaders with caution, in light of the greater unknown.  
iii. 
War of 1350 
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 With the Venetians and Genoese still vying for control of trade in the Black Sea, tensions 
again began to rise. Due to the “intermittent opportunistic taking of vulnerable vessels and their 
cargo by both sides flared into a more serious conflict between a Venetian fleet of armed galleys 
sent east under the command of Marco Ruzzini to deal with the quarrel over trading rights in 
Tana.”327 The Venetians caught 14 Genoese galleys in the harbor of Castro and captured 10 of 
these vessels, thus officially starting the next major war between Genoa and Venice in 1350. In 
response to these initial Venetian victories, Genoa dispatched a fleet in 1351, of 64 galleys to the 
Aegean under the command of Paganino Doria in an effort to disrupt Venetian shipping.328 
Venice had difficulties initially responding to this despite preparations in this region. Much of 
this difficulty, ultimately, came from a severe lack of man-power brought on by the decrease in 
population due to the Black Death. Frederick Lane estimated that “the usual Venetian draft 
would man about 25 galleys. Additional manpower had to be sought in Dalmatia and Greece.”329 
One could further acknowledge this fact by reviewing the “reduced size of these fleets, compared 
to the huge ones mustered in the 1290s, is more evidence of how both cities suffered from the 
plague.”330 If Venice was in fact suffering from a lack of man-power which it was, and every 
other state in Europe was dealing with the same situation at the time, one could conclude that 
since Venice lacked sufficient resources of people, they, therefore, could not easily launch large 
fleets which would then explain the reduced fleet sizes in Venice.  
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 In light of this, Venice chose to make several diplomatic and military alliances in order to 
garner enough power to take on Genoa. In 1351, Venice entered into an alliance with the King of 
Aragon and the Byzantine Empire.331 The King of Aragon had a special relationship with the 
Catalonians and thus provided Venice with their resources. This demonstrates a larger pattern of 
city-state behavior. Upon entering into a conflict with another city-state or state, Venice, tends to 
branch out diplomatically in an attempt to gain additional allies which they hope will tip the 
power-scale in their favor. This can be done by all sorts of means; however, Venice seems to be 
learning from this action over time and has, in the 14th through 16th centuries at least, 
consistently turned to the King of Aragon332 and the Catalans for aid when fighting the Genoese. 
Both of them act as rivals to Genoa and would be perfect allies. Venice’s goal in attacking Genoa 
is to cut off her shipping and commercial routes, and in order to do this, Venice needs allies 
closer to Genoa that can directly interfere with her commerce.   
 The Catalonians have been mentioned briefly before but not in any great detail. The 
Catalans were an important conglomerate of city-states under the authority of the wealthy city of 
Barcelona. In the 1220s, these cities saw a significant rise in power as they entered into the scene 
as a rival to both Pisa and Genoa. Catalans benefited greatly from the leadership of the Count of 
Catalonia, James “The Conqueror” I, who was the King of Aragon.333 He provided substantial 
protection and resources in return for their alliance. James I was a more enlightened ruler in the 
sense that he had the capacity to perceive and understand both threats and opportunities. For 
example, instead of banishing and barring Jews and Muslims entrance from his cities, he instead 
encourages them to come as he receives economic incentives such as extra taxes and fees on 
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imports and exports.334 This in turn encouraged religious tolerance, even if it is for financial 
reasons. Catalans were skilled sailors, and by the end of the 13th century, “Catalan ships had a 
good reputation for safety and reliability.”335 Most of the trade that the Catalans focused on, 
occurred in the Western half of the Mediterranean, which brought them into contact and conflicts 
with both the Pisans and Genoese. Abulafia reports that Catalans were skilled entrepreneurs, 
muscling “into the Mediterranean trade networks through piracy as well as honest business.”336 
This made them a very valuable ally to Venice, especially after the city was so badly weakened 
from the Black Death.  
 With the Alliance formed, the powers that created it attempted to mass a fleet in which to 
assault Genoese galleys in the Aegean and near the Golden Horn. The fleet numbered to about 
60 ships, with 12 coming from Catalan/Aragon, 8 Greek ships in Venetian pay, 12 Greek ships 
funded by the Byzantines, and the rest were Venetian, all under the command of Nicolo 
Pisani.337 In order to be effective, however, these ships had to link up in order to count their 
numbers to their advantage. In February of 1352, the Allied Venetian and Catalan ships 
attempted to meet their Greek and Byzantine allies in the Golden Horn. However, a Genoese 
fleet intercepted them near the Bosporus.338 This battle was mostly indecisive with both sides 
taking heavy casualties; however, the Genoese did manage to turn the Venetians back so as to 
prevent them from reaching the Greek ships. With this allied fleet failing to address the Genoese 
in the Aegean, the Byzantine Empire was forced to withdraw from the war. In 1353, Pisani once 
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again engaged a Genoese fleet, but this time off the coast of Sardinia. In August of that year, 
another allied fleet of 80 galleys under the command of Nicolo Pisani “inflicted a crushing defeat 
on Antonio Grimaldi off the harbor of Alghero in Sardinia” and managed to capture “41 of the 
60 Genoese galleys… along with their crews,” which had further consequences back home in 
Genoa because the “Guelfs and Ghibellines blamed one another for the disaster and civil war 
again threatened.”339 This was only averted due to the Genoese “placing the government in the 
hands of the ruler of Milan, its archbishop Giovanni Visconti.”340 Although Genoa lost some 
independence in this move, the Milanese still continued to carry out the war with Venice by 
helping them fund and man a fleet to send out the next year. Prior to this, however, the Catalans 
in 1353 sent a fleet to the Bosporus, losing one of its admirals, but inflicting damage on Genoese 
vessels.341  
 With Genoa now under the authority of Milan, Venice hoped that it would be able to sue 
for peace. Due to this belief, Venice gave Nicolo Pisani orders not to engage Paganino Doria, 
whom he had been hunting for over a year. Pisani chose to wait out the winter in Porto Longo, 
near Modon. Shortly after arriving, Doria and his fleet appeared off Modon, sneaked passed the 
Venetian galley at the mouth of the port, and engaged the Venetian fleet, taking most of the crew 
prisoner including Pisani.342 According to the Genoese, they captured “36 Venetian galleys and 5 
large ships” which was a great achievement because “Doria’s fleet consisted of only 25 galleys, 
probably all the plague stricken, recently defeated city could scrape together—another testimony 
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to Genoa’s reduced resources.” Despite this victory for Genoa, “both sides were exhausted, and 
in June 1355, the nephews of the late archbishops of Milan, Maffeo, Bernabo, and Galeazzo 
Visconti, mediated a peace” between the too severely weakened city-republics.343 
 In the end, it is clear that the war benefited neither side. The war left Venice beaten 
badly, and it was not in a position to hold back the Hungarians who were now beginning to 
threaten both the Istria and Dalmatian coasts. Genoa no longer was fully independent, and was 
fully reliant on the Milanese to keep peace within Genoa and the countryside. Although Genoa 
was now quasi-dependent, they still benefited from resources of the overlords and there relative 
well maintained trade routes during this time period. Venice was in a lot worse shape. Elisabeth 
Crouzet-Pavan explains that for the Venetian State of affairs: 
“Venetian interests in Dalmattia and Istria had been weakened by a coalition of Venetian 
enemies, old and new. Rebellion broke out in Zara at regular intervals. Venice lost 
Dalmatia after a war with Hungary (1358), and the doge was reduced to being merely dux 
Veneciarum et cetera, losing the title of dux Dalmatie, which had been his since Pietro II 
Orseolo had added it to the doge’s title. When it lost Dalmatia, Venice lost ports for its 
ships, bases of operations against pirates, and a reserve of naval manpower. A serious 
revolt was put down in Crete only at the high cost, paid by the public treasury, of sending 
a contingent of mercenaries. Competition with Genoa remained bitter. Enemy merchants 
confronted one another in the Black Sea, especially at Trebizond, a port on the northern 
coast of Anatolia and a starting point for routes to Persia, and at Tana in Crimea, a major 
slave market.”344 
This does not paint a good picture when pondering Venice’s position as shipbuilding, an 
essential process that the city must be able to do, which has just become incredibly more difficult 
due to their loss of significant territory along the Adriatic. In addition, one can see how 
politically unstable Venice had become during this war. Before peace was formally negotiated, a 
coup was attempted in order to overthrow the ruling Doge. Marino Falier was the mastermind 
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behind the coup attempt and initiated it in 1354. This excerpt from the Morosini Codex shows 
how the government chose to react: 
“Either for this reason or because he was urged on by the spirit of the Devil, he collected 
some men of the people, sailors and other persons of the lower class, and plotted to have 
the city of Venice subjected to his domination like a tyranny, but God and the Evangelist 
St. Mark, who by their divine grace have never allowed this to happen, nor will they ever 
allow it, inspired some men who were in the conspiracy to reveal it, so at one the doge 
Signoria, as quickly as they could, secured every entrance of the square, and the doge was 
brought to justice on the staircase of the palace, and was at once decapitated.”345 
This shows how well the social and political institutions of Venice work because, conspiracy 
attempts like this genuinely fail to succeed or occur frequently throughout Venetian history. In 
addition, it calls upon the very foundation of the Venetian state arguing that true Venetians want 
liberty and would do anything in their power to stop Tyranny in their city. This was shocking as 
the coup was attempted whilst in the middle of a war with their main rival Genoa, but still 
demonstrates exactly how the Venetian Signoria is able to deal with threats like this. Genoa and 
Venice maintain a relative peace until the next great conflict which erupted in 1378. 
iv. 
War of Chioggia 
 The war of 1378, or War of Chioggia, was initially caused by “a quarrel over right to 
control Tenedos, an island in a strategic position at the mouth of the Dardanelles, which as a 
fortified galley base could control access to Constantinople and the Black Sea.”346 Both city-
states had claims to this island and feared the amount of control the other city could impose on 
access to the Black Sea. This location was even more important to the Venetians as they saw the 
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island of Cyprus come under Genoese influence. Genoa felt the island was theirs as Emperor 
Andronicus IV of the Byzantine Empire granted them the rights to settle.347 However, at the 
same time, another rival faction seeking power in the Byzantine Empire promised Venice the 
same island.  
These events allude to yet another pattern between Genoa and Venice upon entering into 
conflict that revolves around their desire to control specific choke points and their resolve to 
ensure the other did not succeed. Both city-states are attempting to create monopolies or boost 
their power in specific regions in order to push out rivals and better control the trade. The War of 
1378, and the wars prior are a result of city-states carrying out this duty until they arrive at an 
impasse that can only be resolved militarily, at least in their eyes. City-states, Venice for 
example, are exceptionally skilled and adaptable when negotiating with larger states; however, 
this same skill and tenacity appears to fall short when negotiating with other city-states. 
Although Venice and Genoa stay mostly at peace during this century, this is negated by 
devastating wars that both suffered through in order to make negligible gains in the end. 
Furthermore, another pattern that is exhibited from this onset are the strategic diplomatic 
alliances that both sides attempted to make. This again is a result of city-states limited power and 
their fear and insecurity in mounting wars alone due to their incapacity to conquer and hold large 
swaths of territory at great distances from themselves. Although city-states are able to make 
substantial territorial gains, these gains appear to be mostly temporary, with few exceptions, 
thereby prompting city-states to attempt to make more long lasting effects by cumulating allies.  
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 During this conflict, both Genoa and Venice made a series of diplomatic moves in an 
effort to change the balance of power in the war. Genoa made an alliance with Venice’s 
traditional enemy, Hungary, who was willing to launch another war effort against Venice in 
order to further secure their hold over the Dalmatian coast. In addition to this, Genoa formed an 
alliance with Francesco Carrara, the Despot of Padua, who felt threatened by Venetian 
dominance in the region.348 Other Italian cities for this same reason chose to side with Genoa. In 
addition, Genoa furthered their chances of victory by neutralizing Aragon by agreeing to not 
interfere in Sardinia.349 A high price, but one Genoa thought was worth it. This essentially left 
Venice surrounded, leaving only its fleets and lagoon for protection against a siege. Upon 
discovering news of this, Venice ordered all Galleys back to the city and the lagoon, under the 
command of Vettor Pisani, nephew of Nicolo.350  
 Venice also had a few diplomatic moves, but not to the same extent as Genoa. With 
Aragon and the Catalans firmly out of the war, the Venetians had few allies to choose from. The 
Venetians did manage to form an alliance with Milan, led by Bernabo Visconti, who had 
expressed a desire to reassert control over Genoa after they reasserted their independence shortly 
after the last war. To further add to this, Peter II, King of Jerusalem and Cyprus, who was angry 
over Genoese interference and invasions of his island, joined with Venice as a common enemy of 
Genoa.351 Despite successfully creating an alliance, Genoa was in a far greater position as far as 
allies were concerned and their strategic locations. Milan was close to Genoa but could not do 
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much aside from launch a land invasion on Genoese assets in Italy, making them strategically 
placed but not the best allies.  
 The first main battle occurred in 1379 within the Adriatic. Venice, who knew its strategic 
position was compromised due to the high volume of enemies in their immediate vicinity, had 
tried to recall as many galleys as it could, sending the rest to the Aegean and Golden Horn to raid 
Genoese possessions. After linking up with Hungarian ships at Zara, Luciano Doria, an admiral 
for Genoa, discovered 21 Venetian galleys.352 These galleys were under the Command of Vettor 
Pisani who was attempting to transport his mude back to Venice and had stopped here to conduct 
some repairs on his ships. The Genoese appeared off Pola in Istria. Pisani had 16 galie sotil and 5 
galie grosse ships under his command, but the Genoese outnumbered them forcing Pisani to 
abandon 15 Venetian vessels and crews in order to protect the 5 galie grosse ships which held 
the merchandise and booty Pisani would have been responsible to protect at all costs.353 Genoa 
captured the crews of the 15 galleys which was a major blow to Venice, already hurting for 
manpower. However, this was not all good news for Genoa as their admiral, Luciano Doria, was 
killed in the fighting. Pietro Doria was sent from Genoa and assigned to take command of the 
fleet upon arriving a few weeks later with additional reserve ships.354 With this fleet destroyed 
and an enemy fleet so close to Venice herself, the city found that it was in the worst position it 
had ever been. The Hungarians threatened from the North, the Carrarese occupied the Venetian 
Terra Firma to the west, and the Genoese fleet had complete control of the Adriatic, and “with 
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supplies cut off, Venice was threatened with starvation.”355 Upon his return to the city, Vettor 
Pisani was imprisoned by the Senate. They believed his actions during the previous battle 
accounted for his cowardice, and he was not only jailed but stripped of his command.356 Due to 
this, Venice now not only lacked a significant fleet with which to defend the lagoon, but had just 
imprisoned the most experienced commander they possessed in the city, as Carlo Zeno, another 
skilled Venetian admiral, was raiding the Genoese and would not return home until next year to 
relieve the siege of Venice.  
 In August of 1379, Paduan and Genoese forces attacked and occupied the Chioggia, 
located at the Southern entrance of the lagoon.357 This had never before occurred in Venetian 
history, were a foreign army controlled a portion of the lagoon. Venice however, fought back 
with resilience. Vettor Pisani was immediately released from prison, and placed back in 
command of 6 galleys to defend the lagoon, and immediately upon release, Pisani began 
formulating plans to use the lagoon and waterways to isolate Genoese forces.358 In addition, 
Venice prepared tremendous defenses. They sunk ships at large openings of the lagoon to create 
chokepoints, rallied the residents of Venice to arms in defense of the city, and maintained an 
overall sense of order despite “staring starvation in the face.”359 One thing was certain in the 
minds of the Venetians, if they were to come under siege, Venetians were ready to fight back and 
defend their city till the end. This is a tribute to the urban legends surrounding this city that the 
residents of which are willing to commit so much to protect themselves. This in part can be 
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accredited to the social and political institutions that help formulate myths and legends which 
develops a sense of patriotism and nationalism. An institution any city would need if faced with 
an attack from an enemy army. The Genoese found themselves isolated and unable to make 
further progress as the remaining forces prepared for a siege.  
 Finally, after facing siege for some months, help arrived. In 1380, Carlo Zeno returned 
with a fleet of Galleys and began to blockade the Genoese in the lagoon.360 The Genoese now 
found themselves besieged. They held out in hopes of relief from home, but ultimately their 
efforts were in vain as they tried desperately to clear the canals. Months of skirmishes ensued 
until finally, in June of 1380, “running out of food and ammunition, the Genoese forces in 
Chioggia surrendered. The Venetians captured four thousand Genoese citizens and 19 
galleys.”361 This battle lasted in total a few months, and as this was occurring, some Milanese 
forces captured a few Genoese processions. Both Vettor Pisani and Pietro Doria fell during these 
months.362  
 The Morosini Codex in the Patrician Chronicles portray a distinct account of the battle 
from the Venetians point of view. During the months of battle as Pisani initiates his night raids, 
an account reports that: 
“It was great marvel that after the Genoese seized Chioggia, their galleys had never been 
so united that some of them were not at sea, also two galleys or one alone were 
accustomed to stand guard over the harbor, but on this day all of them were enclosed at 
Chioggia; and it was even more remarkable that our fleet stayed for several days within 
the canal of St. Mark, and remained there, and all this was not hidden from the 
enemy…And the eyes and understanding of the enemy could not believe that they had set 
out with such a fleet of galleys, because they were awaiting the noble captain misier 
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Carlo Zeno who was expected to return from overseas…The enemy…aroused themselves 
at once, astonished at so many galleys and regretting their own negligence, and realizing 
that at that very moment that they were keeping us besieged conditions had now changed 
and they were enclosed even more closely, and in such a manner that the seas and rivers 
which had previously been closed to [the Venetians] were now open, and now the 
[Genoese] were at a disadvantage…Hearts and stones would have been moved to 
compassion, seeing two such notable and powerful communities which for the sake of 
destroying each other had placed all their forces on land and sea, and on one side and the 
other were well supplied with noble Lombard men, cannon, mangonels, and crossbows 
with which many were killed, among them the brave captain misier Pietro Doria of the 
Genoese who, wishing to go outside from the galleys, was killed by cannon fire.”363  
Much hope had clearly returned to the city with the release of Vettor Pisani and his new tactics. 
That along with his successful night raids allowed Venice to not only turn the tides on Genoa, 
but also hold out until Carlo Zeno arrived with reinforcements. The Genoese were clearly 
surprised by the attack from within the city, as one can see from their positioning, which would 
have been suited to confront an opponent attempting to enter the lagoons, such as Carlo Zeno. 
The Genoese clearly underestimated the resilience of the Venetian people. From this one can 
also see and acknowledge the strenuous conditions both armies must have faced as both 
eventually faced starvation from sieges. Not to mention that the entire population of Venice also 
had to be fed, thus put the city in a very precarious place. Clearly both sides suffered and lost 
much during this battle alone.  
 The War of Chioggia ended in 1381 with the peace of Turin. Further conditions of the 
treaty required Tenedos to be granted to the Genoese, after the Venetians destroyed all 
fortifications on the island, and that Venice was to agree not to interfere in the conflict between 
Cyprus and Genoa.364 In addition, Venice had to acknowledge the loss of some Dalmatian 
territories to the Hungarians; however, they were still left with the trading disputes over the 
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Black Sea and Romania.365 Although the Genoese and Paduans were badly weakened, there were 
still the Hungarians to the North to worry about. The Venetians also lost Tenedos, failed to 
recover Dalmatia, had to recognize Genoese rights in Cyprus, and lost its grain lands of Treviso 
to the Austrian Duke.366 Although these conditions appear harsh on Venice, their shrewd 
negotiation saved their city.  
v. 
Conflict: Tactics and Diplomacy 
 In the end, Venice ultimately recovered, surviving this period of downturn and launched 
the initiative to expand the Terrafirma so as to ensure Venetian security. Genoa in contrast began 
“to slip into a period of foreign domination, first by the Milanese, and then by the French.”367 
This is partly a result due to the very nature of the Mediterranean Sea. Faruk Tabak explains that 
the differences with Venice and Genoa stem from: 
“A larger order into which the Mediterranean itself dovetailed: the Inner Sea derived its 
main features from the historical attributes and qualities of two disparate worlds of which 
city-states were a part. One existed on its eastern most edges ‘with a well-developed and 
rich money economy’ into which the Venetian merchants were drawn. The other, where 
‘the development of a money economy had hardly begun,’ was a world the Genoese 
opened up and shaped in accordance with the requirements of the moneylenders and 
capitalists who led the colonization”368  
This meant that Venice and Genoa were both created and nurtured in different worlds that 
eventually came head to head with one another. But more importantly, this also signifies how 
these two maritime city-states were inherently different and enjoyed different advantages and 
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disadvantages. Venice will also further prosper during the 1380s and in the long term as this war 
created an atmosphere that saw Genoese power in the East decline due to internal strife and 
Genoa’s difficulty with staying independent from the Spanish and later, French Empires. Venice 
on the other hand will expand economically after this war because Venice will reestablish control 
over the Byzantine Empire and will take advantage of the Genoese withdrawal from the East.369  
 Another result of this conflict was that “while [Venice and Genoa] had been locked in 
rivalry, preying on one another’s commerce and undermining the financial stability of their own 
state as much as that of their rival by incurring the enormous expenses of galley warfare, 
Ottoman power in the region had been steadily increasing.”370 This will be a mistake that the 
Venetians will be to weak and too late to correct, as they enter the 15th century. Aside from these 
conflicts, Venetians and Genoese still managed to maintain stable relations in commerce as is 
shown in Constantinople where merchants from both cities traded alongside one another. This 
shows a complicated multilayered relationship that has created an environment were both parties 
respect the other city, and to a certain extent, expect them to follow equal rules in war.371 These 
city states also knew the importance and value of following these rules. For example, capturing a 
prisoner instead of killing him in battle offers your city a ransom, and some leverage over your 
enemy, whereas, his death, would yield you nothing but further anger. Also people were valuable 
to city-states and, therefore, both preferred to have their citizens captured instead of slaughtered. 
This same dynamic could be applied to trade in foreign cities as the continuation of this practice 
was not only profitable but necessary, especially, since raiders cannot seize enemy ships until 
                                                          
369
 Tabak, Faruk. Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870: A Geographical Approach. John Hopkins 
University Press, 2010. Pg. 18-19 
370
 Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500. Routledge New York, 2002. Pg. 109 
371
 Abulafia, D. The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, USA, 
2011 pg. 378 
116 
 
they’ve been gathered and collected onto ships in these cities, unless they could completely 
eliminate the others presence altogether. Furthermore, relations seemed to have improved after 
these three wars. After 1381, both city-states took caution “to avoid entanglements by defining 
their trading spheres and commercial interests with care: Venice remained the prime centre of the 
Levant trade, sending its galleys to Alexandria and Beruit in search of spices, the Genoese laid 
more emphasis on bulk goods carried in round ships—alum, grain, and dryfruits—searching out 
those products in Asia Minor, Greece, and the Black Sea.”372 This eventual achievement of 
separate spheres of influence demonstrates the final solution to their external struggle.  
 Throughout these wars, both city-states responded differently to threats presented to their 
cities and interests. Both Venice and Genoa did, however, respond either militarily, 
diplomatically- by successfully negotiating with larger states-, and through their defensive 
measures. Even after these crushing conflicts between Genoa and Venice, other states in the 
Mediterranean “from the house of Osman to the house of Aragon and from Byzantine emperor to 
the Mamluk Sultan, were forced to rely on the sea-going city-states to an extent greater than 
before, on their amphibious arsenal, their command of the sea lanes, and their ability to extend 
significant loans without difficulty or hesitation.”373 From initial observations of the three wars, 
it is clear that one could place a value on a city-states sizable fleet. They are important, but not 
essential. They are helpful, but costly, which could lead to civil strife. Susan Rose suggests that: 
“The elimination of a war fleet, while serious, did not spell ruin for the maritime cities. 
Great naval victories seem to have brought only minimal results. The capture of the entire 
Genoese fleet at Trapani in 1266 did not end the war, nor did other seemingly stunning 
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victories by one side or another. The loss of trained manpower that such a defeat entailed 
was apparently more damaging than the loss of the galleys.”374 
Even then, too much man power losses in war usually only led to a temporary suspension of 
hostilities, nevertheless, this would not enable long-term control of the Mediterranean to any one 
city-state.  
 During the wars, Genoa focused mostly on raising money for wars and enabling private 
enterprises to build ships for the city. In fact, Genoa’s main concern during periods of conflict 
was its ability to raise funds, which they were usually able to do, but at times with the price of 
civil unrest/war.375 Genoa would impose forced loans and special taxes on its citizens. Ship-
owners were also made to place their ships at the commune’s disposal, who would then seek and 
shell out compensation to the owners for time used. This could employ a heavy financial burden 
on that of the Genoese citizenry and people.  
But the Genoese were innovative in their actions pertaining to methods of conquering 
territory where no state funded fleet or army could invade. For example in February of 1347, the 
Genoese were planning the invasion of Chios and how to pay for the operation. In the end, “after 
long deliberations and planning of the invasion of Chios, an agreement was concluded… 
between the commune and a group of creditors represented by Simone Vignoso” with the 
association called “Maona of Chios.”376 The Commune also decided that “the debt owed to the 
ship-owners were repaid in shares, or luoghi, to an amount of 203,000 lire genovesi. This was 
less than the commanders of the ships demanded, but nonetheless they got property and the 
administration of Chios and the two Phocaeas, in addition to the revenues provided by the 
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luoghi.”377 This essentially created a state war, funded by private creditors, who, in return for 
their money and risk, would fund the war and potentially be rewarded with shares of what is 
gained. This represents a system that values private innovation and enterprise as opposed to firm 
state control.  
Building ships in Genoa was also centered on private enterprise. Genoa did not even 
attempt to have a state funded fleet until the 1370s under Doge Campofregoso. By 1402, the 
Commune possessed 4 galleys; however, private ship-owners with larger fleets could impose 
there will over the decisions of the Commune.378 The ensuing result of this is that the Commune 
is less powerful and carries less authority in important matters such as war in the face of 
powerful families or individuals.  
Venice in contrast, focused on state shipbuilding and control of merchant ships, planning 
for the future, and ensuring a calm population. What is truly remarkable is the extent to which 
the Venetian government attempted to keep tabs on their merchant and military fleets. The 
Venetian Commune did their utmost to “keep themselves informed of what was going on and 
even attempted to control events despite the distances sometimes involved and the difficulties 
with communications with vessels at sea,” which contrasts sharply with the Genoese 
commanders who had a much freer hand.379 To Venice, organizing a merchant or war fleet was a 
public matter of state, meaning that the State would act on behalf of the people in order to 
undertake this venture. In Venice, merchant ships benefit from the Venetian muda system that 
escorted merchant ships in convey with armed escorts. This was in addition to the standard 
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Venetian galley patrols that guarded Venetian waters.380 Venetians were also known for seeking 
out and destroying pirates within the Mediterranean so as to keep their waters calm and safe.  
The Venetians could also call upon the state run Arsenale. The Venetian Arsenale was 
the largest and best managed industry in the entire city, potentially the entire Mediterranean.381 
The Arsenale was designed to build, repair, and dismantle ships of various sizes. By the 14th 
century, this shipyard was well established and the old Arsenale which could hold space for 
twelve galleys, was expanded and modernized into the Arsenale Novo, which could produce 
three large merchant galleys a year.382 The Arsenale Novo could also produce the new great 
galleys. These new ships were “lateen-rigged triremes that could load up to 150 tons of cargo, 
though they also carried very large crews of maybe 200 sailors.”383 Venetians were well known 
by now for their skills in shipbuilding, as well as navigation. Abulafia reports that Venetian 
sailors had plenty of “exact information” about coast lines and seas, along with navigating more 
confidently with the increased efficiency and use of the compass, thus allowing Venetians to 
extend the sailing season across the year. This placed Venice among Genoa and Majorca as 
centers of cartography.384 In 1435, the Venetian Senate had declared that “out Arsenale is the 
best in the world.”385 Indeed they believed there Arsenal great as they invited many political and 
military leaders to marvel at its magnificence. By 1473, the Venetian Arsenal was “the greatest 
shipyard in Europe and the essential foundation of the state” built upon a system reliant of 
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commercial sea trade.386 Venice also had Arsenals built in several of its important colonies 
including Negroponte, Nauplia, and Candia.387 This created a system where Venice could pump 
out a substantial number of ships in a short time and in many different locations within the 
Mediterranean.  
Venice also had an excellent ability to prepare for the future and see conflicts on the 
horizon. Several historians have concluded that one of Venice’s most important attributes that its 
government chooses to employ is its ability to handle some levels of fortune effectively. Susan 
Rose cites historian Fredric Lane when arguing that, “‘the outcome of the Venetian-Genoese 
rivalry was not to depend on superiority of seamanship or naval operations’ but instead the 
deciding factors would be ‘their relative skill in social organization.’” Furthermore, Lane argues 
that, “in his view the Venetian Republic, for all its faults, was a more robust society than Genoa 
where factional rivalries were often out of control.” 388 This is a fair assessment as Venice’s trait 
of preparing for potential future problems have proven that the Republic is significantly more 
robust than Genoa, who had to, on a number of occasion, submit to foreign rule. An example of 
this can be seen in April of 1349, a year before the war of 1350. The Venetian Senate “required 
all the captains of Venetian armed galleys in [the Aegean], the Venetian authorities in 
Constantinople and the Consul of Tana to consult together about the damage done to Venetian 
merchants and their goods by the Genoese.”389 This was more important than ever since Venice 
had just been ravaged by the Black Death and their population numbers were more than likely 
highly depleted.  
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On the subject of man-power, Venice had various creative ways of luring individuals into 
manning galley crews due to man-power shortages. Permission was given to galley captains in 
Dalmatia to recruit men, in addition to an “issue of decree to be read out on the Rialto which 
gave detail of the better diet to be offered to galley-men, including 4 meals a day, good bread, 
and meat three times a week.”390 Usually men were recruited from Venice and not given such 
luxuries as was just described above, two signs that signal shortages of able-bodied men. 
Throughout this time, the “Senates main concern was to keep trade flowing as freely as possible 
provided this could be done without running undue risks.”391 One step that the Senate undertook 
was that they ordered the Arsenal to increase production of galley class ships. Furthermore, they 
also ordered their ships to avoid Caffa and Pera as not to antagonize the Genoese as they wanted 
negotiations, which they always “preferred to battle.”392 This shows a number of signs of 
insecurity and steps taking by the state to help better safeguard Venice and her assets. 
Lastly, Venetians excelled in calming their population and ensuring the benefits of state 
to go along with their rule. During the ‘Serrata’ or “closing,” the Venetian government saw its 
ruling body to expand and encompass a large amount of the nobility and wealthy families. This 
was not necessarily to fix once and for all the defining governmental group, but to instead allow 
for the “social and symbolic identity of the nobility to be refined and defended” from this point 
forward.393 According to Crouzet-Pavan, “by defining and ‘closing’ a dominant class, the 
aristocratic republic admittedly employed violence (at least symbolic violence) and worked to 
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produce obedience.”394 This in turn, assuming she is correct, would allow for Venice to produce 
a calmer more compliant population by simply expanding and then enclosing the ruling body.  
In the countryside too, Venetians employed tactics to appease and control the peasants 
and middle class folk living in the rural countryside, especially in districts like Treviso that was 
part of the Terrafirma and not in the capital Venice, herself. In the eyes of the Peasants living 
under Venetian rule, “it was not the Venetian landlords they liked so much as the access to 
Venetian markets…Venice was a huge consumer that drove up prices of all kinds of products but 
especially agricultural staples such as grain and wine.”395 Venice, had at its disposal, an 
immensely prosperous economy that people from all over sought to take part in. This provided 
an attractive market incentive to the peasantry that they had been denied prior. This was also 
seen in a later conflict which this thesis will discuss revolving around the war of the League of 
Cambrai in 1508. Pietro Bembo, a Venetian historian writes that upon Venice’s defeat at the 
hands of the French and the subsequent invasion by French and German forces in 1509, Padua 
responded in favor of Venice, the party that appeared to be on the losing side. Bembo reports that 
when the people of Padua heard of the horrible news of the Venetian defeat and saw “the 
Republic under pressure from all sides, they convened a citizen council” where “they passed a 
proposal to collect 500 gold pounds without delay and send it to Venice” along with appointing 
ambassadors to the Senate to let them know that Padua will “do everything to help [Venice] that 
might be commanded of them.”396 In short, in return for participation in the Venetian market, the 
peasantry and cities under Venetian authority remained calm for the most part and willing to help 
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Venice in moments that their overlords come under threat. It is because of institutions and 
systems of state control such as this that allow Venice, and not Genoa, to continue to survive and 
thrive independently into the 18th century while facing a new and dangerous adversary, the 
Ottoman Empire.  
4 “The City-State That Withstood a Millennia: Venice’s Adaptive and Resilient 
Course” 
 Many different states and polities exist within the framework of the Mediterranean world. 
As we have seen through the progression of time, new and foreign entities continue to emerge 
within or outside of the Mediterranean altering the current state of affairs and upsetting the 
balance of power. During the 1300s, as Venice was locked in a desperate struggle with Genoa for 
commercial domination of the Mediterranean, a new threat in the East had begun to arise and 
develop.  This new danger was the Ottoman Empire.  In addition, we can see how Venice slowly 
begins to turn away from her traditional place at sea, as the city begins to expand on the Italian 
mainland, which they hoped to expand in order to ensure that the events surrounding the War of 
Chioggia would never occur again. 
 Venice, one of the few thriving city-states left by the 1500s, was thrown into a new set of 
affairs where dangers lurk around every corner for this small maritime republic. In order to deal 
with these varying turn of events, Venice employed a strategy of appeasement and cooperation, 
while leaving physical conflict in the reserve, to be used at the paramount time, in order to deal 
with the mighty Ottoman Empire and various other European states such as the Spanish, 
Germans, French, and Austrians, who all hope to lay claims on Northern Italy. In this chapter, 
although Venice emerged weakened from the 14th century, one can still see the lessons learned 
from the Genoese war of Chioggia. Venice has now faced adversaries far stronger than they 
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themselves were, and survived, not from utter military domination, but instead by varying 
degrees of responses by engaging in diplomacy, appeasement, and then ultimately cooperation, 
which they find to be widely acceptable when attempting to preserve their commercial presence 
in the Mediterranean. 
 The city-states of Venice and Genoa emerge from the 14th century in a very cautious 
manner. They are both weakened, as previously stated, due to their debilitating wars in the 
previous 100 years, along with the economic crisis accompanied by the emergence of the Black 
Death. Yet despite all of this, both Venice and Genoa survived in one form or another. The 
previous chapters of this thesis have analyzed both Venice and Genoa simultaneously through the 
Mediterranean history. This chapter will divert from that pretext due to the fact that Genoa, from 
the 1400s onward, loses a significant amount of her independence due to constant civil uprisings 
in the city. Although Genoa had the most “powerful merchant marines of the Mediterranean 
world,” her commune, in desperation, will turn to Milan, Spain, and France at various times to 
step in and assert control over the situation. 397 Genoa’s commune will suffer from a lack of naval 
strength as the commune has no efficient system of calling up galleys for war and must instead 
rely upon their citizens and families. Genoa during this time will focus instead on the Western 
Mediterranean, leaving the East mostly to the Venetians and Ragusans. Genoa did however, see 
some economic resurgence with the opening of the Atlantic, its innovations in sugar cultivation, 
their discovery of new alum deposits, and Christopher Columbus’s (a Genoese born merchant) 
discovery of the New World in 1492.398 In addition, during the 16th century, Genoa enters into a 
                                                          
397Hattendorf and Unger, War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Rochester, NY, 2003. Pg. 
143-145 
398Abulafia, D. The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, USA, 
2011 pg. 409 
125 
 
period of time known to historians as the “century of the Genoese.”399 This period marked a time 
for Genoa, where their merchants hold supremacy throughout many European markets and 
institutions. Much of this was made possible, however, due to the fact that Genoa no longer 
existed as a purely independent entity and instead relied upon other European powers, like the 
French and Spanish, to run the city. For example, Thomas Kirk, a modern day historian on 
Genoa, notes that much of Genoa’s economic revitalization and dominance stemmed from how 
the Genoese “overwhelmingly dominated the Spanish Crown’s finances.”400 Some of this is due 
to Genoa’s close relationship to the Spanish as the King of Spain wanted to use Genoese 
shipping in the Atlantic. 
In light of this, Genoa’s actions over the course of the next two hundred years and 
onward, will reflect not necessarily those of the city, but of the larger national interests of Europe 
at play within northern Italy. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, this chapter will instead 
solely focus on Venice and her interactions with the Ottoman Empire and the various other larger 
states within Europe. Venice was never conquered during her time as a state until the time of 
Napoleon Bonaparte at the end of the 18th century, thus ensuring a clearer picture as to the 
motivations of the city-state specifically. Just like Genoa, Venice also thrived economically 
during the 15th century. Although Venice was at first cautious about approaching the Sublime 
Porte (Ottoman Empire), trade flourished during the 1400s and 1500s because of the Venetian’s 
relationship with the Ottomans and the acquisition of “fortunes in presence of Ottoman 
power.”401 This was the case because unlike Iberian and Italian polities that abide by a strict 
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Catholic doctrine to restrict access to their cities by Muslims, the Ottoman Empire as well as 
many other Islamic states “allowed for diverse settlement” thereby inviting foreigners to come 
and enter into commercial activities within their cities.402 
Besides this acquisition of fortune throughout the 15th century, Venice continued to focus 
on the expansion of their land based empire, or Stato de Terra(Terrafirma), which was enlarged 
due to a series of wars that the Venetians fought in the first half the 1400s. In 1425, Francesco 
Foscari became Doge, and Venice began establishing new alliance within the Italian mainland in 
order to challenge Milanese dominance.403 The war that ensued in 1426 lasted until 1428. 
However, this was not the end. Many additional short wars will follow in northern Italy between 
these two powers so that Venice could “enlarge its territorial state, not just nearby 
territories…but in Lombardy.”404 These conflicts initially went quite well for Venice who even 
had the hopes of capturing Milan itself. However, war carries a heavy financial burden, and due 
to this, Venice opted for peace. In 1454 with the Peace of Lodi. “the rights of Venice, La 
Dominante, over Brecia and Bergamo were confirmed, and Crema too became a Venetian 
possession.”405 In addition, Venice also acquired Apulia, and took Trieste and Fiume. In the end, 
thanks to “a skillful political opportunism and a firm expansionist policy, Venice played a 
winning game for some time.”406 This allowed the city’s territorial processions to expand 
                                                          
402
 Goffman, Daniel. The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Pg. 137 
403Crouzet-Pavan, Elisabeth, Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of Myth, translated by Lydia Cochrane, 
John Hopkins University Press, 2002. Pg 129 
404Crouzet-Pavan, Elisabeth, Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of Myth, translated by Lydia Cochrane, 
John Hopkins University Press, 2002. Pg 129 
405Crouzet-Pavan, Elisabeth, Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of Myth, translated by Lydia Cochrane, 
John Hopkins University Press, 2002. Pg 13 
406Crouzet-Pavan, Elisabeth, Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of Myth, translated by Lydia Cochrane, 
John Hopkins University Press, 2002. Pg 131 
127 
 
dreamily, thus bringing Venice into the position of a dominant land and sea based power at the 
top of the Adriatic. 
 
 
i. 
The Emergence of the Ottomans and the War for Negroponte 
Whilst this land-based expansion of Italy was occurring, the Venetian Empire is entering 
into a period of panic. Venice, like the rest of Europe, understood that “the advance of Turkish 
power in the Balkans was made plain… by the crushing defeat of a crusading army, mainly made 
up of French and Hungarian contingents, at Nicopolis in 1396.”407 For the Mediterranean, the 
“failed crusade of Nicopolis would have two important ramifications,” the first being that 
“Serbia, Albania, and Bosnia would come directly under Ottoman control” and the second being 
a significant physiological blow to Europe who was militarily bested by the Ottomans.408 Venice 
somewhat benefited initially from the Ottoman advance. The Ottomans, who were derived from 
Asia Minor, had already extinguished the rival Turkish factions in the home region and had 
begun outward expansion. This came at the expense of the Byzantine territory, as the Byzantine 
Empire was located adjacent to the Turks. Many coastal towns within the Aegean and Asia Minor 
sought the stable Venetian’s oversight and protection in the face of the “declining [Byzantine] 
Empire” which brought “Durazzo and Scutari in Albania, Lepanto, Patras, Argos, Nauplia, and 
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even briefly Athens” all under her authority.409 Due to Genoese and Catalan reluctance to enter 
the Eastern trade, Venice was able to in part, reassert her control over the Levant trade, although 
new rivals such as the Ragusans were beginning to emerge. This also occurred due to the 
Ottoman’s attention being turned toward the East to fight the Persians in central Asia.410 
During this time, Venice exerted no eagerness to confront the Ottoman’s conquest into the 
Mediterranean. Despite being mostly Christians, Venetians did not see themselves as the 
frontline of defense for the West. Instead, Venice hoped to “maintain as good relations as 
possible with the Ottomans consistent with maintaining their positions as merchants and control 
of their bases, particularly Negroponte and those in Morea.”411 However, at the earliest decades 
of the 15th century, the Ottoman naval strength was quite weak. We can see this in the year 1416 
when Pietro Loredano of Venice, was initially successful in destroying the bulk of the Ottoman’s 
ship Gallipoli, and Venetian bases in Morea, Modon, and Coron were “extensively refortified.”412 
Despite the Ottoman’s inadequacy in the seas in the very early 1400s, Venice still acknowledged 
Ottoman power on land and their potential to pose a significant threat to Venice herself, as the 
Ottomans were annihilating what was left of the Byzantine Empire. The maintenance and 
defense of the stato de mar is essential to Venice’s adaptive strategy of responding to military 
threats at a relatively fast paced speed. For example, in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans could 
rely on slaves to fill the scores of rowers that each vessel required. In contrast, Venice “had its 
Milizia da Mar, a government agency [designed] to organize conscription in Venice and its 
dependencies; nearly 4,000 oarsmen were owed by the Venetian guilds and confraternities, and at 
any time over 10,000 conscripts were on the books, from whom galley crews would be selected 
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by lot.”413 The concerns of the Venetians were warranted as Cyriac of Ancona, who was a 
traveler and Renaissance humanists, writes that due to Ottoman invasions near the Peloponnese, 
the Hungarians “transported some troops of cavalry and infantry from the Peloponnese into 
Anatolia and Ozolean Locris and Parnassian Phocis in order to set free places and cities that had 
long been occupied by the barbarians [(Turks)], and fought bravely and vigorously against the 
onrushing barbarian enemy.”414 The Peloponnese is a location of strategic importance to Venice 
as the city as dozens of fortresses, harbors, and ports within the Aegean.  
These fears were only compounded by the 40s and 50s, as the Ottomans begin claiming 
swathes of territory that were either conquered or given to them through gifts in the Balkans. In 
1453, Constantinople fell to Sultan Mehmet II who assumed the throne, establishing 
Constantinople as his new capital and began on a path that he believed would lead to a 
“revitalized Roman Empire controlled by Muslim Turks who would combine Roman-Byzantine, 
Turkic and Islamic concepts of rule.”415 This shows early signs of Mehmet’s intention to create a 
mixed city and empire that encompassed more than just his Muslim subjects. 
It is after the fall of Constantinople that terror seized the Venetians. This is evident 
because between “1456 and 1479 the Council of Ten authorized 14 attempts to poison Mehmet, 
via a string of unlikely operatives.”416 Venice also began immediately reinforcing its naval bases 
along the Aegean and other Eastern Islands in a desperate attempt to dissuade the Ottoman 
Sultan from assaulting these positions. Venice also felt the need for the construction of more 
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galleys and warships to protect the stato de mar and called for the extension of the Venetian 
Arsenal by adding 8 hectares of land to the complex, thus making it the “the greatest shipyard in 
Europe and ‘the essential foundation of the state.’”417 To add to this, “first, Negroponte and 
Nauplia, and then the Arsenal of Candia, an important strong point on Crete, were completely 
renovated between 1467 and 1470.”418  
The weakened state of the Venetian navy was made apparent from a Venetian Census of 
naval forces which determined their naval inferiority. A Venetian chronicler Marino Sanudo, 
explains that this is the case because “there are few ships, because until now, we had no fear of 
the Turks.”419 Despite the growing fears, Venice was still able to adjust and react to the turn of 
events. The result of these changes in the Venetian navy was “that the obligations imposed upon 
the captains of the Mude increased continually” for example in 1496 when “the galleys of the 
Barbary Coast convoy participated in a massive counter-attack, launched to limit the audacious 
actions of the Barbary Pirates.”420 Furthermore, galleys were armed “by the port cities” and “in 
the event of conflict these Dalmatian, Albanian, Greek, and Cretan cities were required by the 
terms of submission to Venice, to provide one or more galleys for the naval draft as was due to 
the metropolis.”421 This shows a clever, albeit risky, solution to amassing a great numbers of 
skilled sailors in times of danger posed toward the stato de mar. The risk posed to less defended 
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naval cities and mude naval convoys that could potentially be carrying exorbitant amounts of 
merchandise could prove costly in the long run. 
In 1463, after relatively peaceful relations between the Ottomans and the Venetians, both 
sides entered into conflict. The Venetians, despite calls to Europe and the rest of Christendom, 
were left to fight the Ottomans alone. Most rivals hoped that the Venetians and Ottomans would 
wear each other down; in fact, this is a grave misperception on the strength and stamina of the 
Ottoman Empire. Muslim naval power had grown considerably since the early 1400s. In the 
West, “Mamluk fleets off Egypt and Syria, Moroccan ships” patrolled the coasts, and “Turkish 
emirs within the Aegean” patrolled the East, “Muslim sea power had expanded outwards on a 
massive scale.”422 Constantinople had become a command center for an enormous Ottoman fleet. 
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the Venetian State “busied itself with the distribution of 
cannonballs, gunpowder, and oars to various strategic hubs, the construction of galleys and 
conscription of men; the supply of ships biscuits; urgent requisitions of masons and materials for 
the repair of fortifications; instructions of the Captain-General to track the Ottoman fleet, but 
‘only from afar and with discretion.’”423 
During this war, the Venetians faced stark lessons and hard times. The Ottomans, learning 
from earlier naval engagements, refused to fight the Venetians in the open sea, thus depriving the 
city-state of its superior naval skill. In the Peloponnese, the Venetian advance had been halted 
and reversed due to a new Turkish advance.424 However, this was just a side theatre. The real 
heart of the struggle lay in Negroponte, a Venetian stronghold located on an island used as a 
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military, naval, and commercial hub for the stato de mar. In 1470, Sultan Mehmet II personally 
led a fleet of 300 ships, 108 of them being galleys.425 Ottoman ships had recently received a few 
upgrades, including improved artillery and better sails that allow their ships to sail faster with 
larger crews. Venice did have 52 galleys and 18 nave vessels at Negroponte, but realized that 
they were heavily outnumbered, and unable to break the siege, fled to Crete.426 Negroponte fell 
later that year, and with it, the Ottomans obtained their real prize. During the conflict, Venice 
suffered due to the fact that the supply lines for their empire were heavily reliant on open and 
safe seas. The Ottomans used this to their advantage by initiating, raiding, and using the Barbary 
Corsairs to interfere with Venetian shipping, thus finding a weak point in their system. This war 
was also extremely expensive, costing the Venetians more than 1,250,000 ducats annually.427 To 
place this into context, this war alone lasted for close to 15 years, which created a considerable 
expense on any large state of the time, let alone a city-state. 
In 1475, Mehmet successfully campaigned and destroyed the Genoese and Venetian 
holdings within the Black Sea.428 With this, most of their possessions in the Aegean were lost 
including Negroponte, as the Ottomans continued raiding up the Adriatic; therefore, the 
Venetians finally began suing for peace. In 1479, the Venetians signed a harsh peace treaty 
stating that: 
“Scutari...was given up, Negroponte was gone forever and all other territories taken in the 
war returned to the Turks. After 1479, the Republic controlled just 26 forts in the 
Peloponnese; the Ottomans 50. In addition, they paid the Sultan 100,000 gold ducats 
outright and a further 10,000 a year for the right to trade in the Ottoman Empire. The 
bailo was restored to Constantinople.”429 
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However, despite this more than a decade long war, the relations between the Venetians 
and the Ottomans following the war were not adversarial. After the war, the Sublime Porte still 
afforded Venetians trading privileges. For the Venetians, the message from Mehmet was one in 
which they could tolerate “Christian merchants from overseas, just as Muslim rulers all around 
the Mediterranean had done for centuries; but they regarded Venetian or Genoese territorial 
dominion within the Akdeniz, or White Sea as unacceptable.”430 The Venetians continued to 
coexist with the Ottomans, although, this will not be easy as long as Mehmet II holds the throne 
due to his territorial ambitions. 
ii. 
Otranto and the Venetian-Ottoman War of 1499 
1480 was an eventful year in the Mediterranean, as both good and bad news would arrive 
to Christendom concerning major sieges that were underway. The good news for Europe was that 
Rhodes remained in Christian hands despite the Ottoman assault.431 However, as the Venetians 
had warned two decades earlier, bad news arrived to Europe that the Ottomans had attacked Italy, 
and the Venetians, to weak and unwilling to oppose them, chose instead to help the Ottomans by 
ferrying their troops across the bay. The Ottomans chose to attack the city of Otranto with 18,000 
men, and 40 war galleys led by Gedik Ahmet Pasha who slaughtered the entire male population 
of the city and enslaved the remaining populace.432 Marsilio Ficino, a Florentine humanist and 
scholar wrote a letter to the King of Hungary in which he implores him to help save Italy from 
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the “inhuman Turks” who are “unruly monsters who wickedly ravage the countryside, destroy 
the towns, and devour the people.”433 The Ottomans held Otranto for a year until they were 
eventually driven off by Alfonso V’s son Ferrante. This served as a shock to Europe and an alarm 
to the whole of Christendom, although besides promises of action, Europe did not move rapidly 
to stem the growing threat of the Ottomans. European nations will now slowly move toward the 
realization that the Ottomans are a serious threat, although not all nations will openly oppose 
them as some chose to maintain diplomatic relations such as the French. In the aftermath of the 
attack, Venice took the opportunity to assert its control over a number of Apulian ports including 
Traini, Brindisi, Monopoli, and Otranto, in order to guarantee free passage along the Adriatic 
straits.434 This was most likely easily accomplished in the aftermath of the Ottoman attack due to 
the need for order and the lack of power Ferrante commanded in the region, making it difficult to 
oppose, openly, the Venetian actions. 
The next significant conflict between the Ottomans and Venetians will not ensue until 
1499, as a result of further Ottoman territorial ambitions in the Aegean. Venice was alerted to the 
onslaught of this war by the Venetian bailo in Constantinople, Andrea Gritti.435 Andrea Gritti had 
established a grain trade in Constantinople and sent back encoded messages stating that “The 
Sultan continues to assemble a fleet.”436 Venice’s main problem was to determine where this fleet 
was headed. According to the famous Venetian humanist and historian Pietro Bembo, the Turks 
invasion of Zara “removed all doubt as to where the sultan’s fleet would invade, since he had 
marched his land forces into the republic’s territory—up to that point there were some who 
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believed that he was going to make war on Rhodes.”437438 Unfortunate for the Venetians, the 
Ottomans were after their processions yet again. In response to the Ottomans building a fleet, the 
Venetians commissioned one in April of 1499 and placed Antonio Grimani as the Captain 
General of the Sea to head the fleet.439 However, despite this successful launching, once the fleet 
had reached the Ottoman ships which had already set sail, the galley commanders refused to 
listen to Grimani.440 Pietro Bembo remarks that during this same war, galley captains in other 
squadrons also proved unable to engage the enemy due to cowardly fleet captains. He reports 
that upon reaching the Turkish galleys, the galley captains of the Venetian vessels “were 
hampered by fear and made the rower’s back-water…in a cowardly fashion.”441 With this, the 
fleet returned home where Grimani and the other galley captains were imprisoned. Due to the 
fleet not engaging the Ottomans, the Venetian strongholds all across Morea and the Peloponnese 
fell. In 1503, the Ottoman Sultan allowed the Venetian citizens to ransom themselves for 
freedom. One such individual, Andrea Gritti, did so and returned to Venice in March of that year. 
According to Bembo, Andrea Gritti returned to the city with a letter from the Ottoman General 
Admete proposing “that if they wanted to end the war which existed between them and Bayazid, 
they should send someone to Constantinople to negotiate peace terms, in which Admete would 
support him.”442 The peace treaty that occurred in 1503 stated: 
“Venice accepted the inevitable and signed a humiliating peace with Bayezit that 
confirmed everything he had won. Soon the Venetians would dip their flags to passing 
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Ottoman ships in implicit recognition of a vassal status they were too proud to publicly 
acknowledge. From now on, cooperation with their powerful Muslim neighbor would 
become an axiom of Venetian foreign policy, and the city would turn its attention 
increasingly to building a land empire.”443 
 With this, the second of the two significant wars ended, with Venice consistently losing 
territory in the East. Yet at the same time, Venice’s economy is still going strong due to their 
cooperation with the Ottomans in trade and other commercial activities, despite the outbreak of 
hostilities in the years prior. 
iii. 
The Italian Mainland Wars: The League of Cambrai and the League of Cognac 
 By the time of the late 15th century, the situation facing Venice on the Italian mainland 
had significantly changed. Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan describes this time as the “isolation of 
Venice, which occurred as a direct result of expanding the Terraferma. She further describes the 
situation by stating: 
“The isolation of Venice was evident during the war with Ferrara. War broke out in 1481 
because thee Venetians were no longer satisfied with their extensive privileges in that 
city, traditionally its rival. Hostilities ended in 1484. The conflict, which marked by Pope 
Sixtux IV’s declaration of an interdict against Venice, was long and costly, and its results 
were mixed. Venice failed to take Ferrara, but at the Peace of Bagnolo it received Rovigo 
ad the Polesine, the flatlands between the lower reaches of the Po and the Adige. This 
chronicle ends with the short lived War of Rovereto in the spring of 1487 against 
Archduke Sigismund, Count of the Tyrol. What it shows is that all of the neighbors of the 
Republic of Venice were worried about its advance.”444 
 As one can read, these wars, in addition to the earlier wars with Milan, have greatly 
expanded Venice’s territorial acquisitions in the Italian mainland, thus ensuring some sense of 
security should an enemy wish to attack Venice. Or so this is what the Venetian Senate was 
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hoping. However, one might argue that the inland expansion of Venice was in actuality the cause 
of many a problem for that city in Italy. Take into consideration the land mass that Venice now 
occupies. David Abulafia reports that “the Writ of Venice reached as far west as Bergamo, where 
the lion of St. Mark brushed against the serpent of Milan.”445 This Terrafirma expansion has 
brought Venice into close proximity with a good number of other Italian city-states, many of 
which are hoping to expand, like the Venetians. Milan, specifically, was a powerhouse in the 
region and constantly threatened their neighbors with their military superiority. This could prove 
to become quite a problem for the newly conquered territory that the Venetians had just acquired. 
In order to subvert some of the dangers posed toward Venice, Venice negotiated with France to 
enter into a war on their side against Milan in the late 15th century. The French were eager to 
accept since, as previously stated, they hoped to further assert their control and authority over 
Northern Italy. By 1499, Pietro Bembo reports that “with Cremona brought under the sway of the 
Republic, magistrates were sent to administer justice, Domenico Trevisan and Niccolo Foscarini, 
and two ambassadors, Niccolo Michiel and Benedetto Giustinian … all four were told to go to 
Milan together, there to welcome the king and congratulate him on his new realm in the name of 
the Republic.”446 This demonstrates another successful negotiation by Venice with a larger 
European state, France, where Venice is able to negate the threat of Milan, at least temporarily, 
and at the same time, continue to expand Venetian territorial ambitions. 
During the first half of the 16th century, Venice entered into two massive conflicts that 
would change the manner in which Venice is viewed internationally, and therefore, influences 
their tactics when negotiating with larger states. The first of these two conflicts is the War of the 
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League of Cambrai that was launched in 1508. During this time, many of the powerful European 
states to the north viewed northern Italy as ripe for the taking. Venice too attempted to take 
advantage of this time by further expanding the Terrafirma, a move that was very unpopular with 
the Papacy. In August of 1503, Pope Alexander VI died, ushering in a moment where Venetian 
diplomats might be able to organize the election of a Pope who would be favorable to Venetian 
expansion.447 Bembo states that Ligurian Julius II succeeded Alexander, which “the Republic had 
very much wanted” since they had “taken great pains to secure this outcome.”448 The Venetians 
believed they had won without causing any outbreak of hostilities with the Papal States. 
However, Julius I had other plans. Several of the towns that Venice hoped to secure authority 
over just so happened to also be under the interests of Julius I, who wanted to take them for 
himself. 
It is an interesting time for European states when they declare war on the Papal States. 
Often, such states are still Christian and have no intention of changing their religion; however, 
when warring with the Papacy, religion is usually never kept out of it. However, many states had 
entered into conflict with the Papacy, therefore, Venice did not have to “reinvent the wheel” per 
say, when explaining internationally, which is why it is acceptable to fight the leader of your 
faith. Paolo Sarpi, one of the most important Venetian historians and religious thinkers of the 
1600s, was “quick to admit the supremacy of the papacy in matters of faith, but concerned to 
maintain that rulers hold their power directly from God, and that therefore the clergy have no 
authority in matters of secular jurisdiction, being entitled to only preach the Gospel.”449 In 
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1507/8, the Venetians began their march south hoping to acquire the new cities believing the 
Pope would do nothing outright to stop them. However, the Venetians were wrong. Upon 
Venice’s engagement of hostilities, Julius I immediately excommunicated Venice and secretly 
began opening negotiations with the Germans, Spanish, and French, hoping to form a league 
against the Venetians.450 In 1508, the major powers of Europe met in Cambrai, forming the 
League of Cambrai whose ultimate goal, as Thomas Madden puts it, was to “turn back the clock 
on the Venetian Empire, returning the Republic to its lagoon.”451 The league was composed of 
the Papacy, the French, the Germans, the Spanish, and many Northern Italian city-states who had 
grown angry by Venetian aggression of the past century. No independent, lone, Italian city-state, 
or any city-state for that matter, had ever “faced such a formidable combination of European 
powers as the league of Cambrai, which declared war against the Venetians in December of 
1508, on the pretext of their ‘insatiable cupidity and thirst for dominion.’”452 Venice responded 
quickly initially through diplomacy but then by raising an army which was ready to march the 
very next year. The Venetian Senate, according to Bembo, initially attempted to negotiate for 
peace with Rome by making the Papal States in charge and allowing Venice to serve as “Rome’s 
vicar of those towns, which their previous masters had been.”453 Early in 1509, “an enormous 
army led by Condottiere Nicolo di Pitigliano and his young cousin Bartolomeo d’Alviano met an 
equally enormous French army just east of Milan at Agnadella.”454 Bembo reports that the 
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Venetian army consisted of some “6,000 heavy cavalry, 4,000 light cavalry, and 33,000 infantry, 
though by no means had all our forces yet arrived in the field.”455  
Bembo’s telling of events shows that Venice could produce a large army, but was not the 
best organized as they were having trouble amassing all their forces with haste. This battle will 
come to be known as the Battle of Agnadello where the Venetian army was crushed by the allied 
forces who quickly occupied most of the Venetian Terrafirma, leaving Venetians to watch and 
wonder if their city would face a similar siege as in the War of Chioggia. After the onset of the 
fighting, Bembo reports that: 
“And so within a short time the French, who not long before had been very fearful of the 
opposing army and had come greatly to regret making war on the Republic, now put to 
flight the men they had feared—not one of the entire Venetian force stood his ground 
once the first company had been routed and put to flight. [The French] also took 
procession of a huge quantity of the very best artillery, which the captain Vincenzo Valier 
and his aides had abandoned as they fled, leaving them unguarded in the middle of the 
field for the enemy to plunder.”456 
 After this, it was said that Venetians “could see the watch fires of the enemy troops camped 
along the lagoon flickering on the water.”457 This was a troubling position for the maritime 
Republic to be placed in once again, proving how vulnerable they were when matched against 
these growing European powers. However, Venice did still have a few towns under her 
command, in addition to what was left of the stato de mar, so by no means was Venice out of the 
fighting. Although, Venice, to some extent, acknowledged that they were out matched and would 
require alternative means to emerge from this war alive, chiefly through diplomacy. But first, 
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Venice had to win back some of its territory as to shows its people and the world that the city of 
Venice was not weak. 
That same year, Venice massed another large army and launched a surprise attack on 
German positions in Padua, comprised of some 10,000 infantry and 3,000 calvary.458 This was in 
part possible as the stato de mar always, except during times directly after plagues, possessed a 
healthy supply of rowers to man the many galleys that the Venetian state runs off of. This army, 
along with popular uprisings in some freshly captured cities who preferred Venetian rule, 
threatened the very framework that with which the league was founded upon.459 All participants 
in the league wanted Venice confined, but only in addition to their states being granted rights 
over a portion of Venice’s old territory. Therefore, when uprisings began to ensue, some parties 
to the league broke ties or switched sides. Starting with Padua, Venetians forces besieged the 
city, and, with the use of artillery knocked down their fortifications and brought the Germans to 
begin “negotiating surrender” as the Venetian “infantry crossed over the walls through the rubble 
and took the fortress” of the city.460  
Apart from a few military exploits such as this, the Venetian diplomats chiefly won the 
war, because without their help, Venice would have succumbed to overwhelming force. David 
Chambers further argues that the “recovery of Venice... lay in the devious diplomacy which took 
advantage of the leagues’ disunity, in provincial reactions against the invaders and in the 
enduring power of the Venetian wealth, trade, and empire overseas.”461 Bembo further notes that 
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Julius II and Venice eventually came to terms with the understanding that if the Pope allowed the 
“barbarian armies” to destroy Venice, then “Julius and all subsequent pontiffs would not be safe, 
even in Rome.”462 This chilling message is mostly accurate since Venice, besides the Papal 
States, served as the strongest maritime naval, and military land presence in the Mediterranean, 
since its primary and historic rival Genoa, had fallen under the competing sways of the French 
and Spanish. The very being of the stato de mar serves Venice as an additional institution which 
they could utilize during wars. When fighting rival city-states or larger states on land, Venice can 
use the stato de mar as a form of protection and a place to regroup. Venice at this time still 
remains a major naval player in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, Venice’s appropriately timed 
diplomatic moves ushered in feelings of uncertainty for the allies, which fractured the already 
wavering league, with which was created to “dial-back” Venice. 
Over the next decade, this war will consist of various battles, betrayals, new allies, and 
switching sides, but in the end, Venice survived. The events that led to the ending of the conflict 
arose from discontent within the league and Venetian diplomatic moves who were aware of the 
dissatisfaction within the alliance. Around 1512, Francesco Guicciardini, a noblemen from 
Florence and Italian historian writes that “the King of France indeed had good Reason to be 
jealous of the Pope, for Leo desired nothing more than the French should have no longer any 
footing in Italy, either because he thought it most conducive to the common security, and to the 
grandeur of the Church, or because he retained the memory of the injuries received by the Crown 
of France.”463 As stated earlier, the Pope feared the power of the French and the resulting actions 
they had taken into northern Italy in light conjunction with the league. Due to this, Julius II broke 
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ties with the French and began to plot and work toward their removal from Italy. Venice noticed 
this and began seeking to establish an alliance with the French who were already considering this 
in light of recent events. Andrea Gritti, who had been captured by the French, negotiated a treaty 
of alliance with the King of France, Louis XII, which read: 
“By this treaty Bartolomeo Alviano and Andrea Gritti obtained their liberty, the Venetians 
were bound to assist the King of France with eight hundred men at arms, fifteen hundred 
light horse, and ten thousand foot [infantry] against all who should oppose his recovery 
of Afti, Genoa, and the Duchy of Milan; and the King was obliged to assist the Venetians 
till they had intirely recovered all that they possessed in Lombardy and in the Marquisate 
of Treviso before the League of Cambray.”464 
This demonstrates the skill and optimal timing that Venetian diplomats are able to make, even 
when held in a French prison.  Gaining the French as an ally proved to be quite effective. The 
French reasserted their authority over northern Italy and kept both the Holy Roman Empire and 
Papal States at bay, although the Spanish proved more difficult to confine as is alluded by 
Guicciardini in volume 6 of his history. With the help of the French, the Venetians are able to 
negotiate all parties to begin seeking peace.  
Two peace treaties concluded the war. The first of which is the Peace of Cambrai, 
negotiated by the French who were now one of the only allies the Venetians had at the conclusion 
of the war. Upon the arrival of the peace agreement in Venice, the French king, Francis I, and the 
German Emperor made it “crystal clear that neither monarch considered the Venetian Republic a 
serious player in international politics,” and all that was agreed to, including “to return [to] 
Charles V within 40 days everything the French and Venetians had conquered in Southern Italy, 
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without even informing their Venetian allies.”465 Venice was not even included in the peace deal 
and was made to negotiate a separate Peace of Bologna. This treaty confirmed Venice’s loss of 
Ravenna and Cervia, along with her territorial claims to Apulia.466 By the time both of these 
treaties were signed, the year was 1516, and the balance of power “was soon redressed, however, 
in an Italy that displayed a new alignment of foreign powers, and after a hard fought campaign… 
Venice regained its dominion over the Terra firma in June 1517.”467 It was not until late 1516 
when Guicciardini finally reported that “at last the Sinews of the war were slackened, and the 
Course of affairs manifestly tended towards a Peace” once the Emperor “restore Verona 
according to the form of the articles of the agreement.”468 This concluded the hostilities that 
brought a majority of Europe to arms.  
At the conclusion of hostilities for this war, Venice had the realization that new European 
powers such as the English, French, Spanish, and to some extent, the Germans were beginning to 
surpass Venice’s strength forcing them to reevaluate their relations with other European states. 
Yet at the same time, by the end of the 15th century and the conclusion of the War of Cambrai, 
Venice had become one of the chief naval and military powers within the Italian mainland and 
along the Italian coast. According to Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan the Venetian territorial state looked 
something along these lines: 
The Venetian stato di terra stretched from Friuli to Ravenna and from Lombardy (Crema 
and Bergamo) to the Adriatic. Moreover, in order to conquer and defend this state, 
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Venice, the ‘maritime republic,’ whose ships fought on the Po and on the Lago di Garda, 
also proved itself capable of putting a powerful army into the field. In the early 15th 
century, some ten thousand to twelve thousand men fought under the banner of St. Mark. 
This figure grew when war became an almost permanent state. At midcentury, Venice 
commanded some 20,000 men, by 1509, that figure had risen to 40,000, with a permanent 
army of some 8,000.”469 
Venice also adopted a new political outlook at the conclusion of the War of Cambrai. Individuals 
such as Andrea Gritti will eventually pave the path for Venice “to represent herself as a center of 
a peace-loving state that could not only offer Italy and Europe a fresh vision of political, 
intellectual, and artistic life, but also play a key role in European culture.”470 This is the role 
Venice chooses to accept in a region where Venice is no longer the strongest player and must 
now learn to cooperate and further adapt should she hope to survive. It is also relevant to note the 
actions of some of the client cities and towns under Venetian rule and how they acted during the 
conflict. While it is true many cities and towns immediately surrendered to the foreign invaders 
as they viewed their situation hopeless if they stayed with the Venetians. However, many cities 
chose to not rebel against the Venetians and stay loyal such as Padua in 1509. In addition, 
Guicciardini alludes to the “inexpressible… was the joy and satisfaction of the Venetian nobility 
and people for having at last seen a happy end of so long and dangerous a war, tho’ after infinite 
costs and trouble, for, as some of their historians assure us, they expended in the whole war since 
the League of Cambray no less than five million Ducats, of which five hundred thousand were 
raised by the sales of places. Incredible also were the rejoicings of the Veronese and all the other 
cities and People within the jurisdiction of the Republic, since they now promised 
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themselves…the benefit of peace.”471 Provided here is yet another report of cities welcoming of 
Venetian rule, and preferring it over that of the foreign invaders as the Venetian commercial trade 
network and market provide considerable monetary incentives for those who are allowed to 
participate in this sphere.  
The next significant war was the War of the League of Cognac, lasting from around 1525 
through to 1530. This chapter will not fully cover this war such as the last one, but it is important 
to acknowledge that Venice’s participation in a league, which they used to further their territorial 
ambitions and to attempt to weather the growing military storms, was caused in part by the 
Northern European states such as the France. This war also encompassed a good number of other 
city-states, including to some extent, the Genoese, the Florentines, and the Papacy, all of which 
are attempting to utilize stronger European powers in order to use them to achieve their goals.  
It is also important to note some Venetian actions in the onset of the war. As has been 
witnessed in earlier conflicts, Venice continues to demonstrate a pattern of preparedness for 
entering into this conflict due to their moves and actions before the league of Cognac was even 
fully established. Guicciardini remarks that “wherefore it was jointly concluded that the 
Venetians fould order the Duke of Urbino to march with all expedition to their frontiers toward 
the river Adda with their men at arms, and six thoufand Italian foot, and that the Pontiff fould 
fend Count Guido Rangone, with six thoufand foot, to Piacenza, and because it appeared 
neceffary to have a large body of Swifs, no lefs than twelve thousand, as the Duke of Urbino 
fignified to the Venetians, in order to obtain a compleat Victory.”472 In addition, we also know 
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that these plans and assignments were given out prior to the outbreak of war because both Venice 
and the Papacy because they were willing to “fend into Swifferland Agents of their own to levy 
them” in order to ensure that the Holy Roman Emperor did not “difcover [The Venetians and 
Papacy] fo openly againft Caesar.”473 This early state controlled planning allowed for the 
Venetians to essentially gain a head start on their enemy which they try to do whenever they are 
thinking of entering into military conflict. The League was also not concluded till later that year 
“on the seventeenth day of May, 1526…between the Pontiff, the King of France, the Venetians, 
and the Duke of Milan” in order to ensure that the HRE did not interfere in the affairs of Milan 
and Northern Italy.474 The danger of introducing so many large European states into Italy to fight 
wars on behalf of city-states was later realized during the war when in 1527, Imperial forces sent 
by Charles V attacked and sacked the city of Rome as is told by Guicciardini who was actually in 
command of the Papal forces during the siege.475 Bourbon, who had been placed in charge of the 
army was killed during the initial assault, which served to enrage the army that at last entered the 
suburb after fighting on the walls for “Two Hours,” and upon entering the city, the Imperial army 
now leaderless, began “to run in all hafte and diforder to plunder, without the leaft regard not 
only to the name of the friends, and to the authority and dignity of prelates, but also to Churches 
and Monafteries, to Reliques honored with the Concourfe of all world, and to things 
confecrated.”476 This was a disaster for Rome as the Pope and his cardinals found themselves 
imprisoned and their capital city brutally sacked by a seemingly uncontrollable army. This war 
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concluded a few tears after the sack and created a somewhat stable peace between competing 
bodies in Northern Italy.  
iv. 
The Rise of Corsairs and the Holy League of 1537 
Upon his father’s death in the 1520s, Suleiman the Magnificent took the throne, 
proclaiming himself Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. In 1522, Suleiman laid siege to, and 
conquered Rhodes, one of the last major naval powers left in the Eastern Mediterranean to 
confront the ever expanding Ottoman Empire.477 During this time, the Ottoman Empire 
controlled much of the Eastern Mediterranean, yet still, their navies could not be everywhere in 
order to ensure the safety of their convoys to downgrade the very real risks that comes with naval 
passages. So in order to expand Ottoman power in the region, the Ottoman Sultans began hiring 
corsairs into their service. Two of the most famous corsairs were the Barbarossa brothers, which 
acquired their renown by raiding along the Aegean. Their main base of operations was Jerba.478 
This was also a somewhat chaotic time for the Ottomans. The sultan constantly had to “switch 
their attention back and forth from the Mediterranean, to the Balkans, to Persia, and their 
struggles with the Safavid Shahs in the East,” which often distracted them from Mediterranean 
affairs.479 Selim I, father to Suleiman, acknowledged these corsairs uses and due to this, the 
Ottomans employed Barbarossa, naming him the official emir of Algiers, giving him 2,000 
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Janissaries, along with enough supplies and weapons to carry out his work.480 Despite moves 
such as this, Turkish influence in the Western Mediterranean world consisted not entirely in 
confrontation, but also in accommodation, such as when dealing with Francis I who agreed to 
work with the Ottomans instead of opposing them when he sent 12 French vessels to resupply 
100 Ottoman ships under Heyrettin.481 
Throughout the rest of the 16th century, 3 major events will occur, which help dictate 
Venice’s decisions by the end of that year, and brought about by their ability to approach new 
and uncertain threats with innovative strategies that other states at the time could not hope to 
reproduce.  These three events are the Holy League of 1537, the Siege of Malta, and the Loss of 
Cyprus/Battle of Lepanto. In 1537, Suleiman launched onto a new advance, sending Hayrettin to 
lay siege to Corfu, which would provide the Ottomans with a Launchpad for further assaults into 
the Adriatic.482 
With this realization in mind, Venetians grew alarmed as their safety within the Adriatic 
was being placed in further jeopardy. To confront this, the Papacy called for a Holly League 
which formed in Nice, bringing together the Spanish (along with Genoa), Portuguese, Venetian, 
Hospitallers, and papal forces together in 1538.483 Due to Venice’s participation, the Ottomans 
launched a series of raids targeting Venetian processions. While the Holly League was being 
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formed, Hayrettin began a series of attacks along Venetian holdings in the Aegean.484 These 
bases were extremely important to Venice as they served as supply lines and harbors of safety for 
Venetian merchants and all Christians. By eliminating these, the Ottomans effectively began to 
whittle away at Venice’s naval strength, stripping them of their tactics which won them their 
empire back in the 13th century. The Holy League fleet set sail that same year, comprised of some 
200 or so ships from various states, including Andrea Doria’s 61 Genoese vessels. The fleet met 
the Ottoman navy on September 28th of 1538 off Corfu in what will come to be known as the 
Battle of Preveza.485 The Ottoman fleet was about the same size as that of the Christian Holly 
League, however, the main problem for the allies was that there were leadership problems along 
with leaders not wanting to risk their ships in open engagement. Naval battles were still chaotic 
and could result in heavy damage to one’s galley fleet. Building galleys was an expensive 
enterprise for a state, thus leading some rulers to offer fewer ships during times of conflict, or 
even attempt to keep those ships out of harm’s way once committed to a fleet. The latter can be 
seen in the Battle of Preveza.  Andrea Doria, a Genoese admiral brought 61 of his own ships to 
fight in this conflict.486 The Christian fleet was badly beaten due to Doria’s actions when the 
fighting appeared to turn against the allies. According to David Abulafia, once the Holy League 
fleet had engaged the enemy, Doria, unwilling to lose his ships, retreated, causing the allies to 
fail and the remaining ships to retreat.487 Since no fleet was able to reach Corfu or the Aegean, 
the Ottomans were able to make great gains in the region, further strengthening their hold on the 
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Eastern Mediterranean. The Ottomans appeared unstoppable at this point. No European power at 
this time has been able to stop and then push back an Ottoman advance, for any significant 
amount of time. That is, until the siege of Malta. Before continuing with Venice’s historical path 
of dealing with threats, we must first acknowledge how significant this event is in the 
Mediterranean context. 
v. 
The Siege of Malta, Ottoman Conquest of Cyprus, and the Battle of Lepanto 
For many historians, the time of 1550 marked a period in history where control of the 
Mediterranean was up for grabs.488 Venice, after the conclusion of the failed Holly League lost 
much of their processions in in the Aegean, yet still had control of Cyprus and Crete. Due to the 
last conflict, the Venetians were in no rush to help other Christian nations fight the Ottomans 
because of their extremely fragile empire, seemingly surrounded by Ottomans at times. The 
control of the Sicilian straits would give either the Spanish, Ottomans, or whoever held them, 
significant power over the commerce and commercial flow of that region. This left Malta, a 
strategic island directly in the sights of Suleiman the Magnificent. Malta had previously been 
used as a base from, which to attack the Ottomans, leaving not many to wonder why the 
Ottomans wish to attack this location besides its strategic importance.489 On March 30th, 1565, 
170 warships, 200 transport ships bearing 30,000 men set off from Constantinople and arrived on 
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May 18th of that year.490 However, do to mismanagement by the commanding Ottoman admiral 
and general, along with some timely reinforcements from the Spanish Empire, the Turks failed to 
capture Malta and were forced to retreat. This broke a long string of defeats served to various 
European nations by the hands of the Ottomans. No more did Europeans see the Turks as 
invincible. They could and were, defeated. Do to this sudden halt and defeat, the Ottomans 
reevaluated their position, observing that in the Eastern Mediterranean, the large islands of 
Chios, Crete, and Cyprus were still in the hands of Italian city-states.491 The latter two were 
specifically held by the Venetians, placing Venice once again in the center of the Ottoman’s 
warpath. 
This brings us to our next major event, the Ottoman Conquest of Cyprus and the Battle of 
Lepanto. Due to the Ottoman’s defeat at Malta, Selim II, son of Suleiman the Magnificent, began 
preparing for an invasion of Cyprus in the late 1560s. However, rumor of this invasion had not 
escaped the Venetians. The Senate had heard rumor “of the attack already being disseminated in 
January of 1566, when the Venetian Bailo in charge of his fellow-nationals in Constantinople 
reported that plans were being drawn up.”492 Cyprus was not only important to the Venetians, but 
also to most Christians in the Mediterranean Sea. This location served as a harbor of protection 
for Christian pirates, which attacked Ottoman grain exports and imports to the Empire.493 Selim 
II knew this shipping line needed to be protected and would be under threat as long as Cyprus lay 
in Christian hands. The Venetian diplomats in Constantinople raised diplomatic concerns to the 
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Ottomans over the growing threat to Cyprus, however, the Ottomans were “not moved by the 
reminder that the Turks had cultivated good relations with Venice over many decades.”494 In light 
of this potential threat, as no fleet had been launched by the Ottomans as of yet, the Senate 
ordered the organization of an additional, “8000 fresh infantry sent da Mar, preparations for a 
fleet of over 150 light galleys, 12 great galleys, and a good number of transports.”495 This 
demonstrates the usual nature of Venice and how the Senate prepares in advance for Fortuna, in 
the event that unexpected or expected threats assault Venice’s interest, the government is at least 
somewhat prepared should the worst happen. This was easier for a single city like Venice to 
organize independently and then implement their plan throughout the stato de mar. 
In July 1570, the Ottomans finally launched their fleet and attacked Cyprus, bringing 
with them some 100,000 men, along with 400 sailing vessels including 160 war galleys.496 This 
naturally brought about a significant response by Christian nations in Europe, invigorated by 
their first victory against the Ottomans and alarms of concern over the potential loss of Cyprus, 
one of the last Christian islands in the Eastern Mediterranean. Like last time, Europe gathered 
together and negotiated the creation of a Holly League. This league was comprised of the 
Spanish Empire, the Papal States, the Venetian Empire, and other states that offered a few ships 
to the main fleet, which was commanded entirely by Don John of Austria, demonstrating how 
significant this event is to the Hapsburgs.497 Their goal was to save Cyprus, which all knew to be 
a Venetian possession. The Holly League fleet set sail in mid-September of 1570, right at news 
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had arrived of the fall of Nicosia to the Ottomans, one of two significant strongholds on 
Cyprus.498 With that news, the fleet set sail, headed for Famagusta, the last fortified Venetian city 
on the island, and their only hope to now holding the island against the Ottoman advance since 
that city could be resupplied by sea allowing the Venetians to utilize, once again, their superior 
naval skills. 
Venice also had other plans for how to hold Cyprus. In addition to the preparations made 
in the previous years and the establishment of the Holly League, the Venetians also set out in the 
Winter of 1571, sending “1,319 additional soldiers bringing the garrison to about 8100 men” to 
defend Famagusta.499 In addition to these reinforcements, Venice also embarked on a number of 
raids against the Ottomans and were even able to recapture Durazzo. The beginning to this war 
went much better for Venice than in past conflicts with the Ottomans. Despite the fall of half the 
island of Cyprus, Venice was still holding their own, had acquired allies, and even had made 
back some of their lost territory with their reclaiming of Durazzo. It is perhaps because the 
Venetians had been doing so well that caused the Venetians to outright reject a peace deal with 
the Ottomans. This deal would have granted the Venetians a trading post in Famagusta in return 
for the island of Cyprus.500 Now although this does not appear to be a good deal, it is the best 
deal the Ottomans had offered to the Venetians yet, especially when comparing these terms to 
past treaties with the Sublime Porte as they tend to be heavily sided in favor of the Turks and 
extremely greedy in seizing possessions from the Venetians. Yet still, the Venetians declined, 
most likely because their hope rested on the 200 ships sailing forth to Famagusta. 
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In response, the Ottomans went back on the offensive. In addition to their siege of 
Cyprus, the Ottomans began raiding Venetian processions along Crete, the Ionian Sea, and up the 
Adriatic as far as Zadar.501 This is the second time in Venice’s history that the Ottomans have 
made it this close to their capital. However, even the Ottomans most likely could have pressed on 
and attacked Venice, the Sublime Porte only intended to “scare, rather than smash Venice—to 
convince the Venetians that their Empire was fragile and that resistance to the Ottomans was 
futile.”502 In addition, on August 5th, 1571, the Whole of Cyprus fell, including Famagusta.503 
The Battle of Lepanto occurred in the Gulf of Corinth, marking the largest military event in the 
16th century, which unfortunately for Venice, occurred after the fall of Cyprus. The men sailing 
onboard these ships received the news while on route to Cyprus. 
The Ottoman fleet consisted of about 300 ships, 30,000 men, and rowers that were mostly 
slaves to power their vessels. Their ships were mostly equipped with few cannon, but mostly 
crossbow men.504 These ships were small and navigable, yet they also had weak wood making 
them not the most formidable warships. The Holly league on the other hand consisted of 206 
light Galleys, 6 galleasses and 20 supply vessels. 65 light galleys and 6 galleasses were supplied 
by the Venetians.505 This fleet also most likely consisted of about 30,000 men, but had twice as 
many cannons as the Turks. For example, the Spanish “flagship, the Real, carried 400 Sardinian 
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arquebusiers, the Ottoman flagship, the Sultana, only half the number.”506 When both fleets met 
in the Gulf of Corinth, Mallet and Hale of The Military Organization of a Renaissance City-State 
reports that: 
“The opposing fleets used similar tactics with vessels comparably designed and crewed; 
the only major discrepancy was the allies’ possession of the Venetian galleasses, whose 
superior firepower helped to shake the otherwise parade ground regulatory of the 
oncoming Turkish lines of battle.”507 
This battle went quite poorly for the Ottomans. The Turkish bowmen were unable to be effective 
due to the smoke and fire from the canons and ships all around. The Turkish admiral 
Muezzinzade Ali was attacked onboard his flagship and died fighting. In the end, some 12,000 
Christian slaves were freed along with the destruction of the Ottoman fleet.508 This was seen as a 
great victory for the Christians against the Ottomans. Finally, Western Europe appeared to have 
caught up with the Ottomans and perhaps even surpassed them due to considerable funding from 
Spain, due to the riches gained in the new world, a nice perk that was also boosted during the 
time they held sway over Genoa. Yet in the end, this victory did not translate into a great deal for 
the Venetians. Cyprus was still lost as the Holly League fleet did not feel well equipped enough 
to continue with an invasion. In addition, in order to make sure their city lost nothing else, the 
Venetians made peace with the Ottomans effectively turning their back on the Holly League and 
confirming their loss of Cyprus to the Ottomans. According to Abulafia, this “victory was, in 
strategic terms, no more than a stalemate, for in the coming years neither side would have the 
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manpower, timber, and supplies to fit out new fleets on this scale” or risk them in great battles if 
they were constructed.509 
With the Battle of Lepanto over, Venice had once again faced and survived another major 
onslaught from the Ottoman Empire, despite losing some strategic positions along the way. 
Venice still held Crete and some small processions within the Aegean and along the Adriatic. In 
addition by the start of the 17th century, the Ottomans were no longer invincible, yet they still 
held dominance in the East, after rebuilding their fleet by the end of the year, and the Spanish 
dominated the Western Mediterranean. Because the Ottomans gave up their interest in expanding 
westward after the siege of Malta, the Sultans of the 17th century would allow their Barbary 
pirates in pay, a much freer hand.510 The nature of naval warfare was also in a period of 
transition. The great ship was slowly replacing the galley in naval warfare as it offered a better 
platform with which to place guns and artillery.511 Furthermore, the situation within the 
Mediterranean will begin to be further complicated as new players, such as the English, Dutch, 
and German seamen will begin to appear more frequently in this region as their empires begin to 
grow. 
 
 
 
vi. 
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Negotiating Borders: The Venetian Nation in Constantinople 
 By the end of the 16th century, Venice still held a fairly decent position within the 
Mediterranean. They still possessed a significant territorial state in the Italian mainland along 
with their stato de mar, which still included the important island of Crete, which Venice will hold 
until the mid-17th century. In Constantinople, Venice also will continue to maintain a large 
presence, with there being at least 12 merchant houses established at this time in that city 
alone.512 After the 16th century, although Venice’s economic and commercial strength will still be 
sound due to cooperation with the Ottomans, the Venetian state will be in a time of decline until 
their call at the very end of the 18th century. Venice benefitted from an increase in manufacturing 
and Western trade, which only increased after the Venetians made peace in 1573, which will 
mark the beginning of the longest period of peace between the Venetians and Ottomans. With 
Venice losing their monopoly in the East due to the Ottomans, the Levant trade began to open up 
to more states and cities looking to make profits. Part of the explanation to Venice’s decline is 
due to their slow adaptation of naval warfare with abandoning lateen-rigged ships for larger more 
powerful vessels, and by 1619, the Venetian state navy now only possessed fifty bertoni 
alongside fifty galleys.513 In comparison, the English and Spanish will acquire much larger 
vessels that will make their fleets far more powerful than anything the Venetians launch. Yet still, 
the Venetian state continued for more than another 200 years. The question of how and why will 
be the subject of the rest of this chapter. 
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 Part of the reason the Venetians, and city-states, were so effective at dealing with threats 
lay in their ability to successfully negotiate with larger and more powerful states, and at the same 
time approach potential dangers in creative and adaptive methods. Much of this will focus 
around trade and diplomacy. After the 15th century onward till the fall of Venice, the “Venetian-
Ottoman border was extremely porous, as the religious and political dividing lines crossed a 
society that was wound together economically and culturally.”514 Due to this fact, Venetian-
Ottoman relations became extremely complex. Past historians who simply analyze this period as 
one of animosity and religious conflict between Christians and Muslims fail to acknowledge the 
full realization of complex and ever changing relations that were, at times, confrontational, but 
more often than not, were accommodating and cooperative. Venice serves as a perfect example to 
study this intertwined and complex relationship for a variety of different reasons. However, the 
first and one of the most important facts is that Venice, similarly to Constantinople, is “uniquely 
situated to function as both boundary and cultural middle ground, ‘a place of transition’ in which 
people throughout the Mediterranean and from every corner of Europe come together.”515 
Geographically, Venice is located in an area that helps foster relations between the East and West, 
although in reality, Venice was far more entrenched and engaged in Eastern Mediterranean affairs 
than that of the West. In fact, due to their expansion of trade and the variety of places traveled 
too, Venetians were encouraged, financially, to be able to develop relations with other foreign 
peoples in order to garner further profit for the city-state. Dursteler, who wrote Venetians in 
Constantinople, which offers an in depth exploration of the Venetian nation within 
Constantinople during the time of the Ottomans, stated that culturally diverse groups of 
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“merchants, travelers, and officials regularly mixed in the cities of the Venetian Empire, and 
indeed, many travelers felt in entering the lagoon that they had already arrived in the exotic 
‘Orient.’”516 
 The initial beginnings of diplomacy cantered around commerce. Dursteler reports that 
Venice nearly monopolized trade in the East due to their relationship with the Sultan for part of 
the 15th century.517 In addition, despite troubles growing in the East, many Venetians believed 
that their cities future and fortune lay in the East.518 
 Venice’s initial strategy during this time was to avoid confrontation. The Ottoman Empire 
was powerful; in fact, there was no point in denying this fact and Venetians knew that for their 
empire to survive, they would need to deal with the Ottomans, either militarily, or diplomatically. 
Gregory Hanlon, a Professor of Italian History explains that “Venice considered it sufficient to 
maintain an infrastructure capable of raising a field army at short notice.”519 This provided the 
basis for Venice to begin maintaining a standing army in the 16th century. During the Battle of 
Lepanto, Venice was able to place 130 galleys too sea with 23,000 infantry men.520 This is quite 
a feat for a small state such as Venice which has become considerably weaker since their 
prominence of the 13th century. During the 16th and 17th century, Venice played a game “of 
balance and equivocation,” attempting to “play one power off the other” by utilizing a system “of 
ever-shifting alliances, and control over the dissemination of information to both the Hapsburgs 
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and the Ottomans in a sometimes desperate effort to appease and manipulate both states into 
positions favorable to the weakened republic as it confronted a brave new Mediterranean 
world.”521 This thought process goes along with the idea that for Venice’s economy to prosper, 
the city-state must have good relations with whatever power is dominant at the time. In addition, 
this too shadows Venice’s policy in the Italian mainland during the 17th century. Hanlon observes 
that Venetian policy during the 1600s was that after the Castro War of 1643, “Venetian policy 
never wavered from an attitude of non-intervention in the great power struggles that engulfed its 
neighbors,” which arguably resulted from more than “three generations of pressure by the 
Ottoman Turks on the Mediterranean Empire.”522 For the 15th, 16th, and 17th century, this 
increasingly became the Spanish and the Ottomans until both powers begin to decline. In fact, 
after hostilities ended in the 16th century, the Venetians earned the nickname “The Turk’s 
Courtesan” bestowed by Europe on Venice due to their close relationship with the Sublime 
Porte.523 From 1500 to the fall of Venice in 1797, Venice and the Ottoman Empire “were at peace 
save for several relatively brief interludes of open hostility, punctuated by raiding and other 
corsair activity,” which for the most part has been covered above.524 
 Before diving into the Venetian nation that existed in Constantinople, it might first be 
helpful to further understand the various identities that people associated to at this time. Contrary 
to popular belief, the ideological clash between east and west, Christians and Muslims did not 
alone, dictate states and individual actions during this time. Daniel Goffman writes that there is a 
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contrast in attitudes between different people within a specific nation “which produced a chronic 
and fascinating tension in Venice between a religious ideology that conceived a perpetual crusade 
against the Islamic world and a situation that demanded bonds with Islamic states that controlled 
the international commercial routes to the East.”525 Dursteler reports that “many individuals 
moved easily between religious poles, and indeed polities were never averse to allying with a 
perceived infidel if the stakes were right…they intermarried and formed alliances across 
denominational lines; when it suited their worldly aims, they changed faiths easily.”  526 This 
paints the portrait of a society, which definitely believes religion to be essential, but also one that 
preaches accommodation and compromise in order to fulfill their larger goals. An excellent 
example of this comes from Venice herself, who was famed for “the position expressed by the 
Senate after Lepanto, Prima semo Veneziani, poi cristiani [First we are Venetians, then 
Christians].”527 Even after the Ottomans defeat at Malta and Lepanto, the Venetians still felt it 
best to break with most of Christendom and end their crusading stance, which the Papacy still 
preached. This independent policy allowed the Venetian State to be more flexible when dealing 
with the Ottomans, giving them a leg up with other European states when it came to commercial 
enterprises. Luckily for Venice, the Ottoman Empire was accepting of both Christians and Jews 
and allowed non-Muslims to assume posts of significance within the Empire. Ottomans governed 
and derived from their frontier milieu, which consisted of “a cultural mix of classical Islamic 
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legal traditions joined with Byzantine and there Inner Asian elements.”528 Thereby allowing an 
already diverse empire to further expand and accept other cultures, while demonstrating theirs to 
be better through their empires great feats. 
 Next, the idea of associating oneself with their nation can be a difficult subject to inspect. 
Nation could refer to a variety of different sizes and groups. For example, the Venetian 
community in Constantinople was considered a “nation” until itself by the manner in which 
Dursteler refers to it. Nation, is used to express community as well as one’s home state.529 
Constantinople, specifically, had a large number of “nations” within their city. These nations or 
communities were from a variety of different countries, and served as “trading and diplomatic” 
centers, which “were juridical[ly] defined, and membership was limited, at least in theory, to a 
small cadre of individuals who met certain specific legal requirements. In practice, these 
communities’ borders were much less clearly delineated, and they contained individuals of many 
different religious, linguistic, political, and geographic backgrounds.”530 The Venetian nation in 
Constantinople was one of the largest the city possessed and should reflect their adaptive nature 
as the Venetian State has maintained a nation in Constantinople since the Byzantine Empire 
existed, and these trading communities served as excellent commercial hubs with which 
Venetians can utilize to further prosper.  
 One aspect of life in the Venetian Nation in Constantinople has become abundantly clear, 
the more complex Veneto-Ottoman relations become, the more possible it is for people to 
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identify with various aspects of different beliefs or cultures. In other words, individuals could, 
and did, possess multiple loyalties and could feel connected to multiple groups or be willing to 
change identities completely. One could be loyal to one’s state, religion, commercial 
organization, family, geographical location, and more. The Venetian Empire was quite diverse 
and at times, encompassed more than 100 bases, cities, and islands scattered throughout the 
Eastern Mediterranean. In light of this, the population comprising the Venetian people, have 
consequently become more diverse and will automatically bear loyalties to their home region or 
place of birth. Loyalty to one’s home was not necessarily a “trump” when dealing with individual 
affairs. For example, Dursteler notes that: 
“Loyalty to the home community—the 16th century patria—was not inherently 
incompatible with the extension of loyalty to a wider community, so long as the 
advantages of political union… outweigh[ed] the drawbacks.” This is evident when 
looking at some Greek subjects of the Venetian stato de mar who came to 
“Constantinople to trade or work in Ottoman shipyards and galleys, and often married 
and settled in the city, never to return to their lands of birth.”531 
In other words, loyalty to one’s home can be significant, if not total, but that is not to say that 
these loyalties have the opportunity and ability to change, depending on the influences and 
motivations for doing so. The Venetian State was fully aware that Venetians took up work in 
Constantinople, however, they still required all official members of the Venetian nation to 
register at the embassy. If nothing else, this has created the opportunity for a widely diverse 
mixing of peoples to encompass a relatively small space in Constantinople. This city will not just 
become diverse due to Muslim Ottomans and Christian Venetians mixing, but due to all manner 
of folk from across the stato de mar and the Ottoman Empire. As far as Venetian loyalty is 
concerned, Venetians had no “natural geographic, religious, linguistic, or cultural coherence to 
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the state’s ‘heterogeneous totality of distinct territories,’ except that provided politically by 
Venice’s governing institutions.”532 This places a heavy importance on the political institutions of 
the state that provide economic and commercial incentives. These incentives will usually take the 
form of being included in the Venetian economy, which for most in the stato de mar, was 
sufficient as people understood from Venice’s past history that their trade, although accompanied 
with some risk, can be extraordinarily profitable. This sums up a broad understanding of some 
loyalties and can serve as a foundation for approaching the complex and ever-changing relations 
that the Venetians possessed with the Ottomans. 
 The Venetian “nation” in Constantinople was the largest and most vivacious foreign 
community within Constantinople during the 16th and 17th centuries. By analyzing this nation, 
one can challenge the pre-assumed animosity tendencies between Venetians and Ottomans, and 
instead argue that “although dissonance and strife were certainly part of this relationship, 
coexistence and cooperation were more common.”533 Alternatively, this relationship was not one 
where individuals were trapped into a specific loyalty or way of life, but could instead represent 
a continuing process of fashioning and refashioning to describe how loyalties can be obtained, 
then lost, and reasserted once more. 
 The nation of Venice, located within Constantinople, has had a long history of being an 
established colony in the city, stemming back into the times of the Byzantine Empire. At its 
height, this colony consisted of up to 1,000 official members.534 In reality, the colony was 
considerably larger, as those individuals who aren’t merchants or a member of the bailate were 
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not considered members of the official nation. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, “Venice 
lost its commercial monopoly, but its merchants continued to enjoy the favor of Mehmed the 
Conqueror, who granted them several lucrative privileges.”535 This patronage will not last 
however, ending in 1463 when the Venetians declared war on the Ottomans. During moments of 
hostilities such as this, the Venetian population comprising the nation will dwindle to almost 
nothing, a pattern that will repeat itself in 1499, 1537, and 1570 to some extent during their 
major, but brief times of conflict.536 
 Life, for the nation, revolved around the Venetian embassy, or bailate. The bailate used to 
have a grand location within the Golden Horn of the city of Constantinople. However, after the 
fall of Constantinople and between the outbreaks of hostilities in 1499, the Venetian embassy 
was permanently relocated to Galata across the bay, in addition to constructing the Vigne di Pera 
in the hillside serving as a retreat.537 The bailate was responsible for everyone with a connection 
to Venice. The embassy is home to the bailo and his famiglia. The vast majority of other 
Venetians would live outside of the embassy, whether near or far in distance.538 
The Bailo is the head of the Venetian nation in Constantinople.539 This position became 
quite powerful and influential over time, making it a position that could bring the holder 
significant rewards. For Venice during the early 1400s, the bailo was “at once consul, 
commercial agent, and ambassador to the Ottoman Court, tasked, above all, with ensuring that 
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commerce in the empire continued as smoothly as possible. It was fear of losing valuable trade in 
Mehmet’s realms with stayed Venice’s hand.”540 Simone Contarini, a former bailo in 
Constantinople, described his former duties in a report to the Senate as: “the task of the bailo in 
Constantinople… seems to me to be contained in two offices: one ambassador, the other 
Consul”, in addition to maintaining “extensive networks of friendships and patronage through 
which… to establish relationships with influential Ottomans in positions to benefit and protect 
Venetian interests.”541 In other words, the task of the bailo was to act as the Venetian 
ambassador, and spymaster simultaneously, all the while promoting Venetian trade interests over 
other European powers such as the English, French, or other city-states. The maintenance of a 
spy network and moles in strategic positions greatly benefited Venice as this served as their 
system of warning in the event that the Ottomans decide to go on the offensive. The bailo also 
held an important symbolic role as protector of Roman Catholicism in the Ottoman Empire until 
after the 1600s when the French, supported by the Jesuits, usurped that role.542 This was a 
significant role and honor for Venice to possess, which demonstrates their importance in 
international affairs, but also within the realm of Christendom. Lastly, the bailo took charge in 
the matters of redeeming former slaves of the Ottoman Empire who were Venetian.  
The bailo, with all these tasks and responsibilities, requires considerable help to achieve 
his goals. The famiglia is a group hired by the bailo to help him run and manage affairs for the 
nation.543 There are many different positions within the famiglia, some far more important than 
                                                          
540Crowley, Roger. City Of Fortune. Random House Publisher, 2011. Pg. 321 
541Dursteler, Eric. Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern 
Mediterranean. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. Pg. 29 
542Dursteler, Eric. Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern 
Mediterranean. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. Pg. 31 
543Dursteler, Eric. Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern 
Mediterranean. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. Pg. 32 
168 
 
others, but all vital to operating the many functions of the embassy. The famiglia that the bailo 
hires was hierarchical organized, with the secretary, coadiutore, ragionato, chaplain, doctor, and 
barber, as well as the dragomans and the giovani della lingua “ making up “the famiglia alta, or 
upper family” with the “famiglia bassa, or lower family, comprised the remainder of the 
household—servants, pages, squires, couriers.”544 The Doctor and barber, along with the 
chaplain both have self-explanatory jobs, except the barber was a term for a medical practitioner 
who was limited on what duties he could perform.  The Rasonata, kept the financial records of 
the nation and kept track of all goods by land or sea.545 Due to the nature of the Venetian nation, 
a significant amount of correspondences flow in and out of the bailate. That being said, the 
Coadiutore, or assistant secretary, was responsible for “maintaining notarial protocols, writing 
and copying correspondence, and enciphering and deciphering letters.”546 
Despite these important roles, the two most significant members of the famiglia alta were 
the Secretary and the Dragomans. The Secretary served as the notary for the nation. This 
extremely time-coming job was meant to ensure “the regular transfer of information between the 
baili and their numerous correspondents: the Senate, Council of Ten, and other magistracies in 
Venice” and the greater stato de mar in general.547 The Dragamons were potentially one of the 
most useful and at the same time dangerous, members of the Venetian nation. Dragomans were 
masters of the Ottoman “idiom” or language and are separated into many different classes of 
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Dragomans. The Grand Dragoman are charged with “treating the most important issues of state 
and spent his days in the divan and the palaces of the Ottoman hierarchy.”548 Next is the little 
Dragoman. These individuals will normally spend their days in the ports or along the “loggia of 
Galata and were charged with interpreting for the merchants and the ragionata and dealing with 
any commercial matters involving Ottoman officials and magistracies.”549 Another important 
Dragoman is the Dragomano di strada or traveling Dragoman. This individual served as a 
traveling translator. He also would accompany the bailo on trips away from Constantinople. 
Other Dragomans include the apprentices who attended to unexpected matters or dealings at the 
embassy.550 Dragomans are significant not only because of their essential attributes in the 
Ottoman tongue, but also because, “in contrast to most other members of the bailo’s team, they 
were permanent residents of Constantinople, and indeed almost all of them were subjects not of 
Venice, but of the Ottoman Empire.”551 This at first glance, could pose a significant problem of 
questioning Dragoman’s loyalty to either the Venetians or the Ottomans. The Senate clearly 
recognized this potential threat in 1551, and attempted to create a program that raised Venetians 
in the Ottoman vernacular; however, this ultimately failed.552 Yet still by the 16th century, 
Dragomans were still considered essential. This is witnessed by the fact that “Venetian 
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diplomatic missions to the Porte usually included a dragoman who accompanied an ambassador 
on his trip from Venice.”553 
The famiglia bassa is comprised of lower level individuals yet still, nonetheless, 
important. The most important of which being the Maestro di casa or Majordono. This individual 
“Oversaw the provisioning, staffing, and maintenance of the physical structure of the bailo’s 
household.”554  Thus the Majordormo acted as a house watchmen and caretaker, looking after the 
members of the famiglia so that the bailo was left a freer hand. Another member was the 
Cavaliere Marshal. The Marshal mostly assisted in consular and judicial duties. Dursteler 
explains that his position encompassed a responsibility for “delivering summons and other legal 
communications; conducting investigations and interviewing witnesses in civil and criminal 
matters brought before the bailo.”555 These represent the two most important positions within the 
famiglia bassa. An important aspect of the Famaglia bassa is that, unlike the famaiglia alta with 
the exception of the dragomans, the former is allowed to possess Turkish individuals. Therefore, 
many Ottoman subjects resided within the famiglia, the most import of which are the Coza556, 
Janissaries557, and couriers, other than the Dragomans already discussed.558 This shows the literal 
mixing of peoples as they work alongside one another for common goals, regardless of their 
opposing places of birth. Bailo and famiglia, along with the merchants essentially created the 
core of the Venetian nation, or the “official” nation, meaning that they were allowed to be there 
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both by the Venetian and Ottoman states and that their assignments and positions were 
“recognized and sustained.”559This maps out the bailate, the institution that allowed the 
Venetians to sustain a colony within Constantinople/Galata. Due to this, a series of mixings 
began to ensue in which a middle ground is created that creates an ever changing and very 
personal relationship between Venice and the Ottomans.  
vii. 
The Mingling of Venetian and Ottoman People in the 16th and 17th Centuries 
Interactions between nations and states were “inherently messy, contradictory, and 
variable [in] nature,” there was no easy divide like East and West or Christian and Muslim.560 Yet 
one can still attempt to approach the subject of Venetian-Ottoman relations by identifying the 
geographical, commercial, social, and religious connections that complicate the clarity. 
Geographically, Constantinople was a perfect location for the mixing of peoples from 
both the East and West. This city was also the largest within all of the Mediterranean, Europe, 
and the Near East at the time. Censuses conducted in 1535 and 1555 both show a population with 
a ratio of Muslims to Christians of 60 to 40 percent.561 Constantinople’s compact and crowded 
streets provided an excellent setting to establish trade and develop relationships. If looked at in 
this image, Constantinople could be seen as a one “conformed to the model ‘Oriental city,’ 
composed of ‘an array of closed and compact societies, each leading lives separate from the 
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other.”562 Geographically, Constantinople was divided across the golden bay, facing opposite 
Galata. Historians refer to this separation as giving Galata the name “City of Infidels” facing the 
“City of Ottomans.”563  This interpretation is both right and wrong. The Sultans of the Ottoman 
time did relocate most foreign embassy and residences to Galata, but this was by no means in 
total and should not signify Galata as purely comprised of Christians. There was physical 
separation, yet also mixing in taverns and streets. When Mehmet II conquered Constantinople, he 
left the suburb [of Galata] relatively untouched so as not to interrupt its commerce, but he did 
incorporate it entirely into the larger metropolitan institutional structures of his new capital” 
because of his greater understanding of the financial capability of this part of the city left 
intact.564 This further demonstrates the understanding of the importance of city-states and 
commerce to the Ottoman Empire, a reputation which has been fostered over a long period of 
time has now paid off once again for these small but mighty Republic. Trade in the 
Mediterranean was still monopolized in part by small city-states with growing or shrinking 
empires, which, nonetheless, prove significant to take into consideration, even during times of 
territorial conquest. In addition, to dispel the notion of the purely Christian face of Galata, 
Dursteler reports that the settling Muslims in Galata was a deliberate part of the Sultan’s 
demographic policies: Suleyman established a community of Egyptians in Galata, and waves of 
Moor and Morisco refugees from Granada settled in the city in the 16th and 17th centuries.”565 
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This demonstrates the physical separation for strategic purposes instead of one that pushes 
foreigners away. 
Another significant arena for mixing is commerce. One of the chief areas of cultural 
exchange with Galata occurred by commercial interactions.566 In fact, not just Venetians or other 
Christians but “Ottoman officials” in addition “appear to have been among the most active 
participants in the Veneto-Ottoman trade; although they rarely traveled outside the Empire, they 
nonetheless invested significant capital in this lucrative enterprise.”567 This should not be too 
surprising after all. Ottomans too, participated in trade within the Mediterranean. The great 
Ottoman historian Naimi even acknowledged that “when he concluded political authority, 
emaret, as one of three main ways to gain wealth, the other two being agriculture and 
commerce.”568 This shows Ottoman cultural inclinations to entering into trade, hence why they 
would seek out the Venetians who are known to conduct trade in these waters. In fact, Ottoman 
trade within the Mediterranean can be seen as early as 1453 during the conquest of 
Constantinople when “Candarli Halil Pasa traded with prominent Venetian merchants 
immediately following the cessation of hostilities;’ in fact, he was accused by some to have 
favored peace early in order to further his own business interests.569 This demonstrates the 
multitude of loyalties within the Ottomans, as this illustrates a high ranking official placing his 
individual commercial interests over that of the state to achieve further military gains. 
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Another example can be seen in the actions of Ca’fer, an Ottoman citizen living in 
Constantinople during the late 16th century. With this example, we can see that the Venetians 
worked with certain Ottoman officials to further achieve their goals. Ca’fer was a merchant who 
“personally managed his commerce and intervened with Venetian authorities on his own behalf, 
he employed a variety of Greek, Muslim, and Jewish agents to carry out the actual trading.”570 In 
addition to this, Ca’fer also helped Venice by informimg the bailo “on matters in the divan and 
worked to free Venetian slaves and to protect Venice’s interests in the Ottoman Empire, no doubt 
to curry favor for his own interests, both political and economic.”571 This is an excellent example 
of the Venetian nation working with local elements to achieve gains for their state's greater good 
back home in Venice. This bailate truly acted as an arm of commercial and diplomatic interests, 
ensuring that Venetians needs are heard and met as far East as Constantinople. This example of 
freeing slaves can be seen in Ca’fer’s personal correspondence to bailo Marco Venier, when 
Ca’fer writes “‘that [he] had not forgotten [their] friendship and promises’ as Ca’fer divulges his 
“efforts to free a number of slaves and his intervention with the kapudanpasa to protect Venetian 
territories.”572 This of course was not done out of the generosity of Ca’fer’s heart. Instead, Ca’fer 
had a special relationship with the Venetians where he enjoyed special treatment in trade and 
conversed with the Doge of Venice personally.573 Utilizing agents of the Ottoman Empire in this 
manner manipulates their individual interests to cause multiple loyalties to shift priorities. 
Venetians are excellent at this tactic and used the very same when negotiating with the Byzantine 
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Empire before their fall. Actions like this in truth are not that uncommon. According to Dursteler, 
Ottoman officials “regularly requested special treatment for their goods and agents.”574 If nothing 
else, this represents a certain level of comfort and closeness between the two nations. Although, 
it is also true that Ottoman official did at times get caught “with contraband, or goods on which 
the appropriate duties had been paid.”575 Moments like this had to be handled with care as 
commercial actions could have counter diplomatic and political reactions. The fact that the 
Venetian State had so much control over commercial transactions would definitely help ensure 
caution and the correct handling of events in situations such as this. Dursterler father explains 
trade with the Ottomans as: 
“Despite such incidents, Venice’s policy was to facilitate all Ottoman trade, regardless of 
who brought it to the city. With Ottoman officials this was accomplished by sending 
secretaries and dragomans to register their commercial transactions, by providing safe-
conducts and letters of introduction, and by obtaining a range of special privileges for 
them. The policy was maintained in recognition of the reciprocal nature of the 
relationship between Ottoman and Venetian officials.”576 
The reciprocal nature of these events represents the importance the Ottomans place on the power 
of the Venetian commercial trade network. As history progresses through the 16th century 
onward, Venetian dominance in the region shrinks with each decade. Yet still, the Ottomans 
chose to make their economic relationship on a more even level, which shows the still powerful 
economic system that is controlled by the Venetian State. Until the capitulation of the state in 
1797, the Serenissima worked toward the restoration of Venice as the “’most favored nation’ 
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trading status” that the Ottomans took from them.577 They wanted this in order to stay 
competitive with the English, French, and Dutch who were all competing with the Venetians in 
Constantinople. This goal by the Venetian state set the main objective of the century which 
would be to exploit the Ottomans during times of vulnerability toward them in order to regain 
their lost possessions from the Turks due to their quest for ever increasing profits and not 
because the Ottomans were simply an Eastern and Muslim polity.  
 Venetians also further their interests with the Ottoman Empire by establishing social and 
personal relationships with high ranking, or strategically placed, Ottoman officials. The past 
narrative of animosity between these two peoples would reject this statement as contrary to the 
manner in which good Christians or Westerners should behave or act. However, Dursteler argues 
that despite this view, these types of relationships were possible because “they already had much 
in common with numerous others in this society, in which migration and conversion were 
common. There was a shared discourse even beyond the migrants and converts, because there 
were shared interests.”578 This is a plausible foundation which would provide the Venetians, and 
potentially other negotiating city-states to begin to develop relations. This has been seen 
historically, most notably by the French and Venetians who both worked and cooperated with the 
Ottomans. In fact, most European nations at one point or another had some dealings with the 
Ottomans other than war, so the current mantra that this time period saw only animosity between 
Muslims and Christians bears little basis in fact. Furthermore, due to the regular contact that 
occurred between members of the bailate and Sublime Porte, “it was not uncommon for the baili, 
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secretaries, and other official members of the nation and important figures of the Porte to become 
friendly, even intimate.”579 
 An example of this can be seen through the relations of Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokullu 
and Bailo Marcantonio Barbaro. These two enjoyed a friendship with one another prior to and 
during the Venetian-Ottoman war over Cyprus in the 1570s. When Barbaro was imprisoned 
during this war, Sokullu permitted him to visit the baths twice weekly for his health and sent 
regularly ‘to inquire about my status, to comfort me that I might be in good spirits.’ Barbaro 
wrote, ‘I could not nor would I know how to desire a better disposition from the Magnificent 
Pasa, who on many occasions, with me and with others shows himself to be very humane and 
affable.’”580 This is an excellent example to show that relations between the Venetians and 
Ottomans surpassed political and cultural differences and managed to manifest in physical 
relationships between peoples, even when their two states are at war with one another. Although 
the opposite is known to occur as well. For those individuals who did not have high status and 
good relations with the Ottomans, their treatment during times of war can be quite different. 
During the Ottoman-Venetian war that lasted between the years 1463-1479, Crowley, the author 
of City of Fortune, states that: 
“Venetians within the Ottoman Empire suffered badly. The bailo died in Constantinople 
prison; captive soldiers and resident merchants were publicly executed, their bodies left 
to rot in the streets. Trade in the Ottoman Empire was dying; commercial establishments 
collapsed.”581 
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Yet still, the Ottomans understood the importance of the Venetians as well as other city-states in 
the Mediterranean. Even after the worst conflicts between these two polities, the Venetians and 
Ottomans always seem to maintain some level of relations, and usually one that benefits both 
sides economically. This has added to the incentive of not warring between themselves, except 
for the exception of Ottoman interest in territorial expansion. The Venetians in particular realized 
that they had far more to gain from the Ottomans through cooperation than through 
confrontation. 
 Venetians and Ottomans also interacted through other means than just meeting with high 
officials. Mixing occurred at parties, balls, banquets, and taverns; individual Ottomans would 
also come to the bailate for a variety of reasons, not just business but also for personal ones as 
well.582 It was also important to follow and acknowledge certain Ottoman customs as a way in 
which Venetians made connections with the Turks. The bailo Paolo Contarini, for this reason, 
valued an open door policy for the bailate “to preserve an honorable reputation in the Porte, it 
was necessary to ‘feed whomever desires it; and I can say with truth to have had a continual 
tavern in my house, and I very often needed to set three or four tables a day, because in this way 
friends are conserved and new ones acquired, and the greatness of this Most Serene Republic is 
made known to the world.’”583 This was a public diplomatic move that not only would improve 
the attitude of the Sublime Porte to the Venetians but also make the people of Constantinople 
favorable to a Venetian presence in the city. 
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 Subjects of either empire would also use play competing institutions off of one another in 
order to achieve some personal gain. Officials would use their position to either help themselves, 
their country, or even their friends or family. An excellent example of this involves one Pietro 
Fortis, an Ottoman subject living in Istanbul who held the position of Dragoman. Rothman, the 
author of Brokering Empire: Trans Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul, reports that: 
Pietro Fortis who, unlike previous holders of the position, this Istanbul-born subject 
created a trans-imperial dragoman dynasty that bridged Venetian understandings of the 
patrimonial state with Ottoman dragomans’ expectations about patrilineal succession in 
office. Fortis, his brother Giacomo, and sons Giacomo and Alvise not only resettled in 
Venice after two generations in Istanbul but trained in languages from a young age, 
specifically in anticipation of their entry into Venetian service as dragomans.584 
This shows cultural and institutional mixing between the Venetian and the Ottoman systems and 
people, showing a family in Istanbul who is Ottoman, specifically preparing his life and that of 
his family member’s lives for Venetian service as Dragomans. 
 Another two centers of cultural mixings occurred, somewhat surprising for the latter, 
through employment but also worship. It is already well known that the Venetian and Ottoman 
Empire was comprised of a diverse group of populations. Some Venetians traveled to 
Constantinople, found work, and then never returned. Under the terms of their commercial 
agreements, Venetian subjects and Ottoman subjects were free to travel to each other’s city, 
although with some restrictions at times. This in part revolves around states efforts to curb the 
spread of the opposing religion of the city. For example in Venice, the Senate took steps to ensure 
that Muslim visitors were not only confined into one area of the city, but that their building was 
also crafted in a manner that stemmed the visitors inherent unintentional or intentional spread of 
their faith. The Senate passed a law explaining the guidelines and rules for the manner in which 
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the Dei Turchi(The Turkish house built in 1621) is to be constructed and operated during the day. 
In this bill, the Senate also included: 
“Turks who are now in this city, and those who shall in future come to it, must go to live 
in the exchange house in full conformity with the decrees of the Senate and with the 
Collegio of 2 March last. Nobody, therefore, even if he is a broker of [the Turks], may 
give lodgings to Turks in contravention of the said legislation on any pretext whatsoever, 
on pain of those fines or corporal punishments that may be deemed appropriate by the 
magistrate.”585 
This shows yet another example of Venetians placing business and state goals over religion, since 
clearly it is unpopular to allow the spread of other faiths, even with the Venetian people. In 1553, 
a Venetian diplomat named “Catarino Zeno, visited the Orthodox Monastery of Milesevo and 
reported witnessing both Musims and Jews who came to hear prayers read by monks and offered 
alms in return.”586 This demonstrates curiosity and the spreading of religious tolerance during a 
time in which past historians argued that Christians and Muslims were mostly if not all in 
abhorrence of one another. This mixing, both on a religious level and social one, was made 
possible because “individual and group identities were composites, constructed of concentric 
circles or multiple layers,” meaning that “identity was more than sum total of its various parts: it 
was malleable, instrumental, a dynamic process of negotiation rather than a static, essentialized 
object.”587 This served as a basis for inviting various cultures, religions and peoples to meet and 
find some semblance of common ground to begin further relations. 
The Venetian Response to Threats 
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 Venetians were able to respond to the Ottoman Empire and the overwhelming power of 
European alliances by approaching these threats in unique and adaptable strategies that oft times 
resulted in favorable outcomes for the city-state. These lessons were learned over the course of 
history and through their struggles against Genoa. During her wars with Genoa, Venice utilized a 
wide range of military tactics, most notably with shipping and the state organization to help 
mobilize and protect their fleets. The Venetian mude is an excellent example of state interference 
in Venetian commerce that yielded benefits of protection from pirates and other raiders in the 
Mediterranean. The authors of War at Sea in the Middle Ages, explained that: 
“In this way it is possible to discern the main lines of power that lead the Republic of 
Venice to dominate a large portion of the Mediterranean. The senatorial nobility, uniting 
the most important investors and committed merchants in the maritime economy, 
patiently forged a tool without equal among the rival nations and competitors: the system 
of regular navigation routes plied by convoys of merchants galleys. The modest ship-
owners, nobles or not, were discouraged by the regulatory and fiscal obstacles that 
favored the mude and by the permanent insecurity of sea-borne commerce, but were 
powerless to compete efficiently against the mixed private and public management of the 
naval potential.”588 
The Venetians were problem solvers, who shifted their position in order to survive and 
manipulated factors in order to alter the current state of affairs. Towards the end of the 17th 
century as Venice maintains a consistent posture of military retreat within the stato de mar, the 
mude system, which had been so vital to the lucrative transactions of the state, begins to receive 
less and less attention as the system is all together abandoned over time. The Venetian state was 
also essential in managing Venetian subjects while they interact with their Ottoman counterparts. 
This strategy could and was applied to other European states that posed potential threats to 
Venice; yet it can be clearly seen in the Ottoman course of events, due to the fragile position the 
Venetians were placed in by the emergence of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Venetian officials 
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were given strict instructions to not offend or cause conflict with Ottoman officials. Venetian 
officials were also known for sending presents to Ottomans upon their initial appointment or for 
special occasions in order to garner favor with them. In some ways, and some historians have 
argued that “due to the Venetian empire’s pragmatic approach to empire had expanded outward, 
encompassing its powerful neighbors as well as it subjects.”589 If one believes this theory or idea, 
it would entail that the Venetian empire formed a sort of symbiotic relationship with the Ottoman 
Empire, encompassing both polities into one grand commercial network enterprise, which would 
explain the economic resurgence of both Empires after the War of Cyprus. In addition, this is 
further plausible when examining the Ottoman Empire's position that states “provided the Turks 
continued to believe that the Venetians were strong, and the Venetians were prepared to pay 
tribute, it did not seem that conflict was inevitable,” and that instead, coexistence was not only 
plausible but worthwhile to both parties.590 This is one of the most successful achievements of 
the Venetians merchants and diplomats, which is in fact, that the Venetian State cultivated a 
thriving merchant class which allowed their diplomatic core to negotiate and become invaluable 
to larger states and polities. This same idea could serve as a reason for the outbreak of uprisings 
in favor of Venetian rule that spread across the former Terrafirma when the League of Cambrai 
conquered the area in the early 16th century. One of the chief reasons for these uprisings was not 
only the presence of foreign troops but also the benefits and economic incentives these cities and 
towns received under Venetian rule. 
On that note, the very creation of the Terrafirma represents a Venetian response to the 
perceived threat of the Ottoman Empire, and the fact that the people of Venice wanted to ensure 
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that the events surround Chioggia, resulting in the siege of Venice, would never again occur. To 
add to this defensive posture, the Venetians cultivated their very own army. By the 1450s, during 
times of peace, Venetian maintained a standing army of some 10,000 soldiers.591 In addition, 
these forces comprised of a mix of cavalry, infantry, artillery, military engineers (for building 
fortifications, bridges, etc.), and river fleets. Of special note to Venice are the infantry and river 
fleet units. By 1508, the Venetian Senate decided that “the infantry,” which mostly acted as a 
garrison force, “should be essentially a national force…composed of Venetian subjects.”592 This 
places Venice in a somewhat different position than other European and Asian armies and many 
states of the time started to become increasingly dependent on mercenary armies, which although 
saves the lives of your subjects, comes with a slew of potential downfalls and problems that 
could result in the loss of the military conflict. Mercenary armies should be avoided, and the 
Venetian Senate understood this. The river fleets of Venice acted as an extension of the 
Mediterranean fleet, into the Italian mainland by utilizing the various rivers within the mainland. 
These river fleets maintained supply lines, contributed to defensive postures, and acted as troop 
transports for rapid deployment.593 All in all, the Venetian Empire created an effective land based 
military to guard the Terrafirma and to compliment the strength of the stato de mar. 
The diplomatic and military options surrounding the Venetian State through the 
institutions that this city implemented allowed for a variable and calculated decision making 
body to navigate the ever changing and turbulent waters of the Mediterranean for over 1,000 
years, from its creation at the end of the 7th century through to its demise at the hands of 
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Napoleon in 1797. In a note written is 1618 from the Spanish ambassador, who was living in 
Venice, to his King, the ambassador explains: 
“Furthermore, it is the most ancient state in Italy today… it has grown so much in the 
course of time, through a continual influx of people from every corner, that it has 
acquired a vast and spacious empire of great wealth and power, both maritime and 
terrestrial. Hence, it can truly be called a great and powerful commonwealth, more amply 
endowed with population, weapons, and riches than is any other state in Italy…Let me 
only say to Your Majesty that in matters relating to the defense of their processions, in 
keeping them supplied with provisions, munitions and victuals for many years, the 
Venetians have spared no trouble or expense. Hence they are fully secured against 
invasion, especially in Lombardy, where they are well equipped not only to resist, but to 
destroy, any powerful army.”594 
After more than a thousand years of constant changes in fortuna, environmental disasters, rival 
city-states, and menacingly strong and polities endangering the city of Venice, the city-state 
turned empire not only survived, but dominated the history of this region for a majority of its 
time in existence. Even during the cities decline in the 1600s, this Spanish Ambassador to the 
powerful Spanish Empire still describes and represents the power and accomplishments of the 
Venetian city-state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
594
 “The Dominos of the Venetian Republic: A Report By the Spanish Ambassador, c.1618,” Chambers, 
D.S., J. Fletcher, B. Pullan, and Renaissance Society of America. Venice: A Documentary History, 1450-
1630. Renaissance Society of America Reprint Texts. University of Toronto Press, 2001. Pg. 31 and 35 
185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 In Fernand Braudel’s now famous characterization, the Mediterranean is a world 
“composed of a series of compact, mountainous peninsulas, interrupted by vital plains” and also 
there “lie vast, complicated, and fragmented stretches of sea, for the Mediterranean it is not so 
much a single entity than a ‘complex of seas.’”595 This is a vast land, home to a vast number of 
different environments, and peoples which interact and develop a sense of unity within this 
context due to the commercial resurgence after 800 AD. Predrag Matvejevic sees the 
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Mediterranean as a locations whose “position and homogeneity of its space make it seem a world 
in and of itself or the center of the world.”596 
 This thesis has been a close case study of specific city-states, focusing on Venice and 
Genoa and analyzing their various abilities and actions when dealing with varieties of threats. 
Analyzing the Mediterranean serves as a perfect example, as this is a region ripe with both 
history, and a plethora of powerful and long lasting city-states intersecting with large polities 
which gives us a solid number of centuries in which to study them continuously. My initial 
question when starting this venture was: “How do city-states, such as Venice and Genoa, respond 
to threats?” This question led to the initial task of identifying exactly what a city-state is, and 
both the physical and political characteristics of the city’s founding. As research progressed, this 
question eventually evolved into “In what manner did the two most significant Italian maritime 
cities choose to react and respond to various threats, including rival city-states, the environment, 
and larger states such as empires?” and “What institutions allow for the adaptability of Venice 
and Genoa to be able to initiate comprehensive responses that seemingly evolve to accommodate 
the specific threat endangering the city?” “Did the two cities manifest fundamental similarities 
and or differences?”  “Where they able to adapt and be successful by different means?” “Can we 
learn about Venetian - Ottoman relations by examining the Venetian-Genoese conflicts during 
the 15th century, specifically looking at the War of Chioggia in the 14th century?” These 
questions were more specific, allowing for further research into the field. City-states, such as 
Venice and Genoa, created and established a variety of political, commercial, and economic 
institutions, which although were used for a variety of different purposes, enabled these polities 
to rapidly deploy the city’s resources and helped them achieve technological advances that, for 
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the most part, only the organized, urban, and industrialized center of a city-state could obtain at 
this time.  
 The most important feature, and the most vulnerable, is the commercial trade that 
maritime city-states always take part in. During the period of 800 to 1600 AD, city-states helped, 
unintentionally, to reunify the fractured Mediterranean world by creating efficient and far-
reaching trading networks in order to establish commercial empires in which revenues would 
fund and expand the home city’s political, commercial, and military power, not only at home but 
also abroad where these trading missions extend too. This risky venture was in part attempted 
due to a city-states need to enter into trade in order to expand for monetary reasons, but also, 
because of practical purposes, such as keeping the home city’s population fed, ensuring 
protection of ships outside of one’s home territory, and also in order to demonstrate and expand a 
city’s international clout. When acknowledging these features pertaining to maritime city-states, 
it is easy to then see how important overseas trade was for these cities, as successful and 
prosperous trade led to enormous wealth and prominence for that city, which would help that 
polity survive in the ever changing context of the Mediterranean. However, these ventures came 
with considerable risk, posed by other polities, natural disasters, and further unseen fortune that 
could alter the fate of any state in the Mediterranean.  
Histories of these city-states have shown that successful and significant maritime trade 
and monopolization of that trade can lead to significant growth within that city, leading to the 
creation of institutions, and thus resulting in a city that has a relatively innate ability to adapt and 
respond to opportunities and risk with relative speed and tactfulness, although this quality is not 
necessarily innate and is reliant upon certain institutions and traits imposed by the state. This in 
part, is a result of the small size allowing for the government and institutions to be more effective 
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at the onset of the Venetian state, which then expanded later encompassing more and more 
territory, yet central authority remained within Venice allowing the state to continue to oversee 
the affairs of the latter Empire. To further explain this point, most city-states have tended to 
materialize in areas of political power vacuums, usually as a result of the collapse and 
disintegration of a large state or empire.597 In light of this collapse, some cities may choose to 
isolate themselves and choose to rule themselves independently, thus allowing for a people with 
a past identity of “greatness”, and at the same time, a new allegiance to a city that does not 
necessarily answer to any greater authority. This line of reasoning leads to the creation of a new 
unique sense of nationality to not only your home city, but also a greater past unifying the whole 
of the city together, and in theory, should at the same time protect against most civil uprisings 
since one is creating love for the state (both past and present). To acknowledge a state’s ability to 
win over its people also alludes to the fact that that state then has the ability to mobilize its 
citizenry by rallying them around their home city. Machiavelli wrote that “princes and 
commonwealths that would save themselves from growing corrupted, should before all things 
keep uncorrupted the rites and ceremonies of religion, and always hold them in reverence; since 
we can have no surer sign of the decay of a province than to see Divine worship held therein in 
contempt.”598 These institutions, Machiavelli argues, preserves the integrity and well-being of a 
government and state, with the added result of uniting the people under these myths. Therefore, 
in light of all this, an effective myth around ones founding can unite a population and invigorate 
this small group to achieve what larger states prove unable to accomplish in history. This line of 
reasoning is witnessed within both Venice and Genoa, although the Venetian government proves 
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to be far more stable over the course of history than that of their Genoese rivals. For example, in 
Venice during the 1354 Conspiracy of Marino Falier, the Venetian people and government 
officials, some involved in the conspiracy, rallied together to stop this coup attempt by a tyrant as 
is stated in the Morosini Codex because “God and the Evangelist St. Mark, who by their divine 
grace have never allowed this to happen, nor will they ever allow it, inspired some men who 
were in the conspiracy to reveal it, so at one the doge Signoria, as quickly as they could, secured 
every entrance of the square, and the doge was brought to justice on the staircase of the palace, 
and was at once decapitated.”599 
The main, and most notable difference between Venice and Genoa revolved around state 
control of commercial and military expeditions. Genoa practiced within a system that did not see 
a tremendous amount of state control or interference in Genoese activities. For example, despite 
the fact that Genoa had the most powerful merchant marines within the Mediterranean world in 
the 14th and 15th centuries, their war fleet was “weak, indeed laughable, in comparison with the 
forces of its naval competitors.”600 In addition, the Genoese commune had no effective means for 
calling up fleets and processed few state owned galleys throughout their entire history. Most 
Genoese vessels were owned by families or individuals, who could place significant sway over 
the affairs of the state for that very reason as they had the naval power to carry out tasks for the 
state. In addition, the simple fact that multiple families or individuals are making the decisions 
based off their military might, alludes to yet another reason as to why there was considerable 
unrest in Genoa. Although allowing businesses to operate without government control can allow 
for creativity and technological advances, this helps explain why Genoa seemed so incapable of 
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keeping extended periods of peace and tranquility without outside help. The result of this is that 
the commune of Genoa was consistently weak and resultantly became a dependent state, tossed 
between the competing interests of the Hapsburgs and Bourbons, although Genoa did benefit 
from the ever expanding frontiers of the Kingdom of Aragon and later the Spanish Empire.601 
Venice, on the other hand, possessed a government that practiced a considerable amount 
of state control over a variety of different areas, mostly concerning military and commercial 
activities along with participation in government. Venetian shipping lanes usually consisted of 
Venetian Mude convoys with which the Venetian government would organize to help protect and 
control the cities shipping. Participation in the Venetian Mude system was mandatory, thereby 
eliminating competition toward the government. This, in fact, made it easier for the Venetian 
government to potentially requisition merchant galleys for their use as war ships.602 To add to 
this, the Venetian government also had a monopoly on shipbuilding. Once the Arsenal was 
created, Venetian ships could only be built within their government owned Arsenals, either 
located in Venice or one of her dependent cities within the Stato de mar. Security was still a 
concern for Venice; therefore, the city began tactically seizing strategic locations within the 
Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide safe ports of harbor for their ships and their allies. 
Furthermore, Venetian patrols would protect the Adriatic and parts of the Aegean in order to 
eliminate piracy or other enemies of the state. This can be seen by the Venetian government’s 
orders to the galley captains to “engage and neutralize pirates, even if it meant diverting from the 
planned course,” thus creating a sphere of safety in which their commerce can continue 
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unabated.603 Politically, the Venetian government initiated the “Serrata” or “closing” of their 
government after opening it to a large group of wealthy and influential Venetian citizens at the 
start of the 14th century. This not only enlarged the number of people who could participate, but 
also ensured those families security and positions thereby guaranteeing that these families would 
be loyal to that government in which they are a part and, will not be working toward the 
overthrow of such.  
However, both also shared some traits in common. Both cities did not possess a good 
location with which to build a port, yet both mobilized for the exploitation of the sea, as this was 
a source of protection from land based threats. Both also created institutions for conducting trade 
on water through the creation of the Sea Loan and Commenda agreements that allowed more 
citizens to participate in trade and at the same time lessening the monetary risks of that cities 
people.604 In addition, both Genoa and Venice, along with a good number of Italian city-states in 
general, seem to have developed quite a talent concerning negotiations and diplomatic processes 
concerning large powerful states and empires. This can be seen most easily through Venice’s 
diplomatic events concerning both the Byzantine Empire and Ottoman Empire after the former’s 
fall. During the early time of the Republic, Venice’s fortunes were “directly founded on its 
Levantine trade, and during the Byzantine Empire’s waning centuries, the city-state emerged as a 
dominant European commercial power in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as a significant 
political and military force, with colonies and outposts in Dalmatia and the Aegean and Ionian 
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islands.”605 Much of the Venetian territorial expansion is due to their participation in the 4th 
crusade and the handsome accommodations with which Venice was rewarded for helping to 
capture Constantinople from the Byzantines. However, this newly expanded stato de mar also 
created a foundation for Venetian diplomatic relations with the soon to be Ottoman Empire. The 
Ottoman Sultan viewed the Venetians monopoly on the Levantine trade as a significant threat, 
and implemented policies “to weaken Venice’s stranglehold on Levantine commerce;” however, 
these policies were not meant to seriously harm Venice or destroy the Republic, as Venice 
remained throughout its time to be “among the Ottomans most important international trading 
partners.”606 Due to the fact that the Venetians asserted themselves to be one of the most 
profitable and important trading partners to possess in the Mediterranean, this allowed for their 
diplomats to negotiate with large states that wished to utilize Venetian trade routes and access 
their lucrative economic market. Most city-states had excellent economies (although Venice’s 
proved to be among the most prosperous), which could help explain and answer the question as 
to why large states and Empires were willing to entertain city-state diplomats.  
By creating commercial, political, and military institutions, Venice and other city-states 
like her, were effective in establishing trade networks across the Mediterranean, in engaging in 
successful diplomatic relations with larger states, and were able to attempt risky ventures that 
could be debilitating if that venture were to have ended poorly. These institutions created an 
environment that allowed for the adaptability and versatility of city-states to react in a wide 
range of responses, both diplomatic, and hostile, which were designed to protect the city-states 
most vulnerable and important function, overseas trade. City-states have been known to retain 
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their identity and their character in which they were originally founded, despite the fact of 
whether or not they were fully dependent or had seen multiple attempts at domination by larger 
states. Citizens of a city-state will also revolt against a government they feel has become to 
tyrannical, or if they feel that that government is no longer functioning or operating effectively. 
This is a threat that city-states must face as these revolts have been known to occur during times 
of war if the commune is perceived to be responsible for a major defeat or setback.  
Venice and Genoa both suffered through the period of economic depression that tested 
their institutions and the resolve of their people. These institutions, however, proved mostly 
stable as both cities survive this period of economic downturn although both were changed. This 
period of economic depression occurred between 1250/1300 AD through 1450 AD according to 
Faruk Tabak. Tabak further adds that “During the tumultuous times of this drawn-out downturn, 
empires circumscribing the Mediterranean experienced a considerable weakening of their hold 
over their territorial processions or a turnabout in the economic fortunes, or worse, both.”607 This 
was a difficult time for any polity that was located within the Mediterranean. The Geohistorical 
approach that Tabak offers allows us to reexamine the question of city-state actions during this 
time as several conditions within the Mediterranean world had changed. Tabak’s work offers an 
approach that analyzes the market economy of Europe, and at the same time, includes the notion 
of multiple temporalities focuses on mechanisms and gears that shift “habitation cultivation, and 
trade within the larger Mediterranean.”608 His framework encompasses and starts with the “little 
Ice Age in the late medieval period and ends only with the Victorian Age” which he uses to 
“explore a period of sweeping and dramatic structural and environmental change when colder, 
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wetter climates transformed the agrarian landscape and a succession of commercial hegemons 
made and unmade the Mediterranean’s linkage with global markets.”609 In addition, instead of 
keeping with the usual “Clash of Civilizations” theory, which follows along the lines that the 
Mediterranean is broken down into distinct regions, where unity is characterized by a multitude 
of varying regions with distinct peoples, one can begin to approach this topic in another light. In 
other words, by studying certain patterns and polities within these regions, within the larger 
Mediterranean context, one can begin to further understand and equate the inter-complexities and 
shifts between the peoples and polities that inhabit this world. For example, Tabak engages his 
theory of a Geohistorical approach by analyzing the “rivalry of Genoa, the avatar of the Atlantic 
system, and the Venetian Republic, the hinge of the Mediterranean-Indian Ocean trade, 
established what [he] calls ‘the tempo of change.’”610 The wars of the 13th century had finally 
begun to take their toll, the Bubonic plague or “Black Death” strikes Europe in the early 1340s, 
in turn devastating Europe by cutting half of its population, and the Bubonic plague is about to 
be introduced to the Mediterranean along with a good number of new state actors within this 
context such as the Ottoman Empire, the British, and more. However, Tabak states that at the 
same time, city-states: 
“In contradiction had fared comparatively better during the downturn, partly because of 
the disarray in which the monarchies found themselves and principally because of the 
opening of the lucrative Central Asian-Mediterranean trade circuit. In fact, the economic 
and political resilience the merchant republics exhibited during these taxing times proved 
to be one of the main reasons it was under the initiatives and labors of a few and select 
city-states, Venice and Genoa at their helm, that the Inner Sea had, by the 1450s, come to 
house and integrated and expansive network of production and trade.”611 
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It is clear that because of city-states resilient institutions, these entities were enabled to survive 
longer than many other large states located in the same area. The Mediterranean is an ever-
changing region with ‘fortune’ playing a significant role in the state of affairs. A state’s adaptive 
ability to understand and confront the concept of fortune, both good and bad, will determine the 
effectiveness, resilience, and duration of a state and government. A maritime city-state republic’s 
most valued institution is its commercial functions, chiefly, the ability to trade by sea. This is 
even more true based off that of Tabak who believes that this institution is one of the main 
reasons that Venice and Genoa survived for as long as they did, because it helped them survive 
the economic ‘downturn’ that he describes taking place during the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries.  
Since trade was so important and lucrative, city-states consistently sought to enlarge and 
broaden their trading empires by establishing monopolies in locations. One side effect of this is 
that “by nature, this Seaborne emporium thrived on and further stimulated cross-border flows: 
merchants and vessels, crops and goods, currencies and ideas trespassed jurisdictional frontiers 
almost casually and on a continual basis despite sporadic wars and the almost ubiquitous 
presence of piracy.”612 This brings up the important fact that maritime trade was constantly 
threatened and despite being such a beneficial institution, comes with a considerable amount of 
risk for those partied with it. As just stated, Piracy, as well as other states, can pose severe risks 
to the well-being of crews and merchandise in merchant ships transporting goods. In light of this, 
“among the great maritime leaders of Medieval Italy…only Venice organized any significant 
part of her merchant marine into a state-run shipping system” to protect from Pirates and raiders, 
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although this was not a guarantee that ships would reach their destination as these vessels could 
still face problems from storms, disease, and large armadas.613 
 City-states were also successful diplomatically in their dealings with larger states 
including Empires. Genoa and Venice both had to deal with a number of large empires including 
Charlemagne’s Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, and the Ottoman 
Empire, to name a few of the prominent ones. This engagement with successful diplomacy could 
mean either the acquisition of rights under their authority, independence, trading rights, territory, 
or a combination of agreements that could severely hurt or hamper a city-states prowess and 
province in their region of influence. Venice is famed for their relationship with not only the 
Byzantine Empire, which placed the city on the path to establish a trading maritime empire, but 
also with the Ottoman Empire, a powerful Muslim state that rocked the power ratio of the 
Mediterranean with its first appearance in the early 1400s. When attempting to engage in 
diplomatic relations with a strong potentially threatening empire, Venice chose the path of 
initiating “commerce” as the “initial basis of this relationship.”614 For Venice, a Christian state to 
attempt to initiate and sustain trade and diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire was 
severely frowned upon, but was less unheard off after the 11th century, when city-states and 
larger states began to look to North Africa, a predominantly Muslim region, to initiate commerce 
trade and treaties. This idea of acting based off of one’s personal financial betterment over that 
of one’s religion, began to appear more common approaching the 13th century; in fact, acting in 
one’s state interests over that of their religion became the norm.     
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The attitude in Europe around 1450 was cautious and fearful of the Ottoman threat, as 
individuals of the day report believing that the Ottomans “would in inaugurate the last dreadful 
days of the world.”615 Dursterler reports that “in the political realm… apparently rigid divisions 
between Christian and Muslim states, proved much more pliable than is often acknowledged” 
with “Venice finding “little trouble breaking with Christendom to treat with the Ottoman 
Empire; indeed the city was famed for the position expressed by the Senate after Lepanto, Prima 
semo veneziani, poi cristiani (first we are Venetians, then Christians).”616 The Ottoman Empire, 
being within close proximity to Venice’s procession and holdings, served as a direct threat to 
their interests. However, instead of engaging in constant military actions to destroy their empire, 
the Venetians opted for a substantial peace with diplomatic relations, in which Venice thrived off 
of the Sublime Porte. This notion of coexistence is essential to the continuing prominence of 
Venice, as they had to manage both times of peace and hostility with the Ottomans, as relations 
could be on opposite poles during certain times. Yet still, the Venetians for more than 300 years 
engaged in varying degrees of successful diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire, receiving at times 
contracts, trade agreements, territory, and more, although Venice at the same time would yield 
much to the powerful Turks.  
 Finally, city-states were increasingly successful in navigating potential risks in order to 
bring betterment and riches to the city itself and its people. An excellent example of this, as 
previously discussed, is the participation in the Crusades by city-states. Venice and Genoa were 
uniquely positioned and able to both build and launch large war fleets with which other 
European countries, as well as the actual city-states, sought to use to invade and capture territory 
                                                          
615
 Bisaha, Nancy. Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks. University of 
Pennsylvania Press, pg. 153 
616
 Dursteler, Eric R. Venetians In Constantinople: Nation, Identity, And Coexistence In The Early 
Modern Mediterranean. The John Hopkins University Press, 2006. Pg. 12 
198 
 
in the Levant and North Africa. Despite this however, Venice and Genoa chose to focus on 
commercial enterprises, instead seeking to make profit from peaceful seas instead of constantly 
engaging in naval warfare. This was the case because peace, in this context, was good for 
business. During the 4th Crusade when the Venetians and Crusader army scaled “the great walls 
of” Constantinople, “the previously impregnable city was taken and sacked in a matter of days” 
with the “most obvious beneficiaries” being “the Venetians, who gained control of the trade 
routes of Byzantium and could exclude their rivals at will.”617 However, although this appeared 
great for the Venetians, this venture was a significant risk for them to undertake as the Byzantine 
Empire, although less so in recent years, had been a patron of the city, showering it in riches and 
trading privileges in exchange for Venetian services. In defeat, Venice risked not only their 
limited resources such as man power, but also potentially permanently destroying this 
relationship with Byzantium and further antagonizing an Empire which is positioned next to 
Venice itself. Venice found herself in this position in 1378 during the War of Chioggia, which 
Venice successfully navigated out of, through the superior naval tactics of the notable Venetian 
Admirals Carlo Zeno and Vettor Pisani, who upon entering the battle changed the conditions of 
the battle “in such a manner that the sea and rivers which had previously been closed to [The 
Venetians] were now open, and now [The Genoese] were at a disadvantage.”618 This in turn, led 
to the Venetian quest to establish a land-based empire in Italy, so as never to be surrounded like 
that again. These successful risks, along with the reputation of being skilled sailors and 
craftsmen, provided a nice international renown and respect for some city-states when European 
rulers sought out the expertise of these individuals.  
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By offering a close examination of the powers and limitations of a city-state’s 
institutions, one can identify a how their perceived response might look when one takes into 
consideration that city’s political, commercial, and military institutions, along with the 
foundations in which that entire city was founded upon. These factors shed light on that city-
state’s overall power and their limitations. After understanding these facts about a city, it 
becomes possible to better understand and interpret the reasoning behind state actions and the 
factors that come into play, such as ideology, resources, and the possibility of reward.  
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